1. This chapter summarizes the main conclusions
of this study on the extent of prolonged use, on the
factors underlying it, and on its effects. We then
make a number of specific recommendations de-
signed to counter the ill effects associated with this
phenomenon. An important caveat is in order at this
stage: since the IEO’s mandate is to evaluate the
IMF and not the policies followed by its member
countries, the emphasis of both our conclusions and
recommendations is on the IMF’s role. This focus
may give the impression that the IMF should be able
to solve all problems in its areas of expertise, if only
its interventions and modus operandi could be per-
fected. Clearly this is not the case. There are obvious
limits to what any external agency can achieve, and
the primary responsibility for the successes and fail-
ures of economic policies necessarily lies with the
governments of the countries concerned. This point
was emphasized by many officials we met during the
evaluation and is the essence of ownership.
Major Conclusions
The prevalence of prolonged use and
the nature of prolonged users
2. Prolonged use of IMF resources, regardless of
how it is defined, has consistently expanded since
the 1970s among both low-income and middle-in-
come countries, in terms of number of countries,
share of the IMF’s membership, and the extent of fi-
nancial exposure. In terms of the number of pro-
longed users, most of the expansion is accounted for
by those eligible for the concessional facilities; how-
ever, in terms of financial exposure, prolonged use
of the IMF’s general resources is much larger. Fur-
thermore, prolonged use is persistent, with relatively
few “graduators.” In addition, arrangements with
prolonged users now represent half the total number
of ongoing IMF-supported programs.
3. Although prolonged users have attracted a sub-
stantial share of both the IMF’s general and conces-
sional resources, they were not a significant con-
straint on overall lending since the IMF’s liquidity
position remained comfortable