What history tells us about our Age of Discord

Peter Turchin
Complexity Science Hub Vienna, and University of Connecticut

Social and political turbulence in the United States and a number of European countries has been rising in recent years. My research, which combines analysis of historical data with the tools of complexity science, has identified the deep structural forces that work to undermine societal stability and resilience to internal and external shocks. Here I look beneath the surface of day-to-day contentious politics and social unrest, and focus on the negative social and economic trends that explain our current “Age of Discord.”

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elite instability Politics Politics violence log log log State elite overproduction drive social instability historical database structural

Peter Turchin
Complexity Science Hub Vienna, and University of Connecticut

About Global Documents

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elite instability Politics Politics violence log log log State elite overproduction drive social instability historical database structural

11/4/2019
1
The History of the Near Future
What history tells us about our Age of Discord
Forecast: growing political instability to the 2020s
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Three major themes
• What are the deep structural forces that drive 
social instability and political violence?
– United States from the 1970s to the present
• All complex human societies experience 
periodic waves of political instability
– a historical database of past societies falling into 
crisis – and emerging from it
• Work in progress and future research
– massively expanding the historical database of 
crises/recovery
– building country-specific models connecting macro-
to micro-dynamics
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Structural Forces Driving Social Instability and 
Political Violence
Mechanism
Brief explanation
Mass mobilization 
potential
When the supply of labor exceeds its demand, the price of labor decreases, 
depressing the living standards for the majority of population, thus leading to 
popular immiseration and growing mass-mobilization potential, but creating 
favorable economic conditions for the elites.
Intraelite 
competition
Favorable economic conjuncture for the elites results in increasing numbers of elites 
and elite aspirants, as well as runaway growth of elite consumption levels. Elite 
overproduction results when elite numbers and appetites exceed the ability of the 
society to sustain them, leading to spiraling intraelite competition and conflict.
State fragility
A fiscal crisis reduces the state’s control of the coercive apparatus (police and army). 
The state’s legitimacy crisis undermines the willingness of the elites and the 
population to defend state institutions against the assault by radical groups. 
International 
environment
Whereas the first three mechanisms are internal, societal stability is also affected by 
external factors: geopolitical (e.g., foreign support for the opposition), geo-economic
(shifting prices of international commodities), and geo-cultural (a successful 
revolution in a culturally similar country).
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Well-being/Immiseration I: Why did real wages stop growing?
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Real wage, Wt , as a function of:
GDP per capita
Labor demand/supply ratio
Extra-economic factors:
norms and institutions
Regression model:
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Full model: GDP, Labor Supply/Demand, Social Norms* 
*proxied by real minimum wage
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Well-Being II: Additional Proxies
• Biological well-being
– average expectation of 
life
– population stature 
(average heights)
• (for other proxies see 
Ages of Discord)
SC Kulkarni, A Levin-Rector, M Ezzati, 
CJL Murray (2011). Falling behind: life 
expectancy in US counties from 2000 
to 2007 in an international context.
Population Health Metrics 9:16
Well-Being:
life expectancy
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(a)
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Height, cm (men)172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
Height, cm (women)160
162
164
166
white men
black men
white women 
black women
Well-Being: Average Stature
(b)
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
Height, cm166
167
168
169
170
171
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Real Wage20
40
60
80
100
120
Average Height (top scale)
Real Wage (bottom scale)
Well-Being: Average Stature and Real Wage
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The Effect on the Elites
• Elites: small percent of the population who 
concentrate social power in their hands
• Declining relative wages means not only 
immiseration of large segments of 
population, but also enrichment of those 
who consume labor – the elites and elite 
aspirants
– elite numbers (and appetites) grow
– high rate of upward social mobility
year
Percent of households
with net worth exceeding:
1 mln
5 mln
10 mln
1983
2.9
0.29
0.08
1986
3.3
0.32
0.07
1992
3.3
0.29
0.04
1995
3.0
0.48
0.19
1998
4.7
0.74
0.23
2001
5.5
1.00
0.32
2004
5.8
1.00
0.31
2007
6.3
1.26
0.40
Proportion of multimillionaires in relation to the total population, 1983–2007 
(Wolff 2010: Table 3) in constant 1995 dollars.
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“Elite Overproduction”
• Growing elite numbers and consumption levels 
eventually overshoot the productive base
– large segments of the elites find themselves lacking 
resources to maintain status
• Since the number of power positions is limited, 
segments of elites/elite aspirants must be 
denied access to them
• Rise of the counter-elites: “surplus” elites who 
challenge the established elites, even by violent 
means
• As a result, elite overproduction drives up intra-
elite competition and sociopolitical  instability
Year 
House Senate 
Both 
chambers 
Millionaires
2000 
1233
191
1424
no data
2002 
1299
146
1445
32
2004 
1212
189
1401
30
2006 
1317
166
1483
42
2008 
1377
168
1545
51
2010 
1897
308
2205
58
2012 
1711
251
1962
48
Numbers of candidates (including the primaries) 
that ran for House and Senate seats: 2000–2012. 
(Source: Center for Responsive Politics, 
OpenSecrets.org)
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2012 dollars200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Cost of Winning (thousands)
Total Amount Spent (million)
The average cost of winning an election to the House, 
