Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Assessing Options and Risks
Matthew Bunn
Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
15 November 2007
http://www.managingtheatom.org
Assessing impact on U.S. security
Range of options for next steps in dealing with Iran’s
nuclear challenge
Not about who did what wrong when, which of Iran’s
actions were violations – should be about how do we best
play the hand we have today
Each should be assessed on the basis of expected risk to
U.S. and international security, given:
– Probability of success/failure
– Remaining risks if successful
– Risks if the option fails
No good options from here – choice is among the least bad
Balancing objectives
U.S. objectives:
– No Iranian nuclear weapons
– To the extent still practicable, broad and verifiable gap between
permitted nuclear activities and a nuclear weapons capability
– Addressing – or at least not making worse in a nuclear deal –
Iranian behavior on Iraq, terrorism, Israel, etc.
Iranian objectives:
– Preserving regime, avoiding attack
– Status and prestige as leader of developing, Islamic worlds
– Recognition of its regional power and role
– Economic development
– Civilian nuclear energy
– Nuclear weapons option (or more?)
– Improving relations with Europe, the United States, others
Facts any policy must cope with
Iran has 2000-3000 centrifuges in place at Natanz
Iran has substantial (though not complete) enrichment
knowledge – can’t be destroyed or negotiated away
Intense U.S.-Iranian hostility, distrust
U.S. has many issues with Iran – Iraqterrorism, Israel, etc. –
going well beyond nuclear issue. And Iran has many issues
with the United States
– Limits what can be offered for nuclear deal (e.g., diplomatic
recognition, security assurances)
Many other states – Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Gulf
states, etc. – also have major interests at stake
Iran has huge reserves of oil and gas – impossible to
completely isolate, exclude from world economy
Facts any policy must c