1 Reece’s motion for rule on clerk asserts that the order extending the time for
lodging the record did not comply with Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 5.
CR071025
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR071025
WOODRUFF T. SPARACIO,
APPELLANT,
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
Opinion Delivered November 1, 2007
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL; MOTION FOR RULE ON
CLERK
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL HELD IN ABEYANCE;
MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK
DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Attorney Thurman Ragar, Jr., has filed a motion to be relieved from representing
appellant Woodruff Thomas Sparacio on appeal. Sparacio was convicted of two counts of
rape in Crawford County onMay 26, 2007. On June 6, 2007, Sparacio’s trial attorney, Naif
Khoury, moved to withdraw as counsel. The trial court granted that motion and appointed
Ragar that same day. Also on June 6, 2007, Ragar filed a notice of appeal on Sparacio’s
behalf. Following the June 6 notice of appeal, attorney Dana Reece filed a motion to set
aside the order appointing Ragar as counsel. The trial court granted her motion on June 16,
2007. On October 3, 2007, Reece filed the instant motion for rule on clerk, 1 and on October
CR071025
2
5, 2007, Ragar filed a motion to withdraw as attorney on direct appeal.
We are unable to consider Reece’s motion at this time. Under Ark. R. App.
P.—Crim. 16(a), once the notice of appeal has been filed, “the appellate court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to relieve counsel and appoint new counsel.” Thus, because Ragar had
filed a notice of appeal on June 6, 2007, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Reece’s
subsequent motion to set aside the order appointing Ragar as counsel. Consequently,
because Reece was never properly appointed as counsel, she did not represent Sparacio, and
this court will not consider a motion for rule on clerk filed by her at this stage of the
proceedings.
As Ragar has not yet been relieved as counsel, he remains counsel of record, a