Indicted ex-FBI informant told investigators he got Hunter Biden dirt from Russian intelligence officials

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Smirnov Russian Official Burisma Official unit state DJA Document Associate Public Official
About Newswire Expert

Newswire Expert is your daily connection to the wire. Covering U.S. and International business, entertainment, technology and financial news releases.
Smirnov Russian Official Burisma Official unit state DJA Document Associate Public Official
 
 
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DAVID C. WEISS 
Special Counsel  
LEO J. WISE 
Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel  
DEREK E. HINES  
Senior Assistant Special Counsel  
SEAN F. MULRYNE 
CHRISTOPHER M. RIGALI 
Assistant Special Counsels 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Room B-200 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Telephone: 
(771) 217-6091 
E-mail: 
Leo.Wise@USDOJ.GOV, DEH@USDOJ.GOV 
Attorneys for the United States 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Alexander Smirnov, 
 
Defendant. 
  
2:24-mj-00166-DJA 
 
Government’s Memorandum in Support 
of Detention  
 
Certification: This response is timely. 
I.  Introduction 
No condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of 
the defendant Alexander Smirnov as required.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(1); see also United 
States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). As discussed in more detail below, the 
nature and circumstances of the offense, weight of the evidence, and the fact that Smirnov’s 
ties to the community are weak establish that Smirnov should be detained.  But, in addition, 
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there are four indisputable facts related to the characteristics of Smirnov that compel 
detention.   
First, he claims to have contacts with multiple foreign intelligence agencies and had 
plans to leave the United States two days after he was arrested last week for a months-long, 
multi-country foreign trip.  During this trip, the defendant claimed to be meeting with foreign 
intelligence contacts.  Those foreign intelligence agencies could resettle Smirnov outside the 
United States if he were released.   
Second, he has access to over $6 million in liquid funds—more than enough money 
for him to live comfortably overseas for the rest of his life.   
Third, Smirnov did not disclose to Pretrial Services his access to these funds.  He told 
Pretrial Services he only had $1,500 in cash-on-hand and $5,000 in a personal checking 
account.  See Pretrial Services Report at page 2.  As the attached bank statements make clear, 
as of the end-of-December, Smirnov has access to more than $2.9 million, see Exhibit 4 
(under seal) and his wife/girlfriend (he refers to her both ways) (hereafter “DL”) has access 
to more than $3.8 million, see Exhibit 7 (under seal).  The latter’s funds are available to him 
because most of the money in DL’s account originated with Smirnov and she pays his 
personal expenses out of her account; in other words, these appear to be shared funds or 
funds controlled by Smirnov, regardless of whose name is on the bank account.  The fact 
that Smirnov misrepresented his assets alone should cause Smirnov to be detained because 
it shows that, at the first opportunity, he did not provide true and complete information to 
Pretrial Services.   
Fourth, as an Israeli citizen, Smirnov can obtain a new passport at any time by visiting 
an Israeli consulate.  The closest Israeli consulate is approximately 5 hours away in Los 
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Angeles, California.  Thus, even if he turns in his U.S. and Israeli passports, Pretrial Services 
has no way to prevent him from obtaining a new Israeli passport and leaving the United 
States using it at any time.   
II.  Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
 
Smirnov was a confidential human source (“CHS”) with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”).  Indictment ¶ 2.  As a CHS, Smirnov was assigned a handling agent 
(hereafter “the Handler”) who was a special agent on an FBI squad that investigated 
violations of federal criminal law.  Id.     
 
Smirnov was admonished by the Handler that he must provide truthful information 
to the FBI when he first became a CHS in 2010 and on multiple occasions thereafter, 
including, but not limited to: 10/1/2010, 1/20/2011, 5/17/2011, 9/14/2011, 8/29/2012, 
11/28/2012, 4/12/2013, 8/29/2013, 1/22/2014, 7/9/2014, 7/10/2015, 9/29/2016, 
9/26/2017, 9/26/2018, 9/27/2019, 3/11/2020, 2/19/2021, 10/28/2021, 10/17/2022 and 
9/29/2023.  Id. at ¶ 4.       
 
In addition, when Smirnov was authorized to engage in illegal activity for 
investigative purposes, he was further admonished that: “Under no circumstances may the 
CHS … Participate in an act that constitutes obstruction of justice (e.g., perjury, witness 
tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or fabrication, alteration, or destruction of 
evidence, unless such illegal activity has been authorized).”  Id. at ¶ 5.  When Smirnov was 
given this admonishment, he signed an FBI form that contained this statement, including on 
10/8/2014, 1/18/2017, 10/8/2018, 1/10/2019, and 8/7/2020.  Id.  
 
