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Nuclear Safety regulate Nuclear Safety secure Regulatory Energy
Effective Nuclear 
Regulatory Systems
Facing Safety and Security Challenges
Proceedings of an 
International Conference, 
Moscow, 27 February – 3 March 2006
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EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY SYSTEMS:
FACING SAFETY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
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The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute o
the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.

f 
. 
 
PROCEEDINGS SERIES
EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS:
FACING SAFETY AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY SYSTEMS:
FACING SAFETY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES
ORGANIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
HOSTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AND HELD IN MOSCOW, 27 FEBRUARY–3 MARCH 2006
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2006
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STI/PUB/1272
IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems : 
Facing Safety and Security Challenges (2006 : Moscow, Russian 
Federation)
Effective nuclear regulatory systems : facing safety and security 
challenges : proceedings of an International Conference on Effective 
Nuclear Regulatory Systems : Facing Safety and Security Challenges 
/ organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, hosted by 
the Government of the Russian Federation and held in Moscow, 
27 February –  3 March 2006. — Vienna : The Agency, 2006.
p. ; 24 cm. + 1 CD-ROM.  — (Proceedings series,
ISSN 0074–1884)
STI/PUB/1272
ISBN 92–0–110606–8
Includes bibliographical references.
     1. Nuclear facilities — Safety regulations — Congresses. 2. Nuclear 
facilities 
— 
Security 
measures 
— 
Congresses. 
I. International Atomic Energy Agency. 
II. Title. 
III. Series. 
Proceedings series (International Atomic Energy Agency).
IAEAL
06–00455
    

FOREWORD
Over the past 16 years, the IAEA has conducted a series of major 
conferences that have addressed topical issues and strategies critical to nuclear 
safety, for consideration by the world’s nuclear regulators. This series was 
initiated in 1991 with the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power: Strategy for the Future. The conference marked the beginning of a 
global safety regime based on international conventions and legal instruments 
that was supported by a set of nuclear and radiation safety standards and 
related review services. The very successful Convention on Nuclear Safety 
(CNS) resulted from this effort and now has 56 Contracting Parties.
Currently, regulatory authorities and the nuclear industry are facing 
significant new challenges, which require new strategies and oversight. The key 
challenges are the result of the following factors:
To address these challenges, the International Conference on Effective 
Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Facing Safety and Security Challenges, was held 
in Moscow, Russian Federation, from 27 February to 3 March 2006. 
The IAEA invited global leaders to this conference, including both 
government regulators and industry representatives, to share their perspectives 
and experience in addressing these challenges that transcend national 
boundaries. Participants were asked to make their contributions in the context 
of global safety and security standards and methods by which a common vision 
can be achieved.  The aim of this conference was to enhance the global vision 
and commitments among the senior regulators to promote experience sharing 
and international cooperation, thereby continuously improving nuclear safety 
and security worldwide. 
On the basis of the presentations and subsequent discussions, the 
President of the Conference developed issues for consideration by 
governments and regulatory bodies, issues for future international cooperation 
and conference conclusions. 
● Renewed global interest in the use of nuclear energy for electricity 
generation and, consequently, its likely expansion;
● Increased threats to the security of nuclear installations and the need to 
link closely security and safety issues and response capabilities;
● Increased global use of radioactive materials and the need to ensure their 
safety and security, similar to the issues faced with the use of nuclear 
energy; 
● New safety and security challenges from existing nuclear facilities 
associated with ageing and extensions of their operating lifetimes.

This publication constitutes a record of the conference and includes: a 
summary; the opening and closing speeches; the invited papers and the 
President’s summary.  A CD-ROM, which is attached to the back of this 
publication, contains the unedited contributed papers to the conference and 
the slides that were submitted with some of the invited papers.
The IAEA gratefully acknowledges the support and generous hospitality 
of the Government of the Russian Federation.
EDITORIAL NOTE
These Proceedings have been edited by the editorial staff of the IAEA to the extent 
considered necessary for the reader’s assistance. The views expressed remain, however, the 
responsibility of the named authors or participants. In addition, the views are not 
necessarily those of the IAEA, the governments of the nominating Member States or the 
nominating organizations.
The report does not address questions of responsibility, legal or otherwise, for acts 
or omissions on the part of any person. 
The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any 
judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, 
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The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated 
as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be 
construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
The authors are responsible for having obtained the necessary permission for the 
IAEA to reproduce, translate or use material from sources already protected by 
copyrights.

CONTENTS
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
OPENING SESSION
Opening Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
M. Fradkov
Independent oversight: The challenges of effective nuclear 
regulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
M. ElBaradei
Opening Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
I. Kamenskih
Opening Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
L. Williams
Facing safety and security challenges: 
A national and international perspective  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
N. Diaz
Facing safety and security challenges: 
Specific regulatory perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
A. Malyshev
INDEPENDENCE AND REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS 
(Topical Session 1)
Independence and effectiveness in licensing, 
inspection and enforcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
W. Renneberg
Regulatory management system for licensing, 
inspection and enforcement: Regulatory approach, planning, 
quality manual, feedback, and measurement and improvement 
of effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
J. Laaksonen
Meeting challenges through good practice: 
Using the highlights from the third review meeting  
of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to improve national 
regulatory systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
L.J. Keen, J.K. Cameron

Role of international standards and international 
cooperation for effectiveness of national regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71
J.A. Hashmi, M.S. Rahman, S.A. Mallick
Interacting with stakeholders: Generating trust, confidence 
and influence through credibility, responsiveness and values  . . . . . .
87
M.W. Weightman, P. Storey, F. Thorne
Establishment and application of safety standards and 
security guidance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
T. Taniguchi
Legal implication of the global nuclear safety and 
security regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
105
J. Rautenbach
REGULATORY SAFETY CHALLENGES (Topical Session 2)
Adaptation of the South African regulatory framework 
to the licensing of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor: 
Regulatory challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
113
M.T. Magugumela
Approach to regulatory research related to new technologies  . . . . . . . . . .
121
S.K. Sharma
Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the 
Safety of Research Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
129
J. Loy
Balancing risks and benefits in medical applications and how to regulate: 
The role of the regulator compared to that of a physician . . . . . . . . .
137
J. Azuara
Balancing risks and benefits in industrial applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
139
M.Y. Bahran
Radiation focus: Preparation for the regulator to be ready for new  
technologies and applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
147
M.K. Lee
REGULATORY SECURITY CHALLENGES (Topical Session 3)
Synergies between safety and security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
157
I. Levanon
Contribution of State nuclear safety and regulatory authority 
to the maintenance and long term sustainability of 
security of nuclear and radioactive materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
169
V. Bezzubtsev, B. Krupchatnikov

How to deal with the radiological dispersal device (RDD) threat  . . . . . . .
177
M.J. Virgilio
International multilateral cooperation for development of the 
legal basis for the plutonium disposition programme . . . . . . . . . . . . .
185
J.-P. Carreton, N. Hollasky, B. Gmal, A. Petry, B. Sicard, A. Kislov, 
V. Neretin, I. Sokolova, J.-Y. Ravachol, J.-M. Pisani
Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources and of the associated import/export guidance: 
A user’s perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
199
G. Emi-Reynolds, C. Schandorf, E.O. Darko
ICAO safety and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209
M. Kourenkov
Need for an international law of nuclear security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
215
C. Stoiber
ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION 
(Topical Session 4)
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency activities to enhance international 
regulatory cooperation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
237
L.E. Echávarri
Using IAEA safety standards for harmonized safety levels: 
The WENRA experience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
239
A.-C. Lacoste
Multinational design approval programme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
241
N. Diaz
Role of international appraisals and peer review missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
247
O. Mykolaichuk
Nuclear safety regulations and review of new nuclear 
power plants in China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
255
Ganjie Li, Xiaofeng Hao, Bo Tang
Building international information and knowledge management networks: 
Development of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
259
T. Yokoyama, P. Lemoine
REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS FROM THE OPERATOR’S  
VIEWPOINT (Closing Session)
Regulatory effectiveness from the operator’s viewpoint: 
Fuel cycle facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
267
V. Decobert

Regulatory effectiveness from an operator’s perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
273
O.D. Kingsley, Jr.
Summary and Conclusions of the Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
279
L. Williams
Chairpersons of Sessions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
293
President of the Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
293
Secretariat of the Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
293
Programme Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
294
List of Participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
295
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
331

