Evan S. Medeiros
Strategic Hedging and the
Future of Asia-Pacific Stability
© 2005 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 29:1 pp. 145–167.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ WINTER 2005-06
145
Evan S. Medeiros is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, based in Washing-
ton, D.C. The author would like to thank M. Taylor Fravel, Paul Heer, Eric Heginbotham,
Seth Jones, Derek Mitchell, Brad Roberts, Robert Sutter, and Michael Yahuda for their
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. The views and conclusions
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those
of the RAND Corporation or any of its research sponsors.
The United States and China are shadowboxing each other for in-
fluence and status in the Asia Pacific. Rhetorically pulling punches but
operationally throwing jabs, both are using diplomacy and military coop-
eration to jockey for position as the regional security order evolves. Driven
by China’s ascending role in Asian security and economic affairs and the
U.S. desire to maintain its position of regional preponderance, policymakers
in each nation are hedging1 their security bets about the uncertain inten-
tions, implicitly competitive strategies, and potentially coercive policies of
the other. To hedge, the United States and China are pursuing policies
that, on one hand, stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on
the other, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security
cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization pro-
grams. Neither country is openly talking about such hedging strategies per
se, especially the security balancing, but both are pursuing them with mis-
sion and dedication. U.S. and Chinese leaders regularly recite the bilateral
mantra about possessing a “cooperative, constructive, and candid” rela-
tionship, even as policymakers and analysts in each nation remain deeply
concerned about the othe