Despite repeated admonishments that he must provide truthful information to the 
FBI and that he must not fabricate evidence, Smirnov provided false derogatory information 
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to the FBI about Public Official 1, an elected official in the Obama-Biden Administration 
who left office in January 2017, and Businessperson 1, the son of Public Official 1, in 2020, 
after Public Official 1 became a candidate for President of the United States of America.  Id. 
at ¶ 6.   
In March 2017, Smirnov reported to the Handler that he had had a phone call with 
the owner of Ukrainian industrial conglomerate Burisma Holdings, Limited (hereafter 
“Burisma Official 1”) concerning Burisma’s interest in acquiring a U.S. company and 
making an initial public offering (“IPO”) on a U.S.-based stock exchange.  Id. at ¶ 6(a).  In 
reporting that conversation to the Handler, Smirnov also noted that Businessperson 1, Public 
Official 1’s son, was a member of Burisma’s Board, a fact that was publicly known.  Id.   
Three years later, in June 2020, Smirnov reported, for the first time, two meetings in 
2015 and/or 2016, during the Obama-Biden Administration, in which he claimed executives 
associated with Burisma, including Burisma Official 1, admitted to him that they hired 
Businessperson 1 to “protect us, through his dad, from all kinds of problems,” and later that 
they had specifically paid $5 million each to Public Official 1 and Businessperson 1, when 
Public Official 1 was still in office, so that “[Businessperson 1] will take care of all those 
issues through his dad,” referring to a criminal investigation being conducted by the then-
Ukrainian Prosecutor General into Burisma and to “deal with [the then-Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General].”   Id. at ¶ 6(b).   
Smirnov also reported two purported phone calls between himself and Burisma 
Official 1 wherein Burisma Official 1 stated that he had been forced to pay Public Official 1 
and Businessperson 1 and that it would take investigators 10 years to find records of illicit 
payments to Public Official 1.   Id. at ¶ 6(c).   
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The events Smirnov first reported to the Handler in June 2020 were fabrications.  Id. 
at ¶ 6(d).  In truth and fact, Smirnov had contact with executives from Burisma in 2017, after 
the end of the Obama-Biden Administration and after the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor 
General had been fired in February 2016, in other words, when Public Official 1 had no 
ability to influence U.S. policy and when the Prosecutor General was no longer in office.  Id.  
In short, Smirnov transformed his routine and unextraordinary business contacts with 
Burisma in 2017 and later into bribery allegations against Public Official 1, the presumptive 
nominee of one of the two major political parties for President, after expressing bias against 
Public Official 1 and his candidacy.  Id.   
When he was interviewed by FBI agents in September 2023, Smirnov repeated some 
of his false claims, changed his story as to other of his claims, and promoted a new false 
narrative after he said he met with Russian officials.  Id. at ¶ 6(e).   
 
On February 14, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Central District of California 
returned a two-count indictment charging Smirnov with one count of making false 
statements to federal law enforcement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count One) and; 
one count of fabricating information in a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1519 (Count Two).  United States v. Smirnov, Cr. No. 2:24-cr-00091-ODW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
14, 2024, ECF 1).     
 
That same day, Smirnov was arrested in the District of Nevada as he returned to the 
United States on an international flight.  Smirnov was scheduled to leave the United States 
two days later, on February 16, 2024, for a months-long, multi-country trip that, by his own 
description, involved meetings with officials of foreign intelligence agencies and 
governments.  During his custodial interview on February 14, Smirnov admitted that officials 
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associated with Russian intelligence were involved in passing a story about Businessperson 
1.   
 
On February 15, 2024, Smirnov had an initial appearance in the District of Nevada.  
At that time the government moved for detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(a) and 
(b) on the basis that Smirnov posed a serious risk of flight and a serious risk of obstruction of 
justice.  The Government requested a three (3) day continuance of the detention hearing, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). A detention hearing is scheduled for February 20, 2024.   
III.  Points and Authorities 
 
The facts before the Court establish that there are no conditions or combination of 
conditions that will reasonably assure Smirnov’s appearance.  Therefore, Smirnov should be 
detained pending trial.   
Detention is appropriate where a defendant is either a danger to the community or a 
flight risk; it is not necessary to prove both. United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1508-10 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142 (hereafter the “Bail Reform Act”) specifically 
provides, in relevant part, that “the judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are 
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required” 
consider the following factors:  
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged …; 
 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 
 