SUMMARY
The conference resulted from a meeting between IAEA Director 
General M. ElBaradei, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairperson N. Diaz, 
and Deputy Head and then acting Chairperson of Rostechnadzor A. Malyshev. 
This meeting recognized that other forums in which regulators collaborated 
were often constrained by time, membership or subject matter and there was a 
need for regulators to have their own conference to focus on regulatory 
matters.
The objective of the conference was to give senior regulators the 
opportunity to discuss ways of improving the effectiveness of nuclear safety, 
radiation safety and security regulation as a whole for the benefit of the global 
community.
This conference was the first of a kind because it brought together senior 
regulators of nuclear safety, radiation safety and security, from around the 
world to discuss how to improve regulatory effectiveness and hence the 
protection of the public and the users of nuclear and radioactive materials. The 
President of the Conference was L. Williams, the Director for Safety and 
Security at the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority in the United Kingdom. A 
total of 216 participants from 57 countries, 6 organizations and 7 observers 
participated in the conference. There were also 75 press representatives to 
cover the conference.
The conference programme consisted of an opening session, four topical 
sessions which were devoted to Independence and Regulatory Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Safety Challenges, Regulatory Security Challenges and Enhanced 
International Regulatory Cooperation, and a concluding panel on Safety and 
Security Outlook: Global Visions and Commitments for the Future. There 
were also keynote presentations representing the view from the perspective of 
both the regulators and the operators.
In the opening session, there were two keynote presentations from the 
regulatory perspective to set the scene for the conference. In the first keynote 
presentation, N. Diaz noted that regulation is done for the well-being of people 
for the common good with full consideration of national interests and interna-
tional law. In the second keynote presentation, A. Malyshev noted that safety 
and security were mandatory for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. He reported that major achievements had been accomplished in 
nuclear safety regulation in the Russian Federation, including the implemen-
tation of effective control and supervision in the field of nuclear energy. He 
concluded that the world community should prepare global answers to the 
global challenges.
1
SUMMARY
The first topical session, Independence and Regulatory Effectiveness, 
focused on the key elements needed to deliver effective regulation of nuclear 
safety and security so that government can be assured that nuclear energy and 
associated technologies can be used safely, that society can have confidence 
and trust in the regulator and that the nuclear industry can be assured that it is 
being regulated competently and fairly. The second topical session, Regulatory 
Safety Challenges, identified some of the key challenges in nuclear safety and 
radiation protection and then discussed how effective nuclear regulatory 
systems will meet these challenges. The third topical session, Regulatory 
Security Challenges, looked at how the regulation of nuclear security could be 
made more effective in the light of the challenges from the changed interna-
tional security situation. The fourth topical session, Enhanced International 
Regulatory Cooperation, addressed the need for international cooperation to 
enhance the effectiveness of safety and security regulation.
The closing session provided an opportunity for two eminent representa-
tives of the nuclear industry, in their keynote presentations, to comment on 
regulatory effectiveness from the operators’ perspective. From these presenta-
tions, the conference noted the following industry viewpoints:
● Nuclear safety is a prerequisite for sustainable development and the 
industry needs effective nuclear safety and security regulation.
● The regulatory body needs to be independent from both operators and 
politics. The regulatory body needs to have effective communication with 
all its stakeholders and command the confidence and respect of the 
public.
● Regulatory credibility is essential and the regulatory body needs to have 
a broad range of skills and experience so that it can understand the 
technology it is regulating.
● International regulatory consistency, especially in relation to the global 
use of nuclear reactors for electricity generation, is desirable.
● Regulatory effectiveness should be given the same rigorous review and 
attention as that required of the industry.
The concluding panel on Safety and Security Outlook: Global Visions 
and Commitments for the Future addressed a question posed by the 
conference president, namely, “What would you do to improve the regulation 
of nuclear safety and security?” The following are some of the significant points 
emerging from the discussion:
● Although costly in terms of time and effort, international relationships in 
the regulatory field are an essential means of moving forward. Regulatory 
2
SUMMARY
bodies should actively encourage the exchange of staff to share 
knowledge and experience.
● This conference represents the kind of dedicated forum in contrast to 
marginal meetings at other events that can have a major impact on 
nuclear regulation and should be regularized.
● The interrelated elements of accountability and communications are key 
elements of successful regulation. They should be identified at all 
interfaces and levels of interaction between regulators, operators and 
other stakeholders.
● Nuclear safety regulation has both technical and political aspects. State 
regulation of nuclear activities and practices requires that nuclear safety 
and security issues receive attention at the highest political level in 
countries using nuclear technology.
● Attention is needed by regulators in all Member States to the essential 
functions of standard-setting, licensing, inspection and enforcement.
● IAEA standards documents are extremely valuable to guide national 
regulatory activities. However, they need to be continually updated to 
reflect new developments.
● Cooperation at the regional level is of great value and regulators should 
meet to discuss regional cooperation every 2–3 years,
● At the national level, nuclear regulators need to address continual 
improvement and quality management and measures to avoid compla-
cency. Sharing of experience and training of a new generation of 
regulators is needed in view of the retirement of many experienced 
personnel. On the international level, partnerships of nuclear regulators 
and harmonization of legal and regulatory regimes need to be pursued.
The conference identified several issues for consideration by govern-
ments, issues for consideration by the regulatory bodies, and issues for future 
international cooperation and made some recommendations. The conference 
also drew several conclusions.
The conference concluded that the delivery of effective nuclear safety 
and security regulation is vital to the safe and secure use of nuclear energy and 
associated technologies both now and in the future and is an essential prereq-
uisite for the achievement of global energy security and global sustainable 
development.
Regulators work for the benefit of the society and therefore they play a 
vital role. To be effective they must be independent and free to make 
regulatory decisions solely in relation to the need to maintain safety and 
security, without pressure from those who are responsible for the promotion of 
3
SUMMARY
the use of nuclear energy and associated technologies, or those who are 
opposed to its use. 
Regulators must be competent and have adequate resources to 
accomplish their mission, which is to ensure the protection of the public and the 
environment, and to assure the government and the public that their nuclear 
industry is safe. The safety and security of nuclear facilities and nuclear and 
radioactive materials requires effective coordination of safety and security 
regulation.
The conference reiterated the importance of continued and improved 
international cooperation to develop comprehensive international standards 
for safety and guidance for security. The conference also stressed the 
importance of wider participation and fuller implementation of the interna-
tional instruments such as conventions and codes of conduct. Continued inter-
national cooperation to promote good practices in nuclear safety and security 
was seen as being essential for the delivery of effective regulation and 
continuous improvement of the regulatory bodies.
The conference noted the value that would be obtained from conveying 
IAEA standards to the regulatory design review and safety goals of new 
reactors.
The conference valued this forum and agreed that the head regulators 
should meet again within three years to review the progress made based on the 
findings of this conference and identify new emerging regulatory challenges.
4
OPENING SESSION

.


OPENING ADDRESS
M. Fradkov
Prime Minister,
Government of the Russian Federation,
Moscow, Russian Federation
Presented by K. Pulikovsky
On behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation let me welcome 
the participants to the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on 
Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems — Safety and Security Challenges.
Recent global developments resulted in the fact that the issue of ensuring 
the safety and security of energy supplies would become one of the main issues 
to be addressed by the G8 within its framework during the presidency of the 
Russian Federation. Atomic energy can, and should play an important role in 
the provision of energy for sustainable development of mankind and global 
environmental enhancement. For its successful deployment, it is necessary to 
assure a high level of nuclear and environmental safety. 
The anticipated high tempo of atomic energy development in a number of 
countries and a global expansion in the construction of nuclear power plants 
define the need for stringent requirements related to nuclear and radiation 
safety regulation and dictate the necessity of strengthening international 
cooperation in this field.
Atomic energy should be used for the benefit of the global population 
with the assurance of the required level of nuclear and radiation safety and 
hence, Russia is supporting the enhancement of the effectiveness of national 
and international nuclear regulatory systems. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that this IAEA conference dedicated to the challenges of nuclear and radiation 
safety regulation is being held in Moscow.
Russia is a country that has extensively been using atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes for more than 50 years. We are grateful to the IAEA and our 
foreign colleagues for the assistance rendered in the improvement of nuclear 
safety regulation and ensuring physical security of nuclear facilities, as well as 
in developing the normative basis for the regulation of nuclear facilities, taking 
into account international experience. 
I wish you success in the work of the Conference.
7
.