1986–2012 (in thousands of inflation-adjusted 2012 
dollars) and the total amount (in millions of 2012 
dollars) spent by major party candidates.
Data source: The Campaign Finance Institute
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Part I: conclusions
• Two major structural trends are undermining 
social and political stability of the US
• Declining well-being of large segments of the 
American population drives mass-mobilization 
potential
• Elite overproduction drives intra-elite 
competition and conflict
Three major themes
• What are the deep structural forces that drive 
social instability and political violence?
– United States from the 1970s to the present
• All complex human societies experience 
periodic waves of political instability
– a historical database of past societies falling into 
crisis – and emerging from it
• Work in progress and future research
– massively expanding the historical database of 
crises/recovery
– building country-specific models connecting macro-
to micro-dynamics
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10
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Real Wage0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Real GDP per capita (2005$$)0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
GDP per capita
(source: MeasuringWorth)
Real wages
(source: MeasuringWorth)
Where do waves 
come from?
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Relative Wage60
80
100
120
140
160
180
data
smoothed 
trend, h = 5
Relative Wage: Scaling Wage by GDPpc
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1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Relative Wage60
80
100
120
140
160
180
data
smoothed 
trend, h = 5
Economic inequality as a “proxy” (indirect indicator) 
of  structural pressures for instability 
Summary of well-being indicators
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Elite overproduction/competition indicators
The “double spiral” of well-being 
and elite overproduction
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Social and political instability in the US
Effect of  structural pressures on 
instability/political violence
Instability Waves in France (Sorokin's Index)
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
Instability Index0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
Carolingian
break-up
Late
Medieval
Crisis
XVII c. Crisis:
Wars of 
Religion,
Fronde
Early Medieval Crisis:
Political fragmentation,
Capetian reconquest,
Albigensian 
crusades
Instability Waves in Rome
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Index of Political Instability0
50
100
150
200
Kingdom-
Republic
Transition
Republic-Principate
Transition
Principate-
Dominate
Transition
Delving deeper 
into the past
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Russia
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
France
England
Romanov
USSR
Muscovy
Capetian
Valois
Bourbon
Plantagenet
Tudor-Stuart
United States
Cycles of well-being/low inequality –
immiseration/high inequality
Russia
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
France
England
Romanov
USSR
Muscovy
Capetian
Valois
Bourbon
Plantagenet
Tudor-Stuart
United States
War of 
the Roses
Hundred 
Years War
Wars of 
Religion
Civil
War
Civil
War
Time of 
Trouble
Revolution
??
Cycles of well-being/low inequality –
immiseration/high inequality
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The pessimistic view:
“Death is the Great Leveler”
Inequality can decrease only by 
major, violent shocks:
• Mass-mobilization warfare
• Transformative revolution
• State failure/collapse
• Lethal pandemic 
Note: I see inequality as a “proxy” (indicator) of  social 
pressures undermining stability, rather than a direct 
cause of  it 
My take: a bit more optimistic
• Entry into crisis (“revolutionary 
situation”) is relatively 
stereotypical
– mass-mobilization, intra-elite 
conflict, state fragility
• The exit from the crisis is 
hugely contingent
– a “fan” of possible outcomes: 
from relatively mild to 
catastrophic
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Sample:
30 societies experiencing 
revolutionary situations 
(Europe, Russia, Middle 
East, India, China, US)
Severity components of  
the outcome:
Population decline
Population decline > 50%
Lethal epidemic
Elite: massive downward 
mobility
Elite: dispossession or 
extermination
Ruler executed or 
assassinated
Transformative revolution
Civil war
Prolonged civil wars (>100 
years)
Territorial fragmentation
External conquest
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Three major themes
• What are the deep structural forces that drive 
social instability and political violence?
– United States from the 1970s to the present
• All complex human societies experience 
periodic waves of political instability
– a historical database of past societies falling into 
crisis – and emerging from it
• Work in progress and future research
– massively expanding the historical database of 
crisis/recovery
– building country-specific models that integrate 
macro- to micro-dynamics
Predicting social unrest/political violence is difficult
“The Soviet Union would not break apart because Soviet 
generals would never permit the dissolution of the state 
they were sworn to defend”
– Jerry Hough, a prominent Soviet expert; October 1991 
Ultimately, the hope that big 
data will somehow yield valid 
forecasts through theory-
free “brute force” is 
misplaced in the area of  
political violence. 
Erroneous Instability Ranking of "Arab Spring" Countries, 2007-2010.
Source: J. Eli Margolis. 2012. Estimating State Instability, Studies in Intelligence 56.
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Multipath Forecasting (MPF) Engine
• Empirically grounded in
historical analysis of a 
massive database of past 
crises/recoveries
• Integrating qualitative 
(“Thick Data”) and 
quantitative (“Big Data”) approaches
• Translating between macro processes (structural 
pressures) and micro-dynamics
– contending rival elite groups, state and non-state organizations 
(including radical ones), and individuals
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General Conclusions
• Structural causes of Ages of Discord:
• declining population well-being and 
growing popular discontent
• elite overproduction, intra-elite 
competition and conflict
• In past societies these structural 
conditions usually end with major 
outbreaks of political violence—
revolutions and civil wars
• We are on track for the predicted 
instability peak in the 2020s
• the underlying structural pressures are 
still building 
37