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including— 
 
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, 
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, 
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, 
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; … 
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18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015).    
A finding that that there are no conditions that will reasonably assure a defendant’s 
appearance need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence.  Santos-Flores, 
794 F.3d at 1090; United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.1991); Motamedi, 
767 F.2d at 1407. “More finely put, this means that the Government must demonstrate 
that it is more likely than not that there is a serious risk that the defendant will flee, 
not that it is more likely than not that the defendant will flee.” United States v. Figueroa-
Alvarez, No. 4:23-CR-00171-DCN, 2023 WL 4485312, at *5 (D. Idaho July 10, 2023); 
see United States v. Duarte-Vela, No. 2:23-cr-00009-TOR-1, Amended Order Following 
Status Hearing Regarding Detention and Detention Hearing at 7 (Dkt. 32) (E.D. Wa. 
Jan. 25, 2023); Alvarenga-Canan, No. 1:23-cr-00042-BLW, Tr. at 7 (Dkt. 26) (“It's got 
to be 51 percent of a serious risk.”). 
A. 
Smirnov is charged with lying to law enforcement and fabricating evidence.  
            The nature and circumstances of the offense make clear that there are no conditions 
of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of Smirnov.  Pretrial supervision is, at 
its core, based on trust.  Pretrial Services must trust a defendant to abide by the conditions 
the court imposes and to accurately report information requested by Pretrial Services as they 
attempt to police those conditions.  The circumstances of the offenses charged—that Smirnov 
lied to his FBI Handler after a 10-year relationship where the two spoke nearly every day—
means that Smirnov cannot be trusted to provide truthful information to Pretrial Services.  
Critically, Smirnov lied to his FBI Handler after repeated admonishments that the 
information he provided to the FBI must be truthful.  And the false information he provided 
was not trivial.  It targeted the presumptive nominee of one of the two major political parties 
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in the United States.  The effects of Smirnov’s false statements and fabricated information 
continue to be felt to this day.  Now the personal stakes for Smirnov are even higher.  His 
freedom is on the line.  If he could not be trusted to report truthful information to his FBI 
Handler, he cannot be trusted to report truthful information to Pretrial Services.   
B. 
The weight of the evidence against Smirnov is strong. 
As described in the indictment, the evidence against Smirnov is strong.   
Smirnov is charged with lying to the FBI about two meetings in late 2015/2016 and 
two phone calls in 2016/2017 and 2019.  Specifically, Smirnov told the FBI in 2020 that “in 
late 2015/2016 during the Obama/Biden Administration” he first met with Burisma Official 
2 and that at that meeting Burisma Official 2 told him that they hired Businessperson 1 to 
“protect us, through his dad, from all kinds of problems.”  Indictment at ¶ 24.   
Smirnov also claimed that he met with Burisma Official 1 “one or two months later,” 
around the time “[Public Official 1] made a public statement about [the then-Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General] being corrupt, and that he should be fired/removed from office,” which 
occurred on December 9, 2015, and that at that meeting Burisma Official 1 admitted that he 
had paid Businessperson 1 $5 million and Public Official 1 $5 million each so that 
“[Businessperson 1] will take care of all those issues through his dad,” referring to the then-
Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s investigation into Burisma, and to “deal with [the then-
Ukrainian Prosecutor General].”  Id.       
The evidence at trial will establish that no such statements were made to Smirnov 
because, in truth and fact, Smirnov met with officials from Burisma for the first time in 2017, 
after Public Official 1 left office in January 2017, and after the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor 
General had been fired in February 2016.  Id. at ¶29.  The evidence at trial will show 
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Smirnov’s story to the FBI was a fabrication, an amalgam of otherwise unremarkable 
business meetings and contacts that had actually occurred but at a later date than he claimed 
and for the purpose of pitching Burisma on Smirnov’s services and products, not for 
discussing bribes to Public Official 1 when he was in office.   
Smirnov began to pursue business opportunities with Burisma in spring 2017, at the 
earliest, through two associates of his.  Id. at ¶30.  Associate 1 was a Ukrainian business 
consultant.  Id. at ¶ 30(a).  He was introduced to Smirnov by a mutual acquaintance who 
told Associate 1 that Smirnov was an expert in IPOs in the United States.  Id.  Smirnov and 
Associate 1 subsequently met in Kiev, Ukraine, and Smirnov asked Associate 1 to connect 
him to businesses in Ukraine interested in IPOs in the United States.  Id.  Associate 1 
subsequently identified Burisma as such a company.  Id.  Associate 2 was an American who 
owned a cryptocurrency business.  Id. at ¶ 30(b).  In the spring of 2017, Smirnov presented 
Burisma to Associate 2 as a company that might be interested in a cryptocurrency product 
Associate 2 was trying to commercialize.  Id.  Around this time, Smirnov sent Associate 2 a 
link to the Board of Directors of Burisma.  Id.  Smirnov specifically called out the fact that 
Businessperson 1 was on the Board and indicated that because Businessperson 1 was on the 
Board, Smirnov thought Burisma was a company with which they could do business.  Id.   
Between March 2017, when Smirnov first reported on Burisma to the Handler, and 
June 2020, when he first made his false claims about bribes paid to Public Official 1 when he 
was in office, directly and through his son Businessperson 1, Smirnov had a series of routine 
business contacts with executives at Burisma.  Id. at ¶ 31.  All of these contacts occurred in 
2017 and 2018, when Public Official 1 was out of office and after the then-Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General had been fired.  Id.   
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The same day that he first reported on Burisma, March 1, 2017, Smirnov messaged 
the Handler a photograph of a business card for Burisma Official 2.  Id. at ¶ 31(a).   
 
In response, on that same day, the Handler asked Smirnov, “How’s [Burisma Official 
2] fit into the story”, to which Smirnov responded, “This is the guy that will do the public 
company from there [sic.] side.”  Id. at ¶ 31(b).   
The Handler then messaged Smirnov, “Looks like the CEO or Owner might be 
[Burisma Official 1] or [].  Either sound familiar?”, to which Smirnov responded with the 
first name of Burisma Official 1.  Id. at ¶ 31(c).  The Handler then asked Smirnov whether 
he was meeting with Burisma Official 1, to which Smirnov responded, “No.  The guy that I 
send [sic.] you the business card.”  Id.   
On April 13, 2017, the Handler messaged Smirnov asking him, “U know who from 
Burisma will be in the meeting,” to which Smirnov responded, “Not yet Will know after we 
[sic.] I will get the email.”  Id. at ¶ 31(d).   
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Four days later, on April 17, 2017, Associate 1 sent Smirnov and Burisma Official 2 
an email introducing them to each other.  Id. at ¶ 31(e).   
 