OPENING ADDRESS
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT: THE CHALLENGES
OF EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATION
M. ElBaradei
Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna
Presented by T. Taniguchi
On behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency I would like to 
welcome you to Moscow to the International Conference on Effective Nuclear 
Regulatory Systems. I would like to thank the Russian Federation, and in 
particular Rostechnadzor, for hosting the conference.
This conference is the result of a meeting I had at the IAEA General 
Conference in 2004 with Chairman Diaz of the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and 
then Acting Chairman Malyshev of 
Rostechnadzor. The discussion revolved around the fact that other forums in 
which regulators collaborated were often constrained by time, membership or 
subject matter. Nuclear regulators needed a conference of their own, where 
they set the agenda and the work focused on regulatory matters. And so here 
we are.
Last October, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee surprised and 
honoured all of us at the IAEA with its 2005 Peace Prize announcement, I took 
careful note that the Committee’s citation included a recognition of the IAEA’s 
efforts “to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest 
possible way”. The Committee also emphasized that the achievement of world 
peace would not hinge purely on effective safeguards, but would also be the 
result of a global sharing of common visions and objectives. It is in that context 
that I would like to couch my remarks today.
THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY REGIME
The origins of the global safety regime can be traced back to the 
aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, when worldwide consensus emerged 
on two points related to nuclear safety: first, the need for effective international 
9
ELBARADEI
cooperation; and second, the need to effectively separate nuclear power 
development from nuclear safety oversight functions. 
At the IAEA, this led to a sweeping re-evaluation of its role in interna-
tional nuclear safety cooperation, and a sustained effort to assist Member 
States in upgrading their safety programmes on all fronts. Ultimately, this 
reform led to the creation of the Department of Nuclear Safety in 1996, and the 
recognition of safety — encompassing nuclear facility safety, radiation safety, 
transport safety and waste safety — as one of the three pillars of the IAEA. 
During the following year, legally binding safety instruments were 
developed including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, and the Early Notification 
and Assistance Conventions. In the years since, the implementation of these 
instruments has been notable. Most recently, two non-binding Codes of 
Conduct have been developed, one on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 
Sources, and the other on the Safety of Research Reactors. 
In a similar way, the development of a global security regime was 
triggered by the tragic events of 11 September 2001, and successive terrorist 
events in Europe and Asia. These events gave rise to sweeping reviews of 
security measures in many fields, including the nuclear industry. The results 
were seen in a commendable worldwide effort to upgrade national and interna-
tional nuclear security measures. They were also seen in United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and, more 
recently, the strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials.
Today, many of the principal elements of a global nuclear safety and 
security regime are in place: namely, the international instruments, the body of 
international safety standards and security guidelines, strong governmental and 
legal infrastructures, and the strong interest in knowledge management and 
sharing through growing nuclear safety networks. 
THE CHALLENGES FACING NUCLEAR REGULATORS
Most of our international conferences cover one particular industry or a 
given aspect of nuclear technology. This conference is different. The topic of 
“Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems” cuts across all technical areas. 
Being a regulator has always been tough. You are given the considerable 
responsibility of deciding whether someone else is competent and responsible 
enough to use radioactivity safely. You must oversee an industry that often has 
much greater resources than you have. Your power is defined by the laws that 
created your organization, and you must operate within the bounds of these 
10
OPENING SESSION
laws. You need enough technical expertise, comparable to that of your 
licensees, in order to effectively exercise your authority. And as a regulatory 
body, you must be an exemplary corporate citizen, complying not only with 
nuclear laws and regulations, but also with the many other legalities that apply 
to government entities. Even the most independent of regulators must answer 
to its government in at least some respects. 
And although nuclear safety is clearly the responsibility of the operator 
of the facility and the user of the technology, in the case of a serious accident, 
there will always be questions about what the regulatory body was doing, or not 
doing. During any subsequent inquiry, the regulatory body will surely be asked 
some tough questions.
Standard designs exist for nuclear power plants, research reactors, radio-
therapy units and security fences, but every regulatory body has a unique 
design, based on national laws and the industry it must regulate. Some only 
regulate nuclear installations. Some must regulate all uses of ionizing radiation, 
or even non-ionizing radiation. Some share regulatory responsibilities with 
other organizations. And no two regulatory bodies have the same enforcement 
tools at their disposal.
But regulatory bodies also share many commonalities — and it is these 
common challenges and objectives that bring us together here for the next 
three days. Around the world, civil society and the public at large are increas-
ingly recognized as important stakeholders in the work of the regulatory body. 
They demand openness, transparency and input in how the regulatory body 
makes its decisions. 
Nuclear regulators have, to a certain extent, had to consider the security 
implications of the activities they regulate. But today, the security of nuclear 
installations and radioactive sources is very much in the forefront. Many 
regulatory bodies are now taking on the difficult challenge of reconciling safety 
and security requirements. For the first time at an international conference, the 
regulation of nuclear safety, radiation safety, and nuclear and radiological 
security are being discussed as a whole.
The next few years will be particularly challenging for regulatory bodies. 
High-level waste storage and disposal, life extension of existing nuclear 
facilities, the increasing interest in new nuclear construction, and the ever 
expanding medical uses of radiation will keep you fully occupied. 
And it will be difficult for you to operate in isolation. Your performance 
and modes of operation may be compared with those of regulatory bodies in 
neighbouring countries. Increasingly, you will be held to account for your 
decisions, not just by your parliament or elected officials, but by citizens and 
other stakeholders. You must always be on guard to defend against compla-
cency. And you will have to do this even though key staff are retiring and 
11
ELBARADEI
moving on; succession planning is a concern not only for the nuclear workforce, 
but also for nuclear regulators.
GOALS FOR THIS NUCLEAR REGULATORS’ CONFERENCE
Much discussion has already taken place concerning the challenges facing 
regulators and the activities you regulate. It is my hope that this conference will 
take things to the next level. 
I would hope this conference could identify key success factors that apply 
to all regulatory bodies. What tangible steps can regulatory bodies take towards 
achieving these key success factors? What can we in the IAEA do to help? Are 
we learning everything we can from our colleagues that regulate other 
industries that demand high reliability — such as the aviation and space 
industries?
What else should we look to achieve at this conference? First, I would 
hope that the participants would work to articulate the clear link between 
effective nuclear regulation and safe, secure and efficient use of nuclear energy. 
Second, I would hope that practical recommendations could be made to 
national governments, regarding: the nature of legislation needed to create and 
empower their nuclear regulatory bodies, the resources these regulatory bodies 
need to be effective, and the key components of an effective nuclear regulatory 
system. Third, I would hope that participants at this conference would reiterate 
the international commitment to the global nuclear safety and security regime 
— by, inter alia, supporting the implementation of the Conventions and Codes 
of Conduct, and the application of IAEA safety standards and security 
guidelines as the international reference point for the high level of safety and 
security required in the nuclear field.
CONCLUSION
It is a truism that every operator and user of nuclear and radiological 
facilities and materials has the responsibility to conduct these activities in a safe 
and secure manner. It is equally true that national governments bear the 
responsibility for overseeing these activities in a manner that reinforces those 
safety and security measures. 
The concept of a global nuclear safety and security regime goes further. It 
recognizes that, just as the safety and security risks inherent in these activities 
extend beyond facility fences and national borders, so too our nuclear safety 
and security strategies must incorporate international cooperation, assistance, 
12
OPENING SESSION
standard setting, and information networking. We must learn from each other, 
and we must continually stimulate each other towards greater effectiveness. In 
short, we must build a global nuclear safety and security culture. Ultimately, 
our success will only be as strong as our weakest link. 
Your programme committee has worked hard to come up with a useful 
agenda, and I would like to thank them for this. I also thank Laurence Williams, 
Director of Nuclear Safety and Security for the United Kingdom Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority, for agreeing to be the President of the 
Conference. His former experience as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector at the UK 
Nuclear Installation Inspectorate and as chair of the IAEA’s Commission on 
Safety Standards will be of immense help during your deliberations.
I wish you all a successful conference.
13
.


