Introduction
1. Growing external imbalances and diminished
prospects for continuing private external financing
led Senegal to seek its first IMF arrangement in
1979. Since then, the country has had an almost con-
tinuous succession of IMF arrangements, except
during 1992–93 (Table 11.1). A short-lived arrange-
ment under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was
followed by four Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs)
during 1981–85. Since 1986, the bulk of IMF lend-
ing to Senegal has been through concessional facili-
ties—a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)
arrangement and three Enhanced Structural Adjust-
ment Facility (ESAF) arrangements—with resort to
regular facilities/resources limited to supplementing
access levels (1986, 1987) or in a transition to a mul-
tiyear concessional facility arrangement (1994). Fol-
lowing the transformation of the ESAF into the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF),
Senegal’s third ESAF arrangement was converted to
a PRGF arrangement in 2000; it expired in April
2002.1
2. Senegal has had outstanding IMF credits and
loans continuously since 1975.2 They increased
from SDR 110 million (174 percent of quota) at
end-1980, to SDR 221 million (260 percent of
quota) at end-1990, and then fell to SDR 205 mil-
lion (127 percent of quota) at end-2001, partly re-
flecting Senegal’s net repayments to the IMF in re-
cent years (Figures 11.1 and 11.2).
3. What factors contributed to this prolonged use of
IMF resources, and what have been the effects? In
particular, to what extent were the objectives of the
programs supported by these arrangements achieved?
To the extent that key objectives have not been
achieved (or achievements have not been sustained),
do the failures represent weaknesses in policy imple-
mentation or in the design of programs? What can be
learned about improving the effectiveness of IMF-
supported programs and avoiding permanent reliance
on IMF financing? These are the main questions ad-
dressed in this evaluation.
4. The evaluation is based largely on an exten-
sive review of (