That same day, Associate 1 sent another email to Burisma Official 2 summarizing, in 
general terms, how a company could undertake an IPO in the United States.  Id. at ¶ 31(f).   
On or about April 27, 2017, Burisma Official 2 responded to Associate 1’s April 17, 
2017, email.  Burisma Official 2 thanked Associate 1 for introducing him to Smirnov and 
promised to send Smirnov and Associate 1 information about Burisma’s desire to buy an oil 
and gas company in the United States.  Id. at ¶ 31(g).   
On or around May 11, 2017, Burisma Official 4, another Burisma executive, emailed 
Associate 1 telling him that Burisma was not interested in pursuing an IPO in the United 
States and that their priority was acquiring a U.S.-based oil and gas company.  Id. at ¶ 31(h).   
Seven days later, on or about May 18, 2017, Associate 1 forwarded Burisma Official 
4’s email to Smirnov.  Id. at ¶ 31(i).   
On July 24, 2017, Smirnov messaged the Handler, “Cutting a deal with Burisma  Will 
update you soon bro” and “It’s gonna be a contract so we can review it first.”  Id. at ¶ 31(j).   
On September 16, 2017, Associate 2, the individual whom Smirnov claimed in the 
2020 1023 attended the first meeting Smirnov had with Burisma executives in late 2015 or 
early 2016, flew from New York to Kiev, via London.  Id. at ¶ 31(k).  Associate 2 remained 
in Ukraine until September 23, 2017, when he returned to the United States through London.  
Id.   
During the six (6) day period that Associate 2 was in Ukraine, he and Smirnov met 
with representatives from Burisma, including Burisma Official 3, the daughter of Burisma’s 
owner Burisma Official 1, to discuss a cryptocurrency product.  Id. at ¶ 31(l).  The meeting 
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was in Russian, and on the drive back from Burisma’s headquarters, Smirnov described to 
Associate 2 what had been discussed.  Id.  Smirnov told Associate 2 that the Burisma 
representatives were not interested in the cryptocurrency product Smirnov and Associate 2 
were selling and were instead trying to find an oil and gas company in the United States that 
Burisma could purchase.  Id.  Smirnov did not describe to Associate 2 any discussion of 
Businessperson 1 or Public Official 1 during this meeting.  Id. 
On September 19, 2017, Smirnov messaged the Handler photographs of business 
cards for Burisma Official 3, the person Smirnov claimed he met at the first meeting in late 
2015 and or 2016 during the Obama-Biden Administration, and Burisma Official 4, the 
individual who had sent an email to Associate 1, which Associate 1 then forwarded to 
Smirnov, in May 2017, as described above.  Id. at ¶ 31(m).   
After the September 2017 meeting, Associate 2 prepared a document outlining steps 
that Burisma could take in order to acquire a company in the United States and use it for an 
IPO.  Id. at ¶ 31(n).  Associate 2 sent this document to Smirnov on September 22, 2017.  Id.   
Associate 2’s trip to Kiev in September 2017 was the first time he had left North 
America since 2011.  Id. at ¶ 31(o).  Associate 2’s travel records conclusively establish that 
fact.  Thus, he could not have attended a meeting in Kiev, as Smirnov claimed, in late 2015 
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or early 2016, during the Obama-Biden Administration.  Id.  His trip to Ukraine in September 
2017 was more than seven months after Public Official 1 had left office and more than a year 
after the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General had been fired.  Id.   
On January 23, 2018, Associate 2 flew from Los Angeles to London.  Id. at ¶ 31(p).  
During the previous week, on January 16, 2018, Smirnov messaged Associate 2 asking him, 
“Brother Send me the name of the place in London please,” to which Associate 2 replied, 
“Baglioni.”  Id.  On January 25, 2018, Smirnov attempted to call Associate 2.  Id.  Associate 
2 responded, “Downstairs getting breakfast,” and Smirnov responded, “Cool.  See you in a 
few.”  Id.  Both Smirnov and Associate 2 were staying at the Hotel Baglioni in London at 
that time.  Id.  When Associate 2 was with Smirnov in London, Smirnov told Associate 2 
that he had received a call from the owner of Burisma, Burisma Official 1, and that Burisma 
Official 1 was interested in doing business with them.  Id.    
On January 26, 2018, Associate 2 flew from London to Kiev, staying until January 
30, 2018.   Id. at ¶ 31(q).   
During that five (5) day period, Smirnov and Associate 2 traveled to Burisma’s 
headquarters.  Id. at ¶ 31(r).  Once there, they had a brief meeting with Burisma Official 2, 
who told them that Burisma was not interested in their cryptocurrency product.  Id.   Burisma 
Official 2 spoke English during the meeting, and Associate 2 was able to participate.  Id.   At 
no point during this meeting between Smirnov, Associate 2, and Burisma Official 2 did 
Burisma Official 2 tell Smirnov that Burisma had hired Businessperson 1 to “protect us, 
through his dad, from all kinds of problems.” Id.    
All the contacts that Smirnov had with Burisma occurred no earlier than spring 2017, 
after the end of the Obama-Biden Administration.  Id. at ¶ 32.  Notably, Smirnov was only 
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introduced to Burisma Official 2, via email, on or about April 17, 2017.  Id.   Therefore, 
Smirnov’s claim that he had met with Burisma Official 2 in “late 2015 or 2016, during the 
Obama/Biden administration,” was false because if Smirnov had met Burisma Official 2 
then, he would not have needed Associate 1 to introduce him to Burisma Official 2 in April 
2017, and Burisma Official 2 would not have thanked Associate 1 for introducing them in 
April 2017.    Id.    
As to the second meeting, the one that supposedly happened in Vienna, contrary to 
what Smirnov told the Handler, Associate 1 did not meet with Smirnov and Burisma Official 
1 at a café in Vienna around the time that Public Official 1 “made a public statement about 
[the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General] being corrupt, and that he should be fired/removed 
from office,” which occurred in December 2015.  Id. at ¶ 33.  In fact, Associate 1 has never 
met or spoken with Burisma Official 1.  Id.  
Further, based on his own travel records, Smirnov did not travel to Vienna “around 
the time [Public Official 1] made a public statement about [the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor 
General] being corrupt, and that he should be fired/removed from office,” which occurred 
in December 2015.  Id. at ¶ 34.   
As to the two phone calls Smirnov claimed to have in “2016/2017” and 2019, 
Smirnov told his Handler that Burisma Official 1 said he was “pushed to pay” Public Official 
1 and Businessperson 1, had text messages and recordings that show he was coerced to make 
such payments, and it would take investigators ten years to find the records of illicit payments 
to Public Official 1.    Id. at ¶57(c) and (d).  When Smirnov was interviewed by the FBI in 
September 2023, he reversed himself and said he did not speak to Burisma Official 1 on the 
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phone after they met in a German speaking country in early 2016.  Id. at ¶ 49.  Further, 
Associate 1 has never spoke to Burisma Official 1.  Id. at ¶ 36.   
In sum, Smirnov’s own travel records, emails and messages with his Handler, along 
with emails and travel records of the individuals who Smirnov claimed to have attended the 
two meetings with him, will all be used as evidence against him.  Further, the individuals 
who participated in these meetings and phone calls will refute that there was ever any 
discussion of Public Official 1 or Businessperson 1 in those meetings or any phone calls at 
all.   
C. 
The history and characteristics of Smirnov make clear that no conditions can 
reasonably assure his appearance.   
Smirnov’s personal history and characteristics also weigh in favor of detention. 
Smirnov has very weak ties to the community in Las Vegas.  He has only lived in Las Vegas 
since 2022.  Pretrial Services Report at 1.  The condominium where he lives is owned by DL, 
a fact about which he lied, as will be addressed below.  Exhibit 1 (under seal).  He has no 
family in Las Vegas.  To the contrary, he reports that his mother, father, and sister all reside 
in Israel.  Id.  Smirnov lived in Israel from 1992 to 2006, longer than he has lived in the United 
States.  Id.  He does not report any employment that is located in Las Vegas.  Instead, he 
claims to have a “security business,” that is registered in California, where he used to live.  
See Pretrial Services Report at 2.  DL, with whom he lives, does not appear to even know 
what he does.  Id.  Nor do his bank records reflect that he is in the “security business,” as he 
claims.  Id.  Instead, the statements for the accounts he controls show large wire transfers from 
what appear to be venture capital firms and individuals.  See Exhibit 4 (under seal).        
 
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1. Smirnov claims to have contact with foreign intelligence agencies.   
While Smirnov has no ties to the community in Las Vegas, what he does have is 
extensive foreign ties, including, most troublingly and by his own account, contact with 
foreign intelligence services, including Russian intelligence agencies, and has had such 
contacts recently.  Smirnov could use these contacts to resettle outside the United States.   
As noted, law enforcement knows about Smirnov’s contact with officials affiliated 
with Russian intelligence because Smirnov himself reported on a number of those contacts 
to his FBI Handler.  As described below, these contacts are extensive and extremely recent, 
and Smirnov had the intention of meeting with one of these officials on his upcoming 
planned overseas travel. 
Of particular note, Smirnov has reported numerous contacts with Russian Official 1, 
who has been described by Smirnov in a number of ways, including as the son of a former 
high-ranking Russian government official, someone who purportedly controls two groups 
of individuals tasked with carrying out assassination efforts in a third-party country, a 
Russian representative to another country, and as someone with ties to a particular Russian 
intelligence service.  This latter fact was reported by Smirnov in October, 2023. 
In December 2023, Smirnov reported to his Handler about a recent overseas trip, 
where Smirnov attended a meeting with Russian Official 2, who Smirnov has described as a 
high-ranking member of a specific Russian foreign intelligence service.  According to 
Smirnov, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a potential resolution to Russia’s war 
against Ukraine.  During this same trip, Smirnov apparently attended a separate meeting 
with Russian Official 1, the individual who controls groups that are engaged in overseas 
assassination efforts.  During this meeting with Russian Official 1, Russian Official 1 claimed 
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that another individual, Russian Official 4, the head of a particular unit of a Russian 
Intelligence Service, ran an intelligence operation at a “club” located at a particular hotel. 
Smirnov told the FBI Handler that the Russian Intelligence Service intercepted cell phone 
calls made by guests at the hotel. The Russian Intelligence Service intercepted several calls 
placed by prominent U.S. persons the Russian government may use as “kompromat” in the 
2024 election, depending on who the candidates will be.  As described below, this story, 
which again was relayed by Smirnov to his Handler in/about December, 2023, appears to 
mirror the story that Smirnov was pushing on investigators and prosecutors during their 
meeting with him in September, 2023 (in which Smirnov pushed investigators to look into 
whether Businessperson 1 had been recorded in a foreign hotel).   
Most recently, Smirnov has reported: 
a. Meetings in or about December 2023, outside the United States, between top 
officials of another country and Russian officials;  
b. Contact with a Russian official on November 27, 2023, where the Russian 
official provided Smirnov with information on his knowledge of certain 
Russian military operations in a third country; and  
c. Contact with a Russian intelligence service operative and top Russian 
representative to a third country on November 8, 2023.    
Exhibit 2.   
The following is a declassified summary of additional contacts that predate the 
contacts referenced above and in Exhibit 2.  This summary was prepared by the FBI and 
taken from several reports he made to the FBI:  
 
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1. (U//FOUO) (Document 1) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about October 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following: 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV was invited to and planned to attend the 
birthday party of an identified individual in the Middle East, 
COUNTRY A, which would include activities on a mega yacht 
owned by a high-ranking member of Russia’s largest steel and 
mining company. SMIRNOV provided the names of individuals 
who might attend the birthday activities, including RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1, who he identified as the son of a high-ranking former 
Russian government official, and RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 1, a 
high-ranking member of a Russia state-owned defense 
conglomerate. 
    
2. (U//FOUO) (Document 2) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about January 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following: 
i. (U//FOUO) In December 2022, SMIRNOV learned from a Russian 
Foreign Intelligence official the whereabouts of a particular Russian 
Foreign Intelligence officer living outside of Russia.   
ii. (U//FOUO) In or about January 2023, SMIRNOV spoke to another 
Russian Foreign Intelligence officer who provided the first name of 
the Russian Foreign Intelligence officer living outside of Russia. 
  
3. (U//FOUO) (Document 3) 
a. (U//FOUO) On or about August 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following: 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV had been introduced to RUSSIAN 
INDIVIDUAL 2, a high-ranking member of a Russian steel 
company.  RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 2 was organizing a birthday 
party for another person on RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 2’s mega 
yacht.  RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 2 mentioned that two of the 
oligarchs who would be attending the party have “connections” or 
“business ties” to a high-ranking member of a Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2. Because of the 
language used by RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 2, SMIRNOV was not 
clear about the precise nature of the relationship between the 
identified Russian oligarchs and RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2, a high-
ranking member of a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. 
  
4. (U//FOUO) (Document 4) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about October 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information (this information was provided to supplement Document 1): 
i. (U//FOUO) The planned COUNTRY A birthday party may be 
attended by RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1, the son of a former high-
ranking Russian government official.  An associate of SMIRNOV 
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provided SMIRNOV with a copy of RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1’s 
passport. 
 
5. (U//FOUO) (Document 5) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about November 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information: 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV learned from RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 
himself, that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 has direct access to the 
highest levels of the Russian government. Although RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1’s father was a former high-ranking government 
official in Russia, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1’s access to the highest 
levels of the Russian government is direct, and not through his 
father. 
ii. (U//FOUO) RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 is a top, unofficial 
representative of Russia to COUNTRY B. 
iii. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV provided a photograph of RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1 taken in or about November 2023, during RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1’s visit to COUNTRY A. 
  
6. (U//FOUO) (Document 6) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about November 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information: 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV learned from sources, including RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1, that a particular individual, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 3, 
is the representative of the former head of a particular unit of a 
Russian Intelligence Service, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 4. 
ii. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV provided information about RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 4’s chain of command.  SMIRNOV named three 
individuals who have direct, immediate access to the highest levels 
of the Russian government, including the father of RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1. 
 
7. (U//FOUO) (Document 7) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about December 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information (which is also reported in Document 6). 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV learned from sources, including RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1, that a particular individual, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 3, 
is the representative of the former head of a particular unit of a 
Russian Intelligence Service, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 4. 
 
8. (U//FOUO) (Document 8) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about November 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information: 
i. (U//FOUO) In October 2023, SMIRNOV had in-person 
conversations with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 overseas.  During these 
conversations, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 discussed his knowledge 
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and seeming control of two groups of Russian operatives who were 
previously tasked with the assassination of a high-ranking official of 
COUNTRY C.  RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 offered to stop the 
assassination efforts in exchange for certain things, including an 
agreement by COUNTRY C to stop targeting civilian-family-
members of certain Russian officials living in Moscow. 
ii. (U//FOUO) RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 also provided SMIRNOV with 
specific information about Russia’s military resources for a winter 
attack in COUNTRY C. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 also told 
SMIRNOV about the Russian government’s intentions for their war 
in Ukraine. 
 
9. (U//FOUO) (Document 9) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about December 2023, SMIRNOV reported the following 
information: 
i. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV attended a meeting in COUNTRY A in 
December 2023 that was attended by RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2, a 
high-ranking member of a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The 
primary purpose of the meeting was to discuss a potential resolution 
to the Russia-Ukraine war.  
ii. (U//FOUO) On this same trip, SMIRNOV attended another meeting 
with, among others, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1. 
iii. (U//FOUO) Unrelated to the above, SMIRNOV had a separate 
conversation with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1, wherein RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1 claimed that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 4, the head of a 
particular unit of a Russian Intelligence Service, ran an intelligence 
operation at a “club” located on a particular floor of HOTEL 1, 
which is in COUNTRY C. SMIRNOV stated the Russian 
Intelligence Service intercepted cell phone calls made by guests at 
the hotel. The Russian Intelligence Service intercepted several calls 
placed by prominent US persons the Russian government may use 
as “kompromat” in the 2024 election, depending on who the 
candidates will be. 
iv. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV later had a meeting with another 
COUNTRY C government official, who stated it was common 
knowledge that the Russian Intelligence Service did, in fact, run 
such intelligence operations at HOTEL 1. 
 
10. (U//FOUO) (Document 10) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about February 2022, SMIRNOV provided the following 
information: 
i. (U//FOUO) When SMIRNOV was working in COUNTRY D circa 
2002, he conducted a joint operation to recruit two individuals: 1) 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5, Russian consular to COUNTRY D, who 
was caught spying; and, 2) a COUNTRY E consular to COUNTRY 
D. 
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ii. (U//FOUO) SMIRNOV first met RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 at an 
event/party COUNTRY D put on for foreign officials. Thereafter, 
SMIRNOV spent numerous months developing a “friendship” with 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5. After some time, SMIRNOV was asked 
by COUNTRY D to contact RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 and tell them 
that COUNTRY D had info that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 was 
spying. Rather than arresting/PNGing RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5, 
COUNTRY D told RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 had to leave within 48 
hours or there would be “adverse consequences”, but that 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 should keep in touch with COUNTRY D 
and SMIRNOV. Thereafter, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 would 
occasionally provide SMIRNOV with information. RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 5 never provided information that was “adverse” to 
Russia. 
iii. (U//FOUO) Approximately three years before the time of this 
reporting, possibly in 2019, SMIRNOV traveled to Russia and met 
with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5. They had a very careful, coded 
conversation about what Russia might look like under different 
leadership. For background, SMIRNOV understood that RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 5’s spouse is somehow related to RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 6, a former high-ranking member of a Russian 
Intelligence Service. SMIRNOV has never met RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 6, however SMIRNOV once called RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 5 who was in the car at the time with RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 6, who spoke very briefly to SMIRNOV over speaker 
phone. 
iv. (U//FOUO) During a subsequent meeting two days later, 
SMIRNOV and RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 spoke again about matters 
pertaining to Russia. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 indicated that 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 6 was not happy with Russian leadership, 
and that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 6 was also close friends/associates 
with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2, a high-ranking member of a Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service. 
v. (U//FOUO) First call with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 (High-ranking 
member of a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service): Prior to a recent 
overseas trip, SMIRNOV contacted RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 to see 
if he could arrange to have RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2, speak to a 
high-ranking official of COUNTRY C. SMIRNOV contacted 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 and provided him with a proposed date 
and time for RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 to call. SMIRNOV obtained 
a “throw-phone” and foreign SIM card and provided RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 5 with the number. SMIRNOV indicated that a call 
subsequently took place between RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 and a 
high-ranking official COUNTRY C, the subject matter of which 
SMIRNOV was aware. 
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vi. (U//FOUO) Second call with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 (High-
ranking member of a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service): In 
January 2022, SMIRNOV had a second call with RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 2 (SMIRNOV used a second throw phone). SMIRNOV 
asked RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 for a “favor”—namely that Russian 
troops do not hurt SMIRNOV’s associate, an official of COUNTRY 
C. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 asked what SMIRNOV thought of 
SMIRNOV’s associate.  SMIRNOV later reiterated his “ask” that 
his associate not be harmed during any Russian incursion. 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 said he was told by RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 
5, who SMIRNOV “befriended” years earlier after RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 5 was caught spying, that SMIRNOV was a “good 
guy,” and therefore RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 would help to ensure 
SMIRNOV’s associate was not killed or harmed. 
vii. (U//FOUO) Third call with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 (High-ranking 
member of a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service): After 
SMIRNOV returned from his overseas trip, he again asked 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 5 to set up another call with RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 2. During the call, SMIRNOV discussed the additional 
escalation of Russian troops along the Ukraine border and asked 
RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 whether he could provide any details 
about Russia’s intentions.  RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 2 stated he was 
99% that only a skirmish would occur.  
 
11. (U//FOUO) (Document 11) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about October 2023, SMIRNOV provided the following 
information:  
i. (U//FOUO) Photo of passport of RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1. 
ii. (U//FOUO) In October 2023, SMIRNOV advised that RUSSIAN 
OFFICIAL 1, the son of a high-ranking former Russian government 
official, was invited to attend a birthday party in October 2023 in 
COUNTRY A, which will be held on RUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL 2's 
mega yacht. SMIRNOV received a copy of RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 
1's Russian passport. 
Smirnov’s anticipated travel from the United States, on Friday of last week, two days 
after his return, was for the purpose of meeting with Russian intelligence officials, among 
others.  Specifically: 
12. (U//FOUO) (Document 12) 
a. (U//FOUO) In or about January 2024, SMIRNOV provided the following 
information. The information was recorded in an FD-1040a, CHS travel/ET 
Activity Request Form. 
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i. SMIRNOV reported future travel and meeting itineraries to his FBI 
Handler, which outlined travel to various countries in February 
2024. SMIRNOV planned to meet with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1, 
an operative of a Russian Intelligence Service. The primary purpose 
of the meeting with RUSSIAN OFFICIAL 1 was to discuss the 
exchange of Russian and Ukrainian military prisoners. The meeting 
was set to occur in COUNTRY A. 
 
Smirnov’s contacts with Russian officials who are affiliated with Russian intelligence 
services are not benign.  At his meeting with FBI investigators in September 2023, Smirnov 
pushed a new story about Public Official 1 and Businessperson 1, as described in the 
indictment.  Indictment at ¶51.  Specifically, Smirnov wanted them to look into whether 
Businessperson 1 was recorded in a hotel in Kiev called the Premier Palace.  Id.  Smirnov 
told investigators that the entire Premier Palace Hotel is “wired” and under the control of 
the Russians.  Id.  Smirnov claimed that Businessperson 1 went to the hotel many times and 
that he had seen video footage of Businessperson 1 entering the Premier Palace Hotel. Id.  
Investigators know that Smirnov’s new story is false because Businessperson 1 has never 
travelled to Ukraine.  Id. at ¶ 54.   
Smirnov suggested that investigators check to see if Businessperson 1 made telephone 
calls from the Premier Palace Hotel since those calls would have been recorded by the 
Russians.  Id. at ¶ 52.  Smirnov claimed to have obtained this information a month earlier by 
calling a high-level official in a foreign country.  Id.  Smirnov also claimed to have learned 
this information from four different Russian officials.  Id.   
Smirnov told investigators that the four different Russian officials are all top officials 
and two are the heads of the entities they represent.  Id. at ¶ 53.  These Russians said that 
conversations with Ukrainians about ending the war will include the next U.S. election.  
Smirnov told investigators he is involved in negotiations over ending the war and had been 
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for the previous four months.  Id.  According to Smirnov, the Russians want Ukraine to assist 
in influencing the U.S. election, and Smirnov thinks the tapes of Businessperson 1 at the 
Premier Palace Hotel is all they have.  Id.  Smirnov told investigators he wants them to ask 
Businessperson 1 how many times he visited and what he did while at the Premier Palace 
Hotel.  Id.   
Thus, Smirnov’s efforts to spread misinformation about a candidate of one of the two 
major parties in the United States continues.  The Court should consider this conduct as well 
when evaluating his personal history and characteristics.  What this shows is that the 
misinformation he is spreading is not confined to 2020.  He is actively peddling new lies that 
could impact U.S. elections after meeting with Russian intelligence officials in November.  
In light of that fact there is a serious risk he will flee in order to avoid accountability for his 
actions.   
2. Smirnov has access to millions of dollars that he did not disclose to Pretrial Services. 
Smirnov has already demonstrated that he cannot be trusted to provide truthful 
information to Pretrial Services.  When he was interviewed, he told Pretrial Services that he 
only had access to $1,500 in cash and another $5,000 in a checking account.  See Pretrial 
Services Report at 2.   
That is not true.  Smirnov is the sole signatory on a Bank of America business 
checking account ending with 3928 in the name of Avalon Group Inc. (hereafter “BOA 
3928”) Exhibit 3 (under seal).   As of December 31, 2023, BOA 3928 had a balance of $2,917,496.61.  
Exhibit 4 (under seal).  The fact that Smirnov lied to Pretrial Services in his very first 
interaction with them establishes conclusively that there are no conditions that could 
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reasonably assure his appearance.  That is because the effectiveness of any condition or 
combination relies on Pretrial Services ability to obtain truthful information from Smirnov.   
Smirnov uses BOA 3928 to fund his and DL’s lifestyle, although the transfers 
themselves look like payments from a business, “Avalon Group, Inc.” to DL.  From 
February 2020, when the account was opened, through December 31, 2022, Smirnov 
withdrew $1,737,500 to purchase cashier’s checks in the name of “Avalon Group Inc.” and 
payable to DL.  Id.  Those cashier’s checks were then deposited in DL’s account, in some 
cases within 30 minutes of Smirnov withdrawing the funds to purchase the checks.  See 
Exhibit 10 (under seal).  DL deposited these cashier’s checks into one of her accounts at a 
branch near where Smirnov withdrew the funds.  Id.  For example, on October 13, 2020, a 
withdrawal was conducted by Avalon Group Inc. in the amount of $599,000 from BOA 
3928. Exhibit 5 (under seal).  The transaction was conducted at a Bank of America branch 
located in San Juan Capistrano, California. Id.  A handwritten note on the withdrawal slip 
identified “CADL XXXX349 4/26/2022,” which was Smirnov’s California driver's license.  
Id.  Immediately following the withdrawal, Bank of America official check 1145711247 in 
the amount of $599,000 payable to DL was purchased using the funds. Exhibit 6 (under seal).  
On October 14, 2020, Bank of America official check 1145711247 was deposited to DL's 
Wells Fargo account ending 1356, for which she is the sole signer. Id.  The transaction was 
conducted at a Wells Fargo branch located in San Juan Capistrano, California.  Id.  The 
withdrawal from BOA 3928 was funded by a previous wire transfer of $600,000 received 
from Economic Transformation Technologies Corporation on September 22, 2020.  The 
BOA 3928 account balance prior to receipt of the wire transfer was approximately $31. 
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Smirnov also wired DL $785,000 in two payments, $740,000 at the end of 2020 and 
another $45,000 at the end of 2022.  Exhibit 4 (under seal).   
As of February 1, 2024, DL had $3,827,460 in her Wells Fargo account ending in 1356.  
Exhibit 7 (under seal).     
In 2022 and 2023, after Smirnov began making these substantial transfers to DL, 
albeit using cashier’s checks that make it appear she is receiving the funds from a business, 
“Avalon Group Inc.,” DL made payments to Smirnov’s Citi credit card, which is the primary 
means by which he pays personal expenses.  See Exhibit 10 (under seal).  Specifically, in 
2022, DL paid $108,916.52 towards Smirnov’s Citi credit card debt and in 2023, she paid 
$275,869.44.  Id.   
Smirnov told Pretrial Services that he lives with DL in a condominium she leases.  See 
Pretrial Services Report at 1.  That is also not true.  The attached report shows she is in fact 
the owner, having purchased it on February 28, 2022, for the sale price of $1,425,000.  See 
Exhibit 1 (under seal).  In February 2022, DL purchased a condominium in Las Vegas where 
she and Smirnov reside.  Id.  While the condominium is titled in her name, she purchased it 
after receiving more than $2.4 million from Smirnov.  See Exhibit 10 (under seal).   
Smirnov also withdrew $174,219 in cash from the account, including $60,304.25 in 
2023.  Exhibit 4 (under seal).  In addition to DL paying his personal expenses, Smirnov also 
pays various personal expenses out of this account including gasoline, credit card payments, 
restaurants, duty free shopping and others.  Id.     
The government assumes that Smirnov did not disclose these substantial assets to the 
Court when he submitted his financial affidavit.  That is because while the government has 
not seen the affidavit, the Court appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender to 
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represent Smirnov at his initial appearance.  The court specifically admonished Smirnov that 
he was submitting his financial affidavit under the penalties of perjury.  If he did not disclose 
his substantial assets the this is a second example of an instance where Smirnov lied to the 
Court.   
In the event that Smirnov did not disclose these assets, the government respectfully 
requests that the Court release the affidavit to the government so that the government can 
consider whether to charge Smirnov with perjury.   
3. Smirnov can obtain an Israeli passport at any time. 
Finally, the Court should also consider that Smirnov is a dual national who holds 
both U.S. citizenship, and a U.S. passport, and Israeli citizenship, and an Israeli passport.  
While Smirnov can be ordered to turn both passports in to Pretrial Services and could be 
prohibited from obtaining a new U.S. passport, he cannot be prohibited from obtaining a 
new Israeli one.  He can obtain a new Israeli passport in the United States by visiting any 
one of Israel’s consulates in Washington, DC, New York, Houston, Miami or Los Angeles.  
See Exhibits 8 and 9. 
 
 
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IV.  Conclusion 
Based on the above, this Court should conclude that no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the Smirnov as required and order him 
detained pending trial.   
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of February, 2024. 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
DAVID C. WEISS 
Special Counsel  
 
 
 
 
LEO J. WISE 
Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel  
 
DEREK E. HINES  
Senior Assistant Special Counsel 
 
SEAN F. MULRYNE 
CHRISTOPHER M. RIGALI 
Assistant Special Counsels 
 
United States Department of Justice  
 
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