OPENING ADDRESS
I. Kamenskih
Rosatom,
Moscow, Russian Federation
Achieving a sustainable and vigorous economic development and energy 
security in any country or region of the world can be possible only with an 
adequate supply of safe and clean source of electricity. It is becoming increas-
ingly clear that the threat of a deficit of hydrocarbon energy resources and 
eventual interruption of its supply cannot be dismissed lightly. The process of 
reconsideration of existing energy policy and structure has started around the 
world and an active search for alternative sources of energy is underway.
The resolution of the problem apparently lies with the expansion of 
energy sources that are capable of satisfying energy needs without political 
conflicts and on a sustainable basis while meeting contemporary requirements 
of industrial and environmental safety. Not the least important is the factor of 
economic competitiveness of alternative sources of energy.
On the basis of the above mentioned considerations nuclear energy 
appears to be one of the most promising and well established sources in 
comparison with wind, ocean or biomass, though their contribution as 
alternative sources should not be diminished. It is also worth noting that 
without nuclear energy the prospect of large scale use of hydrogen fuelled 
technology will not be feasible. 
There can be no doubt that global energy security directly depends on an 
increased role of nuclear energy in the future world energy balance.
 Fast industrial growth of several developing countries and regions 
already requires the introduction of new energy facilities as well as appropriate 
infrastructure development related to the energy sector. According to an 
IAEA assessment, for instance, 30–80% of the increased energy demands in 
Asia can be provided by the construction of new nuclear power plants. 
In this context one cannot exclude the possibility that a unilateral search 
for ways and means to maintain national energy security and an assured access 
to energy resources could lead to political instability, military confrontation, or 
even a proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. 
The G8 countries, as the leading industrialized nations of the world, 
should therefore assume the responsibility to create mechanisms that can cope 
with new challenges to attain optimal shares of nuclear energy in the global 
15
KAMENSKIH
energy market taking into consideration its role in maintaining global energy 
security.
We strongly advocate unconditional implementation of the 2004 G8 Non-
Proliferation Action Plan in particular the part devoted to providing an assured 
access to nuclear material, equipment and technology including nuclear fuel 
and relevant services in accordance with the market conditions, to all nations 
that meet their norms and commitments in the field of non-proliferation. 
 Further expanding this plan, President Vladimir Putin launched an 
initiative in January 2006, for future development of atomic energy and 
improvement of its infrastructure. The focal point of the initiative was the 
proposal to create an international nuclear fuel cycle centre in the Russian 
Federation under the auspices of the IAEA.
Implementation of this initiative would substantially strengthen global 
energy security in the long run and provide equal access to all nations 
interested in the use of nuclear power and increasing nuclear safety and 
security as well as environmental protection. The most important consequence 
would be a drastic reduction in the potential for proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; at the same time promoting sustainable development of the world.
We are now in the process of preparing detailed proposals for the 
creation of such a center on the Russian territory taking into consideration 
global trends in the use of nuclear energy and potential demands for nuclear 
fuel cycle services including enrichment. It is believed that these proposals 
would facilitate international discussion.
The Russian Federation is a country, which is interested in developing its 
national nuclear energy programme. Energy strategy approved by the Russian 
government envisages increasing the nuclear share of total electric power 
generation in the country to 23% by 2020. A simple calculation shows that to 
achieve this goal we need to put into operation additional capacity of 2 GW(e) 
annually.
Such ambitious developments are not feasible without strengthening our 
national nuclear regulatory system and improving its effectiveness and 
efficiency.
A strong, independent and competent nuclear regulator in the Russian 
Federation will create the necessary conditions for public support of nuclear 
energy and provide confidence to the public on its safe use. The principle of 
exclusive responsibility of the nuclear operator for the safety and security of 
nuclear facilities is incorporated into the Russian laws and reflected in several 
safety standards. This is the general organizational principle for nuclear safety 
and security in the Russian Federation.
Over the years, we created the national system of licensing which was 
used to develop internationally recognized basis for nuclear safety of existing 
16
OPENING SESSION
NPPs and to perform activities on the first generation units further extending 
their operational life. 
Having said that, one cannot affirm that the existing system of licensing 
would be adequate to meet the needs of such a large scale plan for nuclear 
energy development in the Russian Federation. That is why I believe it would 
be useful for the community of nuclear regulators to devote a part of your 
discussions on how to align the licensing system with the nuclear energy 
development objectives of a nation.
Our national experience and the international experience show that the 
safety regulations as well as actual improvements of nuclear safety and security 
should be ahead of any large scale increase in the utilization of nuclear power. 
In conclusion I would like to mention the following. The use of nuclear 
energy for civil purposes for over 50 years gives us clear evidence that it is a 
safe, economic and effective source of energy. Its safety and security, which are 
prerequisites for social acceptability, fully depends on us — personnel in the 
nuclear sector. We know our problems, are ready to solve them and are solving 
them. In Rosatom we have created the ‘Public Council’ to discuss nuclear 
safety and environmental protection issues as well as social problems in the 
framework of nuclear energy development plan. Russian NGOs will not only 
participate in providing expertise to prepare the laws and decisions related to 
nuclear power development but will also be involved in its implementation. 
17
.


OPENING ADDRESS
L. Williams
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority,
Moor Row, Cumbria, United Kingdom
It is indeed an honour for me to be the President of this important 
conference and to share the stage with so many eminent people. The title of our 
conference is Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems, and I believe, therefore, 
that the key theme is the delivery of effective nuclear regulation. What do we 
mean by ‘effective’ in the context of nuclear safety and security regulation? I 
believe effective regulation means the delivery of independent and efficient 
oversight so that government and society can be assured that their nuclear 
industry is operating at high levels of nuclear safety and security that are 
consistent with international norms.
I believe nuclear regulators play a vital role in the delivery of nuclear 
safety and security. The operators, quite rightly, have the legal responsibility for 
safety and security but experience has shown us that this is not enough. We 
need effective regulators to set the appropriate standards, monitor the 
performance of the industry and take action if industry does not meet the 
required performance standards. Nuclear regulators, by their very nature, are 
law enforcement officers and hence effectiveness is not only related to 
technical competence but also legal powers.
International standards require that nuclear regulators must be 
independent of the promotion of the nuclear industry so that their views can be 
accepted as being authoritative and unbiased. However, nuclear regulators 
exist because there are nuclear industries to regulate. Governments and society 
decide whether nuclear energy is to be used and hence the nuclear regulators 
can influence such decisions. If the regulators are effective, then nuclear 
activities will be seen as safe and secure; the nuclear industry will be committed 
to sustained excellence in safety and security performance; and the public will 
not be concerned about nuclear matters. 
If nuclear regulators are ineffective, the safety and security of the nuclear 
industry is likely to be poor and government and society will loose faith in the 
value of nuclear energy. Nuclear regulators can, therefore, make a difference to 
the public perception of nuclear energy. However, I believe a positive 
difference can only be achieved by nuclear regulators recognizing that they can 
only achieve their goals through the work of others in government, industry 
and society.
19
WILLIAMS
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Governments have a considerable role to play in the delivery of effective 
nuclear regulation. I believe, for effective regulation, governments need to 
define what assurance they need, to be satisfied that the nuclear industry is safe 
and secure. 
Governments also need to set the regulatory framework that gives the 
regulators the necessary powers to control design, construction, commis-
sioning, operation and decommissioning. In addition to these powers, 
governments also need to ensure the independence of the nuclear regulators 
from those with the responsibility for the promotion of the nuclear industry.
Finally, nuclear regulation can only be effective if the nuclear regulator is 
adequately resourced. Governments clearly have a responsibility to ensure that 
the regulators have the resources they need to effectively regulate the industry 
and deliver the necessary assurance on safety and security.
THE ROLE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGULATOR
To be effective, the regulator needs to be independent, but how should 
regulators judge independence? I believe independence is not simply a 
separation of reporting lines within government but the guarantee of freedom 
from influence in decision making through the law. Effective independence 
also means acceptance of regulatory decisions.
It is not easy to determine what resources a regulator needs to be 
effective. There is little guidance on how resources should be matched to 
regulatory workload but effective regulators have robust processes to 
determine their staffing levels and the competence, qualifications and 
experience of their staff. 
Effective regulators need to be able to measure the impact of their 
regulatory activities on the performance of the industry they regulate. Again, 
there is little international experience on how regulatory performance can be 
measured. Regulators must, therefore, develop effective methods to measure 
safety and security performance.
For regulators to be effective, they must deliver sustained regulatory 
excellence. Some regulators have effective quality management systems and 
continuous improvement programmes but more needs to be done to develop 
international guidance in this area.
20
OPENING SESSION
THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY
The nuclear industry has a role to play in the delivery of effective nuclear 
regulation. The industry needs to explain what it requires of the regulator. This 
should include an understanding of the regulatory standards, what the 
regulatory goals are and how routine regulatory activities affect their 
operations. Synchronizing regulatory authorizations with the industry’s 
operational needs is an important part of effective regulation.
Industry can also contribute to effective regulation by embracing 
regulatory requirements positively and constructively. By working with the 
regulator the industry can minimize the likelihood of unexpected regulatory 
intervention and hence minimize unnecessary operational interruptions. 
Industry, by delivering sustained excellence in safety and security performance 
can help deliver effective nuclear regulation.
THE VIEWS OF SOCIETY
Society has an input in the effectiveness of nuclear regulation. Regulation 
is effective if the public are engaged in the regulatory process and have 
confidence in the quality and independence of regulatory decision making. 
Effective regulators engage with society to determine how nuclear safety and 
security issues are understood, what society requires of the regulator, and how 
society should engage in the regulatory process.
STAKEHOLDERS
In judging the effectiveness of nuclear regulation there are three key 
stakeholders: government, industry and society. For nuclear regulation to be 
effective, government must have confidence in the competence and judgement 
of the regulator to make trusted decisions. Industry must also have confidence 
in the competence and fairness of the regulator. Society must also have 
confidence in the impartiality and judgement of the regulator. 
THE ROLE OF THIS CONFERENCE
As I stated earlier, this conference is about the delivery of effective 
nuclear safety and security regulation to improve safety and security now and 
in the future. I believe our conference should be meaningful and make a 
21
WILLIAMS
difference to nuclear safety and security worldwide. To do this we must discuss 
the issues and hopefully go away with the message that nuclear safety and 
security regulation must be effective.
CONCLUSIONS
For regulation to be effective the regulator must be seen to influence and 
contribute to a safety and security conscious industry; government accepts that 
the nuclear industry is safe and secure; and finally society accepts that the use 
of nuclear energy is safe and secure.  There is also another dimension to 
regulatory effectiveness and this relates to international recognition of a global 
approach to the harmonization of nuclear safety and security regulation. 
THE PROGRAMME
I believe our conference will address all these issues; Session 1 will 
address the topic of independence and regulatory effectiveness. Session 2 will 
look at regulatory safety challenges. Session 3 will address security regulatory 
challenges. Session 4 will look at the international dimension by addressing 
international regulatory cooperation and the Closing Session will provide an 
industry view and the opportunity for a panel discussion on safety and security: 
global visions and commitments for the future.
At the end of the conference I will attempt to summarize the key findings 
relating to:
● The importance of effective nuclear regulation to the safe, secure and 
efficient use of nuclear energy;
● The key components  of an effective nuclear regulatory system;
● The role of international organizations in supporting the importance of 
regulatory effectiveness;
● Recommendations to governments; and
● Topics for future regulatory conferences.
I will need your help and I will welcome contributions from you in any of 
these areas. Let us use the next three days to explore the issues and really make 
a difference to the way nuclear safety and security is regulated.
22
OPENING ADDRESS
FACING SAFETY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES:
A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
N. Diaz
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, D.C.,
United States of America
It is indeed a pleasure and distinct honour to be here among fellow 
regulators and distinguished guests, to share my views on effective nuclear 
regulatory systems, with a few examples specific to the United States of 
America, and a global perspective. We are all, one way or another, preparing to 
discharge new responsibilities in a changed and changing world; preparation 
appears to be turning quickly to implementation. 
First, I want to thank the IAEA for organizing this important conference. 
I especially want to thank IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei 
for his direct role in making this meeting of senior nuclear regulators a reality, 
and Deputy Director General Tomihiro Taniguchi and the IAEA staff for their 
hard work and commitment to the effort. I would also like to express my 
sincere appreciation to our Russian colleagues, particularly, First Deputy 
Chairman Andre Malyshev, for their extraordinary efforts in hosting  this 
meeting, which is dedicated to the key role that national regulatory authorities 
should continue to play in society, supported by effective international bodies. 
I am confident that the resulting deliberations and recommendations will 
contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of national regulatory 
systems, to new regulatory approaches for the use of advanced technologies 
and innovative designs, and to the development of additional instruments and 
mechanisms for cooperation among regulators in international forums. 
Before I enter into the main topics that I want to share with you, I would 
like to make a comment on the issue of nuclear proliferation, or better, on the 
issue of assuring nuclear non-proliferation. It is now unmistakably true that the 
overriding necessity to achieve nuclear non-proliferation — as a fait accompli 
— has become a dominant issue in international politics, and of course, at the 
IAEA. Its importance to world peace, trade and geopolitical activities cannot 
be overstated. Yet, I will dare to say, that in a grand scheme of world prosperity, 
commerce, and international law, proliferation should not be more important 
than nuclear safety and security. In fact, in a world where abundant, economic, 
23
DIAZ
and well distributed energy becomes a global cornerstone, safety, security, and 
non-proliferation are interdependent components of a better and reliable 
framework for peace and prosperity. Nuclear proliferation should not be a 
deterrent for safe and secure civilian utilization of nuclear power. 
This international conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems is 
more than a gathering of senior regulators and of nuclear technologists; it is 
truly an international assembly of those who implement nuclear safety, security 
and emergency preparedness. The sessions should have a definitive underlying 
theme and purpose that support the objectives of the conference. A common 
understanding of the purpose of regulation in general and nuclear regulation in 
particular, should provide the connectivity between every one of us, 
independent of country or organization. A good starting point for the common 
understanding of regulation would be to note that regulation is done for the 
well-being of our people, for the common good, with full consideration of the 
national interests, and of international law and agreements.
Nuclear regulation is a disciplined national tool for establishing 
predictable safety and security frameworks. It works by establishing and 
improving technical and legal structures to define the acceptable safety case 
that serves the public interest. 
Senior nuclear regulators, you and I, are coming together, in Moscow, in 
winter, in 2006, to make a statement regarding our responsibilities and to 
deliver a series of products, sustained by a common understanding of nuclear 
regulation. Moreover, we are here because we care about our nations and 
because we can and want to work together, better. In this regard, I present for 
your thoughtful consideration here, as a purpose, the objective stated by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its current strategic plan: to enable 
the use and management of radioactive materials and nuclear fuels for beneficial 
civilian purposes in a manner that protects public health and safety and the 
environment, promotes the security of our nation, and provides for regulatory 
actions that are open, effective, efficient, realistic and timely.
With that purpose in mind, it becomes clear why our presence here today 
is important. In fact, as inevitable as day and night, there is supply and there is 
demand. Unfortunately, there are also imbalances that may occur in supply and 
demand. The world is again experiencing that almost forgotten enemy: 
expensive and/or unreliable energy supply. Many times we have seen that 
society is disrupted and people suffer when energy is costly, scarce, or not 
available. The solutions to economic and reliable energy supply are surely 
important worldwide. In the case of the USA, dependence on energy is 
somewhat unique; solutions are needed for the short term and solutions are 
needed that will endure the test of time and crises. Therefore, the USA, like 
many other countries, is reviewing the strategic, economic, and environmental 
24
OPENING SESSION
considerations of the nation’s overall energy supply and openly considering the 
contributions of nuclear power to meet its present and future energy needs. In 
fact, in the USA, President Bush and the Congress have taken positive steps to 
ensure that nation’s energy mix includes the reliability of supply, the environ-
mental benefits, and the steady costs that are now ascribed to operating nuclear 
power plants. Maintaining the requisite focus on safety and security, the NRC 
has the obligation and responsibility to respond to the needs of the country. 
Although our particular needs may differ, you are surely being asked to be 
ready to implement a set of effective regulatory tools that are responsive to the 
energy, economic, and security demands of the present and the near future.  I 
believe that we can agree that every nation of the world would be better served 
by reducing imbalances in the energy supply and demand, and by supporting 
safe, economical and environmentally friendly electrical energy supply that 
meets the global demand.  
Furthermore, our presence here is important because nuclear regulatory 
authorities have a key role to play in resolving the effectiveness and sustaina-
bility, indeed the predictability and reliability of regulatory decision making, 
and therefore, the role that nuclear power could play. Of course we, as 
regulators, have important duties regarding security and radiological materials 
safety in addition to reactors. We all need the instruments; mechanisms; 
resources; and the international, multinational, and bilateral cooperation that 
will strengthen our capability to serve our people better with regulatory 
resolution of issues, with openness, and credibility.
I want to summarize for you where the USA is in two areas that are 
important to the viability of nuclear power generation: safety and economics. 
These two interdependent factors have seen major improvements in the last 
15 years with respect to the consideration of nuclear power in the energy mix 
for many countries. I believe that safe, reliable, and secure nuclear energy has 
been and can continue to be part of the solution to energy security and environ-
mental stewardship, and thus contribute to the well-being of all our people. We 
have played and should continue to play a key role in ensuring the safety of 
nuclear installations, with the technical know how and regulatory practices of 
today for today’s needs.
For over twenty years, specifically during the decades of the 1970’s and 
1980’s, the economics of nuclear power did not fulfil the early expectations of 
the USA or the world. The reality is that commercial nuclear power did not 
have much of a chance to meet expectations during those years. In the USA, 
and most other places, nuclear power deployment took place during the worst 
possible time for large capital-intensive projects. Financial, technical, or 
regulatory predictability was lacking. 
25
DIAZ
The economic situation for nuclear power plants has changed signifi-
cantly and the prospects for new plants have become more promising. Low 
inflation and low interest rates have been the norm for the last few years, and 
low production costs of nuclear generated electricity, including fuel, are now 
frequently highlighted in the press and in the halls of government. Today, there 
is stability in regulatory requirements. The USA’s plant capacity factor and 
total electrical generation are sustained at, or near, all time highs; nuclear 
production costs, at $0.0168/kW·h, are now lower than coal. 
I discussed economics as a necessary part of the global nuclear scenario, 
but assurance of safety is an essential component. The sociopolitical reality is 
that nuclear power needs to be safer than other forms of generation. In fact, it 
needs to be ‘safe’ in both actual and perceived terms. To achieve safe status, the 
US nuclear power industry needs to over achieve both in actual safety 
performance and in how safety is regarded. According to the performance 
safety indicators used by the NRC, the US nuclear industry has achieved 
overall better-than-ever performance. Beyond individual safety indicators, I 
can tell you with confidence that the US nuclear power industry is performing 
with adequate safety margins, and that NRC oversight is resulting in 
reasonable assurance of the protection of the public health and safety, the 
environment, and national security. One of the key responsibilities of nuclear 
regulators is to define the term ‘safe enough’. We all realize that there is no 
such thing as zero risk; therefore, we need to establish adequate safety margins 
while enabling the safe use of nuclear technology.
The improved industry performance has enabled the NRC to initiate and 
implement reforms that are progressively more safety focused. A look at 
licence renewal is indicative of the profound changes made by the Commission 
to regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. The US nuclear plants were initially 
licensed for 40 years, and licence renewal authorizes an additional 20 years of 
operation after safety requirements for passive components and aging are met. 
The picture for the survival of nuclear power in the USA was not pretty in 1997; 
predictions of the accelerated demise of half of the licensed plants were 
abundant. The Commission undertook the task of reviewing the requirements 
for protecting public health and safety in deciding the renewal of licences, and 
thus, served the national interest as articulated in the Commission’s authorizing 
legislation. The resulting improvements in the license renewal process that the 
Commission put in place, along with changes to the hearing process, assured 
the Nation that a fair, equitable, and safety driven process would be used for 
those applying for extension of their licences. Today, 39 licences have been 
renewed and 12 are being processed. Twenty-seven other licensees have 
announced their intention to apply for renewal of their licences. The NRC is 
completing these licence renewal approvals in approximately 22 months after 
26
OPENING SESSION
receiving the applications. This process is focused on verifying the adequacy of 
licensee ageing management programmes. Moreover, the programme has 
resulted in significant investments by industry that directly contribute to 
enhancing operational safety. In today’s energy environment, the 20-year 
licence renewal of 39 nuclear power plants provides a great value to the USA in 
terms of energy, national and economic security, as would be the probable 
renewal of another 39 nuclear power plant licences in the near future. 
In today’s world, to ensure protection of public health and safety, the 
assurance of security is essential. I believe that the NRC has established, using 
a risk informed approach, the key regulatory requirements needed to provide 
added assurance of the security of civilian nuclear facilities and materials in the 
USA. We started early, progressed methodically, and are currently incorpo-
rating requirements into our regulations. These include three important 
security rule makings, planned or under way, to codify security requirements 
for power reactors. The first is the rule making on the design basis threat for 
radiological sabotage and a final rule will be issued later this year. The second 
rule making will amend the power reactor security regulations to align them 
with the series of orders the Commission issued following 11 September 2001, 
and to ensure that safety–security interface issues are properly considered in 
plant operations. Finally, the Commission’s expectations on security design for 
new reactor licensing activities are to be codified in a third rule making by 
September, 2007. The expectation of the Commission is that the lessons 
learned by the agency and reactor licensees pre- and post-9/11 should be 
considered by the vendors at the design stage. We have learned much and I 
believe improvements can be realized without major design or construction 
changes. 
With this backdrop, I would like to discuss what the NRC is facing and 
doing to address the renewed commitment of the US administration and 
Congress to civilian nuclear energy as a means to address the demand for 
economic and environmentally benign electric power, and the expressed 
intentions of the US nuclear power industry. To date, 11 potential combined 
licence (COL) applications for a total of 17 new nuclear power plant units, 
distributed among the three major reactor vendors now competing for the US 
marketplace, have been publicly announced. They appear to be ‘bunched up’ 
for submittal and review in a short period of time. There are, of course, 
significant infrastructure and logistic issues to be resolved by the industry and 
by the NRC, and the time to do it is short. 
In order to review effectively multiple COL applications in parallel, the 
NRC staff is now preparing to implement a design centered approach for 
reviews of COL applications, to the extent possible, for as many issues as 
possible. This approach involves the use, for each issue, of one review and one 
27
DIAZ
position for multiple applications. It could also be called the ‘one-for-all’ 
approach. It is ready for use now; however, it needs the nuclear industry’s 
commitment. One-for-all is once-thorough, comprehensive, NRC safety 
evaluation to be used repeatedly, as appropriate. Using the design centered 
approach, the NRC staff would use a single technical evaluation to support 
multiple combined licence applications for the same technical area of review, as 
long as the applications standardize the licensing basis to a level that would 
make this approach viable. For technical review areas amenable to this 
approach, the staff can complete the evaluation for a ‘reference’ case, can 
determine if the design proposed by other applicants is the same as the design 
reviewed, and proceed to issue the evaluation without further review. Let me 
emphasize, that for each certified design, standardization is the key to making 
this approach work. Standardization is everybody’s business in reactor 
licensing.
The design centered approach could also be applied to parallel reviews of 
a design certification application and COL applications referencing the design. 
For example, NRC reviews for the ESBWR and the EPR designs are likely to 
be conducted in parallel with reviews of the first few COL applications 
referencing these designs. The NRC could proceed with its review of each 
design and issue a safety evaluation report with open items, just as was done in 
the case of the AP1000 and earlier designs. Using the design centered 
approach, the resolution of generic open items in the NRC safety evaluation 
report could be coordinated between the vendor and the applicants for COLs 
referencing the vendor’s design. The resolution of these generic issues could 
then be incorporated into the design and included in the rule making certifying 
the design. In this manner, they would be available to future applicants 
referencing the design. 
I am confident that applying the design centered approach to parallel 
design certification and COL reviews, and relying on disciplined standardi-
zation, will result in a better, more detailed, and more thorough safety 
evaluation for each design. When an applicant references a standard design 
certified by rule making, all design matters within the scope of the design certi-
fication rule have been resolved using a fair and equitable process and need not 
be readdressed in the COL processing. The design centered approach could 
also lead to a significantly higher level of efficiency in the licensing process, 
thereby reducing the amount of staff resources necessary to conduct each 
review.
Could it be done differently? Of course it could, and the law clearly says 
so. In another world, in another time, it might be different. But, here and now, 
the path forward for nuclear power safety, security, predictability, and growth 
seems clear: standardization. 
28
OPENING SESSION
The worldwide expectation for large scale deployment of nuclear power 
is approaching decision making time in many places. However, uncertainties 
remain. The solution to new reactor deployment includes thorough, timely, and 
safety focused decisions by nuclear regulatory authorities. I believe that we 
would agree that this time around nuclear power plant deployment should be 
carefully planned, and key issues and interfaces, including regulatory issues 
must be resolved at the front end, on budget and on schedule, with all the safety 
and engineering know-how developed and learned over the last 25 years. 
Obviously, there are many ways and various scenarios on how we make 
decisions in the regulatory process. Yet, it is essential that we ensure regulatory 
predictability by handling applications in a manner that is expeditious, in a 
manner that assures that decisions on safety and security are clear, and in a 
manner that is fair to all parties. 
We should be ready to utilize fully international and multinational 
resources, including technical capabilities and research efforts, to deal with the 
realities of the increasing ‘internationalization’ of nuclear technology. We must 
recognize that changes in the marketplace, technology, and regulation have 
taken place; international partnerships of industry and international partner-
ships of independent regulators are needed to make a difference. 
At the same time, we should recognize that the world’s regulatory 
authorities and nuclear operators need to maintain a steadfast focus on the 
safety and security of existing nuclear power reactors. In order to meet this 
challenge and the added burden of new reactor licensing and construction, 
innovative approaches will need to be considered to make the best use of 
regulatory and industrial resources. It is frequently stated by the IAEA that the 
safety and security of nuclear reactors, in many respects, should have no 
borders. We need to increase effectiveness by adding international solutions to 
issues, as appropriate.   
As a key example of an international solution to a global issue, the US 
Department of Energy recently announced the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) as a comprehensive strategy to increase US and global 
energy security, encourage clean development around the world, reduce the 
risk of nuclear proliferation, and improve the environment. GNEP is intended 
to develop and demonstrate new and improved proliferation resistant technol-
ogies to recycle nuclear fuel and reduce waste. The USA will work with other 
nuclear nations to develop a fuel supply and services programme for 
developing nations. In return, this would necessitate their commitment to 
refrain from developing enrichment and recycling technologies. In the 1980’s, 
“do it once, do it right, do it internationally”, became a mantra of the industrial 
sector in the European community. This sounds like a usable path for 
29
DIAZ
developing meaningful, effective and efficient approaches for new technol-
ogies, including their regulatory treatment. 
We will share four days in the beautiful city of Moscow; the cold weather 
only highlights the warmth of our relationships and the strength of our purpose. 
Some worry that our differences would impede lasting and effective solutions 
and that turf battles would diminish the benefits we could accrue from 
converging on safety and security practices, and predictable decision making. I 
disagree. It matters not whether your entry point or outcome is through the 
IAEA, or the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, or you used tripartite or 
bilateral agreements, or multiple combinations thereof. We need them all, and 
I believe we use them all, and will need them even more in the future. What 
matters is the resolve of nuclear regulatory authorities to ensure fair, 
predicable, safety driven outcomes for the well-being of our people, for the 
common good, enabling the safe and secure use of nuclear energy and 
radioactive material for beneficial civilian purposes. Furthermore, it matters 
that international and multinational agencies provide strong and sustained 
support to the efforts of nuclear regulatory authorities.
I am confident that our expectations of this conference will become a 
reality, with increased regulatory effectiveness and responsibility, by addressing 
key challenges and strengthening nuclear safety and security through lasting 
partnerships. 
30
OPENING ADDRESS
FACING SAFETY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES:
SPECIFIC REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES
A. Malyshev
Federal, Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia,
Moscow, Russian Federation
Let me welcome you to the conference of nuclear and radiation safety 
regulators held by the IAEA on the threshold of the 2006 Summit of the G8. 
This is not our first assembly for the discussion of nuclear and radiation safety 
regulation issues. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in this 
direction owing to the efforts made by the whole world community, the G8 
countries, and international organizations, especially the IAEA.
The subject matter of our conference is closely connected with one of the 
major directions of the G8 Summit to be held later this year — the concept of 
ensuring the safety and security of global energy supplies, i.e. ensuring the 
availability of reliable and sustainable energy resources to all the countries that 
need those for their further development. Atomic energy has been playing a 
substantial role in the implementation of this concept and in the long term, 
when the supplies of fossil fuels start depleting, its role and scope of use will be 
getting more significant. The main and indispensable prerequisite for such 
large scale use of atomic energy is the assurance of nuclear and environmental 
safety at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, physical protection of 
nuclear facilities, fissile materials and radioactive substances has recently 
assumed special or one could say paramount importance, which is connected 
with the problem of proliferation and the terrorist threat. 
Ensuring nuclear and radiation safety has always been addressed in 
parallel with the development of nuclear technologies right from inception and 
is reflected in the level of scientific knowledge in this field that existed at each 
point in time. The lessons learnt from the accidents and incidents that occurred, 
have stimulated corresponding scientific and technological developments, 
improvement of regulatory standards and the establishment of continuously 
improving regulatory systems for nuclear safety and radiation safety. 
Unfortunately, the end of World War II, had given rise to a confrontation 
between States that resulted in the race to develop nuclear armaments and the 
‘cold war’, notwithstanding the success in the joint defeat of fascism and the 
foundation of the United Nations organization. This led to the formation of the 
31
MALYSHEV
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which could become the first 
international regulator. 
Meanwhile, the regulation of nuclear and radiation safety, both in the 
military and civil spheres, was exercised in each country and this regulation had 
its own specific history and peculiarities. The scientific and technical progress 
made, in the long run, resulted in the large-scale use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, which in turn had an immediate effect on the establishment 
of nuclear safety regulation systems and the creation and development of 
regulatory authorities. 
The cooperation of the specialists of different countries in the field of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy started with the “Atoms for Peace” speech 
delivered by Mr. Eisenhower, the US President, at the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1953. As a result of this, the IAEA was founded. For the time 
being, the aim of “faster and wider use of atomic energy to sustain peace, well-
being and common good all over the world”, declared by the IAEA, was 
playing a significant role in joining the efforts of the specialists from different 
countries in various directions of peaceful uses of atomic energy, ensuring 
nuclear and radiation safety and non-proliferation. 
Nuclear and radiation safety regulation in the former USSR originated 
from the establishment of radiation safety control service at Laboratory 2 in 
1946 (the present Russian Scientific Center Kurchatov Institute). Twelve years 
later, in 1958, the first divisions of nuclear safety control within the Physical and 
Power Engineering Institute of Obninsk and Atomic Energy Institute of 
Moscow were founded. An independent regulatory authority was established 
in 1983 after the USSR State Committee for supervision over safe performance 
of work on atomic energy had been created. Severe accidents at the Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl nuclear power plants had a considerable effect, both in 
the former USSR and all over the world, on enhancement of the safety of 
nuclear facilities, carried out by the nuclear industry and regulatory authorities.
Subsequently, the international community developed the safety 
standards for the use of atomic energy, and facilitated the implementation of 
the basic procedures for the regulation of nuclear and radiation safety. One of 
the fundamental documents defining the legal bases of ensuring nuclear and 
radiation safety in countries using atomic energy, is the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety, which was developed and adopted with the active assistance of the 
Russian Federation. 
The Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy that fully meets the basic 
requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety determines the legal basis 
and principles of regulating the use of atomic energy in the Russian Federation, 
including the terms of reference of the State nuclear and radiation safety 
regulation authorities and the authorities that manage the use of atomic energy. 
32
OPENING SESSION
Thus, the State system of nuclear safety regulation was established in 
accordance with the international obligations of the Russian Federation. The 
regulation of nuclear and radiation safety in the Russian Federation is the 
constitutional responsibility of the federal executive authority. Enhancement of 
nuclear and radiation safety and improvement of physical protection, control 
and accounting of nuclear materials, is taking on special significance due to the 
current challenges to global security, including threats of nuclear and radiation 
terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 
The Russian Federation is taking an active part in the implementation of 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In 2004, the Russian Federation, jointly with 
the United States of America, initiated the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 
and was one of the organizers of the International Conference of the Partners 
in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in conjunction with the 48th General 
Conference of the IAEA. In 2005, the Russian Federation participated in the 
third meeting of contracting parties on the review of the implementation of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. Last year the Russian Federation ratified the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint 
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management. 
The President of the Russian Federation approved the Basics of the State 
policy in ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the country for the period up 
to 2010 and beyond. A number of enactments and orders of the Russian 
Government were adopted, which aimed at the implementation of the 
measures to ensure nuclear and radiation safety, physical protection of nuclear 
facilities, and state control and accounting of nuclear materials. The Energy 
Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Future was approved, wherein a 
significant role is taken by the development of atomic energy subject to the 
condition that ensuring nuclear and radiation safety shall not be compromised 
under any circumstances. A series of federal programs to meet targets in this 
sphere was formulated and is being implemented. 
On the whole, one may note the considerable progress achieved in recent 
years in safety regulation in the Russian Federation. Major results include the 
following:
● Creation of regulations, standards and the regulatory system for nuclear 
facilities;
● Development of licensing and authorizing procedures;
● Implementation of effective control and supervision over nuclear 
activities with the aim of ensuring safety of the public and the protection 
of social infrastructure facilities that are critically important for national 
33
MALYSHEV
safety against natural and man-induced threats with radiological 
consequences.
Progress has also been achieved in the preparation of new legal and 
regulatory infrastructure including the development of technical standards for 
the regulation of nuclear and radiation safety. When developing the technical 
standards for nuclear and radiation safety, the basic international conventions 
and the standards of the IAEA are taken into account. 
The issues of enhancing the overall safety culture to achieve high 
standards of nuclear safety and security; new initiatives on improving the level 
of professional skills of nuclear personnel; and effectiveness of actions to 
preserve nuclear knowledge are still remaining as important tasks to be carried 
out. The work on preparation of regulatory documents related to nuclear 
liability insurance has commenced.
The major approaches to nuclear safety regulation in the Russian 
Federation aimed at ensuring the preparedness for emerging threats are as 
follows:
● Preparation of an appropriate organizational structure of state regulatory 
authority for regulating nuclear safety and security;
● Transparency of regulatory activities and willingness for consultations 
with relevant stakeholders;
● Harmonization of national and international approaches to safety 
assurance;
● Harmonization of approaches to ensuring safety of nuclear facilities of 
different types;
● Tapping the synergies of nuclear safety and security;
● Assurance of nuclear materials integrity;
● Improvement of the level of professional skills of personnel of all 
categories in the field of atomic energy use;
● Assurance of emergency preparedness.
Nuclear safety and security directly or indirectly depend on the 
settlement of the current global problems. The main features characterizing the 
status of the present-day world economy and rising challenges include the 
following:
● Steady growth of demand for electricity and development of large scale 
programmes to meet the needs, including programs of atomic energy 
development;
34
OPENING SESSION
● Deregulation of electricity and energy markets and associated problems 
of safety regulation;
● Globalization of world economy and the concurrent activation of 
nationalist movements and terrorism;
● Global warming, natural disasters, large-scale development of human 
activities and associated growth of risks caused by human activities;
● Growth of environmental pollution and industrial waste accumulation.
This status defines the basic factors ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ that can have an 
influence on the development of atomic energy in the world and the occurrence 
of corresponding challenges and new problems to be solved by the nuclear and 
radiation safety regulators. 
The problems faced by Russian regulators include the following:
● Plans for further significant development of atomic energy and other 
nuclear technologies in the Russian Federation specify the requirements 
for the relevant development of licensing and supervisory activity of the 
regulator;
● Qualitative improvement of nuclear technologies, development of 
innovative projects of NPPs and construction thereof, use of new types of 
nuclear fuel and necessary closing of the fuel cycle will require new 
actions on the part of the regulator;
● The Russian Federation is proceeding with the deregulation of the 
economy, including that of energy markets, which gives rise to new 
challenges for the regulators, mainly nuclear and radiation safety 
regulators;
● Many NPPs and other fuel cycle facilities are nearing the end of their 
planned lifetime; therefore, the measures for life extension, which in turn 
define the necessity of relevant regulatory decisions, are implemented 
from the standpoint of the global tendencies;
● Unresolved problems of threats from past accumulation of radioactive 
waste and spent nuclear fuel are becoming acute. The situation of 
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel storage facilities at NPPs is 
becoming more complicated. The hazard posed by fuel cycle radioactive 
waste causes a concern;
● The tasks of improving physical protection systems of nuclear facilities 
and nuclear materials, in view of the growth of nuclear terrorism threat, 
are becoming more urgent.
The ‘political climate’ in the world and the possibility of implementing 
mutually agreed decisions considering national interests play a significant role 
35
MALYSHEV
in the responses to the challenges of nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA 
exerts profound influence on the safety policy of its Member States. The 
tendency of harmonization of national regulatory approaches and the IAEA 
safety norms and requirements is growing; and international cooperation on a 
wide range of problems related to nuclear safety and security is broadening. A 
broad cooperation of nuclear safety regulators of the IAEA Member States is 
necessary to provide appropriate responses to new challenges. The joint 
activity on improving the regulating principles of nuclear safety and security 
should be based on the general principles of nuclear safety regulation, 
established earlier. The formation of the West European Nuclear Regulators 
Association and the efforts to harmonize regulatory principles, provide positive 
examples in this regard. 
The decisions of the G8 are of great importance to ensuring nuclear and 
radiation safety. In the course of the G8 Summit in Evian in 2003, constitution 
of the Nuclear Safety Group that immediately started its work, was adopted. 
Among the prospective tasks of the group is rendering assistance to the 
countries developing the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in creating 
adequate regulatory systems to ensure nuclear safety. 
The global directions of future actions for nuclear safety regulatory 
authorities were considered and the statement of the regulating principles of 
nuclear safety regulation in the G8 countries was adopted during the meeting 
held in Moscow on 24–25 June 2004 among the heads of the regulatory 
authorities of the G8 countries. It is obvious that the recommendations worked 
out on the basis of the best experience and practice in the field of safety 
regulation and their extensive use are vital for the population of all the 
countries both for the present time and future. 
We are on the threshold of taking decisions on moving forward from 
international cooperation in research and development to global partnership in 
the management of peaceful use of atomic energy and nuclear and radiation 
safety regulation. At the very beginning of the atomic era, the United Nations 
in its first resolution called for the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and liquidate weapons of mass destruction. However, the Baruch 
plan and other proposals on establishing mechanisms for international 
management of atomic energy use only for peaceful purposes were not 
destined to be implemented. 
As long ago as the end of the cold war, a group of leading scientists 
including Chaunsey Starr from the USA, Steven Peck from the United 
Kingdom and Wolf Haefele from Germany repeatedly proposed consideration 
be given to the issue joint international solution to the problem of spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management by creating the so-called Internationally 
Monitored Retrievable Storage System. However, the actual conditions for 
36
OPENING SESSION
facilitating global partnership in the field of atomic energy have appeared only 
recently. The cold war is over and the leading nuclear powers are actively 
turning from confrontation to cooperation. Also, many developing countries 
are waiting for the possibility of obtaining the benefits of atomic energy and, in 
the course of time, atomic energy may become the sole alternative to ensure 
the safety and security of global energy supply. Therefore, the global task that 
faces the world nuclear community and, of course, the IAEA is to contribute to 
the spread of the benefits of atomic energy and at the same time prevent of its 
use for military purposes. 
Various consortia of operating companies for different stages of nuclear 
fuel cycle have already been existing and joint research and development of 
innovative technologies is being carried out under GIF (Generation IV Inter-
national Forum) and INPRO. Being the community of the specialists in safety 
regulation, we are taking a great responsibility for the wide commercial imple-
mentation, in the future, of nuclear energy technologies in the developing 
countries. What technologies will be given to these countries, how the 
supervision over safety assurance of these technologies will be arranged, how 
the nuclear technologies markets will be developed and regulated — all this 
will depend on us. Therefore, we support the proposal of the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission on the Multinational Program of Safety Assessment of 
New NPP Projects.
As you know, a proposal on creating a global infrastructure, which would 
allow providing equal access to atomic energy to all interested parties on the 
condition that the requirements of non-proliferation regime are securely 
observed, is expressed in the opening statement to the conference by Vladimir 
Putin, the Russian Federation’s President. International centres under the 
control of the IAEA are proposed to be created within the framework of this 
infrastructure for: rendering nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment) services; storage 
of spent fuel; and training of personnel for atomic energy facilities. The 
initiative of George W. Bush, the US President, on the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership is equally important. We should formulate our vision of further 
development of nuclear and radiation safety regulation taking into account 
new global challenges and global responses to these challenges recently set 
forth in the initiatives of the Presidents of the USA and the Russian 
Federation.
In conclusion, I would like to stress again that with a view to preventing 
the possibility of severe accidents in future, the nuclear and radiation safety 
regulators should come up with appropriate responses to the emerging threats. 
The world community should prepare the global responses to the global 
challenges. 
37
.


INDEPENDENCE AND REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS
(Topical Session 1)
Chairpersons
S. MATSUURA
Japan
D. DRÁBOVÁ
Czech Republic

.


INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
LICENSING, INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
W. RENNEBERG
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety,
Bonn, Germany
Abstract 
Nuclear regulators should not actively take part in issues concerning nuclear 
energy policy. Their essential function is to contribute as effectively as possible to 
nuclear safety. The author deals with the impact of the following factors on the regu-
lator’s independence: directives of the government, the organizational form of the regu-
latory body, the procedure for selection of the regulators and the independence of the 
technical service organizations. The paper concludes by describing some measures for 
improving regulatory independence and effectiveness.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Last summer, when I heard for the first time about this conference, I 
asked myself, what should be the goal of a conference whose issues have been 
discussed in so many forums before? There are so many frames of international 
cooperation; do we need another new G8 frame for regulators’ cooperation 
besides the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the IAEA, the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety (CNS), the other frames such as the Western European Nuclear 
Regulators Association and the International Nuclear Regulators Association 
(INRA) and a multitude of bilateral and multilateral agreements? And when I 
looked through the agenda, I noticed a very critical statement and I asked 
myself whether my participation would contribute to the effectiveness of the 
German regulatory body. But in the end, I am here. There was also some 
guidance to the speakers that told us what the goal of the conference should be. 
Let us look at the guidance for speakers and support staff; it says that “If 
nuclear safety and security regulation is made more effective, Governments and 
Society will have confidence in the contribution nuclear energy can make to the 
world’s energy supply.”
I asked myself whether it is the goal of the regulator to enhance the 
contribution of nuclear energy world wide. With such an explicit vision for the 
regulator on energy policy, what happens to the independence of the regulator? 
41
RENNEBERG
What happens to the independence of a conference of regulators under such a 
headline?
Further, the guidance to speakers goes on to state that “If the regulators 
are effective, then nuclear activities will be seen as safe and secure and this could 
influence society’s view on the use of nuclear power.” Is it a leading goal of 
regulators to promote the use of nuclear power by convincing people that it is 
safe?
I can tell you what my goal is. My goal as a regulator is contributing as 
effectively as possible to nuclear safety — not more — not less. As my paper 
deals with independence and effectiveness of regulatory functions, I thought it 
would be most effective to make myself independent of that part of the 
guidance to the speakers that we received.
Independence — that is something very difficult. The very heart of 
society is human beings living and working together, communicating and 
exchanging views and convictions. And society means dependence on each 
other. Can anybody say in this room “I am independent?” So the question is, at 
first, what does it mean for regulators to be independent? There are some 
comprehensive answers given, for example, in the CNS and the IAEA 
standards and there have been good results from discussions within the INRA.
But, at first, let me say what independence does not mean. There are 
some environmental NGO’s that are questioning the independence of 
regulators for they are mostly supposed to belong to the nuclear community 
and regarded as pronuclear. On the other hand, there are examples where a 
nuclear regulator is supposed to be not in favour of nuclear energy and 
therefore is not regarded as independent. If anyone of us judges the 
independence of a regulator by criteria such as presumed personal convictions 
or personal attitudes, we would have to answer the question whether we really 
want to investigate presumed convictions; and if yes, which tools could be used 
to verify them. Finally, we would have to be aware that this process would be 
touching the roots of human rights and of freedom and democracy. 
The same applies to the nations, their freedom and sovereignty. If a 
society has decided to prefer other forms of providing energy supply than by 
nuclear plants and wants to phase out nuclear energy then this is not a reason in 
itself to deny the independence of its regulator. 
This is apparently not the opinion of the guidance that gave us the goal 
for this conference. The guidance reads: “To meet the goal of the conference ….. 
participants must go away with the message that nuclear safety and security 
regulation can only be judged to be effective ……when their (the regulator’s) 
Government accepts that the nuclear industry is safe and secure; and finally when 
Society in their country accepts that the use of nuclear energy is safe and secure”.
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