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44
JFQ / Spring 1998
Military and civilian lead-
ers recognize the need to
assign a greater priority
to combat search and
rescue (CSAR). Today a combat rescue
has political and military implications
that range from the tactical to strategic
level. Public concern over casualties
can intensify a situation that involves
even one American life into a major
crisis. Current joint doctrine stresses
individual service CSAR that allows a
joint effort when service capabilities
are exceeded. Although service capabil-
ities are being maintained, the Armed
Forces emphasize joint planning, coor-
dination, and execution of such mis-
sions as the norm, not the exception.
Current doctrine should be revised to
furnish reliable and flexible joint CSAR
support to both CINCs and other joint
force commanders (JFCs).
The military has conducted a
range of operations—occasionally
combat—in recent decades. Public sup-
port for committing forces has been
difficult to achieve and maintain. Air-
power is often perceived as a low cost
way of demonstrating national will
with lower risk than deploying forces
on the ground. While the real danger
to airmen—who most commonly pre-
cipitate CSAR—may appear low, man-
portable and larger surface-to-air mis-
siles have proliferated.
Combat search and rescue opera-
tions are dangerous and complicated.
They normally take place in enemy
territory or contested areas. Time is
limited and knowledge of the situation
is hard to obtain. The decision to con-
duct a search and rescue operation in
unfriendly territory and under uncer-
tain conditions is difficult. There are
many ways to minimize risks to CSAR
forces, but key among them are tai-
lored assets, detailed coordination, and
timely execution. Moreover, it is criti-
cal that such forces be immediately
available, highly trained in search and
rescue, and equipped with specialized
and capable land, sea, and air systems.
CSAR efforts frequently failed
early in the Vietnam War. Leaders did
not apply the lessons of previous con-
flicts or prepare for the miss