Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published
a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has
been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is
essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency
operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed
by contemporary experiences.
This manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine
Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You
cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the
Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with
each varies considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains,
remain wars amongst the people. They use variations of standard themes and adhere to elements
of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common
characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns
with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies.
A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to
employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies.
The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It
requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers