Loading ...
Global Do...
News & Politics
4
0
Try Now
Log In
Pricing
DNSCurve D. J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago The Domain Name System uma.es wants to see http://www.iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Browser at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO Now uma.es retrieves web page from IP address 203.200.95.142. urve Bernstein sity of Illinois at Chicago The Domain Name System uma.es wants to see http://www.iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Browser at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO Now uma.es retrieves web page from IP address 203.200.95.142. Same f uma.es someon '& ! Mail '& ! Admin Now um delivers IP addr nois at Chicago The Domain Name System uma.es wants to see http://www.iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Browser at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO Now uma.es retrieves web page from IP address 203.200.95.142. Same for Internet uma.es has mail someone@iitk.a '& %$ ! "# Mail client at '& %$ ! "# Administrator a “The mail iitk.a has IP a 203.197. OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.19 cago The Domain Name System uma.es wants to see http://www.iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Browser at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO Now uma.es retrieves web page from IP address 203.200.95.142. Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.a “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. The Domain Name System uma.es wants to see http://www.iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Browser at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO Now uma.es retrieves web page from IP address 203.200.95.142. Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. omain Name System s wants to see //www.iitk.ac.in. %$ "# owser at uma.es %$ "# nistrator at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” OO ma.es es web page from ress 203.200.95.142. Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. Forging uma.es someon '& ! Mail cl '& ! Attac “ OO Now um delivers IP addr actually me System o see tk.ac.in. uma.es at iitk.ac.in server .ac.in ddress 5.142.” ge from 00.95.142. Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. Forging DNS pac uma.es has mail someone@iitk.a '& %$ ! "# Mail client at u '& %$ ! "# Attacker anyw “The mail se iitk.ac has IP ad 157.22.245 OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22 actually the attac m . ac.in . Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on n “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s mac Same for Internet mail. uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Administrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 203.197.196.9. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. for Internet mail. s has mail to deliver to ne@iitk.ac.in. %$ "# client at uma.es %$ "# nistrator at iitk.ac.in “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.197.196.9.” OO ma.es s mail to ress 203.197.196.9. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actuall attacke some b t mail. to deliver to ac.in. t uma.es at iitk.ac.in server for ac.in address .196.9.” 97.196.9. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client s attacker has to re some bits from th r to ac.in Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client sends quer attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. Forging DNS packets uma.es has mail to deliver to someone@iitk.ac.in. '& %$ ! "# Mail client at uma.es '& %$ ! "# Attacker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” OO Now uma.es delivers mail to IP address 157.22.245.20, actually the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. g DNS packets s has mail to deliver to ne@iitk.ac.in. %$ "# lient at uma.es %$ "# cker anywhere on network “The mail server for iitk.ac.in has IP address 157.22.245.20.” ma.es s mail to ress 157.22.245.20, y the attacker’s machine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some g Why do use cry ckets to deliver to ac.in. uma.es where on network erver for c.in ddress 5.20.” 2.245.20, cker’s machine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some general que Why doesn’t the use cryptography r to network chine. Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Actually: Client sends query; attacker has to repeat some bits from the query. Network probably has at least one attacker-controlled machine. That machine sniffs network, trivially forges DNS packets. “No sniffers on my network!” : : : so a blind attacker guesses the bits to repeat, eventually gets lucky. After analysis, optimization: blind forgery is about as easy as downloading a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. ly: Client sends query; er has to repeat bits from the query. rk probably has at least tacker-controlled machine. machine sniffs network, y forges DNS packets. niffers on my network!” a blind attacker s the bits to repeat, ally gets lucky. analysis, optimization: orgery is about as easy wnloading a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is Interne sends query; epeat he query. y has at least ntrolled machine. niffs network, NS packets. my network!” tacker to repeat, ucky. ptimization: bout as easy a movie. Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is there so m Internet commun ry; east achine. rk, ts. k!” n: asy Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is there so much unpr Internet communication? Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” Some general questions Why doesn’t the Internet use cryptography? “The Internet does use cryptography! I just made an SSL connection to my bank.” Indeed, many connections use SSL, Skype, etc. But most connections don’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. general questions oesn’t the Internet yptography? nternet does yptography! I just made L connection to my bank.” , many connections L, Skype, etc. ost connections don’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why ar unencry estions Internet y? oes y! I just made on to my bank.” nnections etc. ctions don’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why are typical I unencrypted and made bank.” ’t. Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why are typical Internet pa unencrypted and unauthent Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” Why is there so much unprotected Internet communication? “Because nobody cares. Cryptography is pointless. Attackers are exploiting buffer overflows; they aren’t intercepting or forging packets.” In fact, attackers are forging packets and exploiting buffer overflows and doing much more. Users want all of these problems fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. s there so much unprotected et communication? use nobody cares. graphy is pointless. ers are exploiting overflows; they aren’t pting or forging packets.” , attackers ging packets ploiting buffer overflows oing much more. Users ll of these problems fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is fraction much unprotected nication? y cares. pointless. ploiting they aren’t orging packets.” s ets uffer overflows more. Users e problems fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used fraction of all HT rotected ’t kets.” lows ers fixed. Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used for only a fraction of all HTTP conne Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Why are typical Internet packets unencrypted and unauthenticated? “It’s too easy to write Internet software that exchanges data without any cryptographic protection. Most Internet clients and servers don’t know how to make cryptographic connections.” True for most protocols. But let’s focus on HTTP. Most HTTP servers and browsers (Apache, Internet Explorer, Firefox, etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. re typical Internet packets ypted and unauthenticated? oo easy to write Internet re that exchanges data t any cryptographic tion. Most Internet clients rvers don’t know how to cryptographic connections.” or most protocols. t’s focus on HTTP. HTTP servers and browsers he, Internet Explorer, , etc.) support SSL. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. But let Google paid fo Google https: Internet packets unauthenticated? write Internet changes data ptographic t Internet clients t know how to hic connections.” otocols. n HTTP. vers and browsers t Explorer, pport SSL. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google has alread paid for a certific Google uses SSL https://mail.g ackets ticated? rnet ata clients w to ctions.” rowsers , Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.co Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. Why is SSL used for only a tiny fraction of all HTTP connections? “Have you ever tried to set up SSL? Do you want to go through all these extra Apache configuration steps? Do you want to pay for a certificate? Do you want to annoy your web-site visitors with self-signed certificates?” Indeed, usability is a major issue. Only 1% of the Apache servers on the Internet have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. s SSL used for only a tiny n of all HTTP connections? you ever tried to set L? Do you want to go h all these extra Apache uration steps? Do you o pay for a certificate? u want to annoy your te visitors with self-signed ates?” , usability is a major issue. 1% of the Apache servers Internet have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why do turn off d for only a tiny TTP connections? tried to set want to go e extra Apache ps? Do you a certificate? annoy your with self-signed is a major issue. e Apache servers have SSL enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why does Google turn off cryptogr a tiny ections? t go ache ou te? r igned r issue. servers enabled. But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic prot But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” But let’s focus on Google. Google has already paid for a certificate. Google uses SSL for https://mail.google.com. If you connect to https://www.google.com, Google redirects your browser to http://www.google.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” Many companies sell SSL-acceleration hardware, but that costs money too. t’s focus on Google. e has already or a certificate. e uses SSL for ://mail.google.com. connect to ://www.google.com, e redirects your browser to //www.google.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” Many companies sell SSL-acceleration hardware, but that costs money too. Why ar comput Can cry without Can cry to solid Google Can cry to prot Can un n Google. dy cate. for google.com. o oogle.com, your browser to ogle.com. Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” Many companies sell SSL-acceleration hardware, but that costs money too. Why are cryptogr computations so Can crypto be fa without being ea Can crypto be fa to solidly protect Google’s commun Can crypto be fa to protect every I Can universal cry om. m, wser to . Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” Many companies sell SSL-acceleration hardware, but that costs money too. Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet pa Can universal crypto be usa Why does Google actively turn off cryptographic protection? “Enabling SSL for more than a small fraction of Google connections would overload the Google servers. Google doesn’t want to pay for a bunch of extra computers. Too slow ) unusable.” Many companies sell SSL-acceleration hardware, but that costs money too. Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break? Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet packet? Can universal crypto be usable? oes Google actively f cryptographic protection? ing SSL re than a small fraction gle connections would ad the Google servers. e doesn’t want to pay for h of extra computers. ow ) unusable.” companies sell cceleration hardware, at costs money too. Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break? Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet packet? Can universal crypto be usable? What c Cryptog stop sn by scra Cryptog as prot attacke the scra Can als attacke a prope e actively raphic protection? small fraction ctions would ogle servers. want to pay for computers. sable.” sell hardware, oney too. Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break? Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet packet? Can universal crypto be usable? What cryptograp Cryptography can stop sniffing atta by scrambling leg Cryptography is o as protecting con attackers can’t u the scrambled pa Can also protect attackers can’t fi a properly scramb tection? tion uld s. y for s. , Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break? Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet packet? Can universal crypto be usable? What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate pa Cryptography is often desc as protecting confidentiality attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forger Why are cryptographic computations so expensive? Can crypto be faster, without being easy to break? Can crypto be fast enough to solidly protect all of Google’s communications? Can crypto be fast enough to protect every Internet packet? Can universal crypto be usable? What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate packets. Cryptography is often described as protecting confidentiality: attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forgery. re cryptographic tations so expensive? ypto be faster, t being easy to break? ypto be fast enough dly protect all of e’s communications? ypto be fast enough tect every Internet packet? niversal crypto be usable? What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate packets. Cryptography is often described as protecting confidentiality: attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forgery. Traditio each le to shar Public- has mu (1976 D many s Each p Two pa securely the oth 1993: I project signatu raphic expensive? aster, asy to break? ast enough t all of nications? ast enough Internet packet? ypto be usable? What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate packets. Cryptography is often described as protecting confidentiality: attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forgery. Traditional crypto each legitimate c to share a secret Public-key crypto has much lower r (1976 Diffie–Hell many subsequent Each party has o Two parties can securely if each p the other party’s 1993: IETF begin project to add pu signatures to DN ? k? acket? able? What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate packets. Cryptography is often described as protecting confidentiality: attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forgery. Traditional cryptography re each legitimate client-serve to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requiremen (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinemen Each party has one public k Two parties can communic securely if each party know the other party’s public key 1993: IETF begins “DNSS project to add public-key signatures to DNS. What cryptography can do Cryptography can stop sniffing attackers by scrambling legitimate packets. Cryptography is often described as protecting confidentiality: attackers can’t understand the scrambled packets. Can also protect integrity: attackers can’t figure out a properly scrambled forgery. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. cryptography can do graphy can niffing attackers ambling legitimate packets. graphy is often described tecting confidentiality: ers can’t understand ambled packets. so protect integrity: ers can’t figure out erly scrambled forgery. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. After fi dollars (e.g., D NSF to Softwar how su The Int 780000 phy can do n ackers gitimate packets. often described nfidentiality: understand ackets. integrity: igure out bled forgery. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. After fifteen year dollars of U.S. go (e.g., DISA to BI NSF to UCLA; D Software Corpora how successful is The Internet has 78000000 *.com o ackets. cribed y: ry. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. After fifteen years and milli dollars of U.S. government (e.g., DISA to BIND comp NSF to UCLA; DHS to Sec Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Traditional cryptography requires each legitimate client-server pair to share a secret key. Public-key cryptography has much lower requirements. (1976 Diffie–Hellman; many subsequent refinements) Each party has one public key. Two parties can communicate securely if each party knows the other party’s public key. 1993: IETF begins “DNSSEC” project to add public-key signatures to DNS. After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Surveys by DNSSEC developers, last updated 2009.03.12, have found 253 *.com names with DNSSEC signatures. 116 on 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. onal cryptography requires egitimate client-server pair re a secret key. -key cryptography uch lower requirements. Diffie–Hellman; subsequent refinements) party has one public key. arties can communicate y if each party knows her party’s public key. IETF begins “DNSSEC” to add public-key ures to DNS. After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Surveys by DNSSEC developers, last updated 2009.03.12, have found 253 *.com names with DNSSEC signatures. 116 on 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. Why is Some o servers the roo the goo DNSSE server-s signatu Signatu saved; Hopefu to sign ography requires client-server pair key. ography requirements. lman; t refinements) one public key. communicate party knows public key. ns “DNSSEC” ublic-key NS. After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Surveys by DNSSEC developers, last updated 2009.03.12, have found 253 *.com names with DNSSEC signatures. 116 on 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. Why is nobody u Some of the Inte servers are extrem the root servers, the google.com DNSSEC tries to server-side costs signatures of DN Signature is comp saved; sent to ma Hopefully the ser to sign each DNS equires er pair nts. nts) key. cate ws y. SEC” After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Surveys by DNSSEC developers, last updated 2009.03.12, have found 253 *.com names with DNSSEC signatures. 116 on 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. Why is nobody using DNSS Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: the root servers, the .com the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precom signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once saved; sent to many clients Hopefully the server can af to sign each DNS record on After fifteen years and millions of dollars of U.S. government grants (e.g., DISA to BIND company; NSF to UCLA; DHS to Secure64 Software Corporation), how successful is DNSSEC? The Internet has about 78000000 *.com names. Surveys by DNSSEC developers, last updated 2009.03.12, have found 253 *.com names with DNSSEC signatures. 116 on 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. Why is nobody using DNSSEC? Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: e.g., the root servers, the .com servers, the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precomputing signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once; saved; sent to many clients. Hopefully the server can afford to sign each DNS record once. ifteen years and millions of of U.S. government grants DISA to BIND company; o UCLA; DHS to Secure64 re Corporation), uccessful is DNSSEC? ternet has about 000 *.com names. s by DNSSEC developers, dated 2009.03.12, ound 253 *.com with DNSSEC signatures. 2008.08.20; 253 > 116. Why is nobody using DNSSEC? Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: e.g., the root servers, the .com servers, the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precomputing signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once; saved; sent to many clients. Hopefully the server can afford to sign each DNS record once. Clients of verif DNSSE client-s choice DNSSE say DS slow fo recomm preferre suggest of only for “lea rs and millions of overnment grants IND company; DHS to Secure64 ation), s DNSSEC? about names. SEC developers, 09.03.12, *.com SSEC signatures. 20; 253 > 116. Why is nobody using DNSSEC? Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: e.g., the root servers, the .com servers, the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precomputing signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once; saved; sent to many clients. Hopefully the server can afford to sign each DNS record once. Clients don’t sha of verifying a sig DNSSEC tries to client-side costs t choice of crypto DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 t slow for verificati recommend RSA preferred algorith suggest RSA key of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in ions of t grants pany; cure64 ? opers, atures. 116. Why is nobody using DNSSEC? Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: e.g., the root servers, the .com servers, the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precomputing signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once; saved; sent to many clients. Hopefully the server can afford to sign each DNS record once. Clients don’t share the wor of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times slow for verification” as RS recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DN suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS Why is nobody using DNSSEC? Some of the Internet’s DNS servers are extremely busy: e.g., the root servers, the .com servers, the google.com servers. DNSSEC tries to minimize server-side costs by precomputing signatures of DNS records. Signature is computed once; saved; sent to many clients. Hopefully the server can afford to sign each DNS record once. Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” s nobody using DNSSEC? of the Internet’s DNS are extremely busy: e.g., ot servers, the .com servers, ogle.com servers. EC tries to minimize side costs by precomputing ures of DNS records. ure is computed once; sent to many clients. ully the server can afford each DNS record once. Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bi 2003: S conclud was alr large co 2003: R recomm 2048-bi of this made t using DNSSEC? ernet’s DNS mely busy: e.g., the .com servers, servers. o minimize by precomputing NS records. puted once; any clients. rver can afford S record once. Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is i 2003: Shamir–Tr concluded that 1 was already break large companies a 2003: RSA Labo recommended a t 2048-bit keys “ov of this decade.” made the same re SEC? S : e.g., servers, mputing . e; s. fford nce. Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsib 2003: Shamir–Tromer et a concluded that 1024-bit RS was already breakable by large companies and botne 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition 2048-bit keys “over the rem of this decade.” 2007: NIS made the same recommend Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. Clients don’t share the work of verifying a signature. DNSSEC tries to reduce client-side costs through choice of crypto primitive. DNSSEC RFCs say DSA is “10 to 40 times as slow for verification” as RSA; recommend RSA “as the preferred algorithm” for DNSSEC; suggest RSA key size of only 1024 bits for “leaf nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. But most users don’t know this. Why aren’t they using DNSSEC? don’t share the work fying a signature. EC tries to reduce side costs through of crypto primitive. EC RFCs SA is “10 to 40 times as or verification” as RSA; mend RSA “as the ed algorithm” for DNSSEC; t RSA key size 1024 bits af nodes in the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. But most users don’t know this. Why aren’t they using DNSSEC? DNS ar Browse DNS ca Bro DNS WV PQ Admin ?> 89 Cache p adminis doesn’t are the work gnature. o reduce through primitive. to 40 times as ion” as RSA; “as the hm” for DNSSEC; size s n the DNS.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. But most users don’t know this. Why aren’t they using DNSSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls dat DNS cache at um Browser DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator ?> =< 89 :; OO ck Cache pulls data administrator if it doesn’t already h rk s as SA; NSSEC; S.” I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. But most users don’t know this. Why aren’t they using DNSSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk. ?> =< 89 :; OO “The w www.iit has IP 203.200 ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the da I say: 1024-bit RSA is irresponsible. 2003: Shamir–Tromer et al. concluded that 1024-bit RSA was already breakable by large companies and botnets. 2003: RSA Laboratories recommended a transition to 2048-bit keys “over the remainder of this decade.” 2007: NIST made the same recommendation. But most users don’t know this. Why aren’t they using DNSSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in ?> =< 89 :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the data. it RSA is irresponsible. Shamir–Tromer et al. ded that 1024-bit RSA ready breakable by ompanies and botnets. RSA Laboratories mended a transition to it keys “over the remainder decade.” 2007: NIST the same recommendation. ost users don’t know this. ren’t they using DNSSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in ?> =< 89 :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the data. Admini through .iitk. Bro DNS WV PQ .iitk DNS .iitk dat Admin WV PQ irresponsible. romer et al. 1024-bit RSA kable by and botnets. oratories transition to ver the remainder 2007: NIST ecommendation. don’t know this. using DNSSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in ?> =< 89 :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the data. Administrator pu through local dat .iitk.ac.in DN Browser DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO _g ble. al. SA ets. to mainder ST dation. w this. SSEC? DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in ?> =< 89 :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the data. Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk. WV UT PQ RS OO “The w www.iit has IP 203.200 _g DNS architecture Browser pulls data from DNS cache at uma.es: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in ?> =< 89 :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck Cache pulls data from administrator if it doesn’t already have the data. Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in WV UT PQ RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g rchitecture er pulls data from ache at uma.es: owser at uma.es S cache UT RS OO nistrator at iitk.ac.in =< :; OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” ck pulls data from strator if it t already have the data. Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in WV UT PQ RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g DNS ca .iitk. .in DN at ii “The D for .iit is with IP 202.3. e ta from ma.es: at uma.es at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” from t have the data. Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in WV UT PQ RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g DNS cache learns .iitk.ac.in DN .in DNS server: at uma.e at iitk.ac.in “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” s .ac.in web server tk.ac.in address 0.95.142.” ata. Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in WV UT PQ RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g DNS cache learns location .iitk.ac.in DNS server .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS '& ! .i DNS .i data WV PQ at iitk.ac.in Admin '& ! “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= Administrator pushes data through local database into .iitk.ac.in DNS server: Browser at uma.es DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .iitk.ac.in database OO Administrator at iitk.ac.in WV UT PQ RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g DNS cache learns location of .iitk.ac.in DNS server from .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= istrator pushes data h local database into .ac.in DNS server: owser at uma.es S cache UT RS OO k.ac.in S server OO k.ac.in tabase OO nistrator at iitk.ac.in UT RS OO “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” _g DNS cache learns location of .iitk.ac.in DNS server from .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= Ganes WV PQ Roo DNS serve .in DNS serve .in data at Inte Central b OO ushes data tabase into NS server: at uma.es at iitk.ac.in “The web server www.iitk.ac.in has IP address 203.200.95.142.” DNS cache learns location of .iitk.ac.in DNS server from .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= Ganesha WV UT PQ RS N N N N N N N N N Root DNS server .in DNS server u u u u u u u u u . .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO . at A WV PQ hhPPPPPP o s .ac.in web server tk.ac.in P address 0.95.142.” DNS cache learns location of .iitk.ac.in DNS server from .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV U PQ R OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac. DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac. database OO at iitk.ac. Administra WV PQ OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS cache learns location of .iitk.ac.in DNS server from .in DNS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO “The DNS server for .iitk.ac.in is ns2 with IP address 202.3.77.23.” 5= Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> ache learns location of .ac.in DNS server from NS server: at uma.es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO itk.ac.in Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO DNS server tk.ac.in ns2 P address .77.23.” 5= Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS se Wikipe DNS, d DNS P MaraD Secure6 DNS da tools lis BPP, D gencid NSC, n update webdns homegr DNS re s location of NS server from es DNS cache '& %$ ! "# .in DNS server OO .in database WV UT PQ RS OO n Administrator '& %$ ! "# OO 5= Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS server softw Wikipedia: BIND DNS, djbdns, Dn DNS Plus, NSD, MaraDNS, ANS, Secure64 DNS. DNS database-m tools listed by 20 BPP, DNS Boss, gencidrzone, h2 NSC, nsupdate, updatehosts, U webdns, zsu. Plu homegrown tools DNS registrars et of from cache %$ "# in server OO in abase UT RS OO nistrator %$ "# OO Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS server software listed Wikipedia: BIND, Microso DNS, djbdns, Dnsmasq, Sim DNS Plus, NSD, PowerDN MaraDNS, ANS, Posadis, Secure64 DNS. DNS database-managemen tools listed by 2008 Salomo BPP, DNS Boss, DNStool, gencidrzone, h2n, makez NSC, nsupdate, SENDS, updatehosts, Utah Tools, webdns, zsu. Plus hundred homegrown tools written b DNS registrars etc. Ganesha WV UT PQ RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser Root DNS server // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO .in DNS server ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO .in data at Internet Central HQ base OO .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS server software listed in Wikipedia: BIND, Microsoft DNS, djbdns, Dnsmasq, Simple DNS Plus, NSD, PowerDNS, MaraDNS, ANS, Posadis, Secure64 DNS. DNS database-management tools listed by 2008 Salomon: BPP, DNS Boss, DNStool, gencidrzone, h2n, makezones, NSC, nsupdate, SENDS, updatehosts, Utah Tools, webdns, zsu. Plus hundreds of homegrown tools written by DNS registrars etc. sha UT RS &&N N N N N N N N N N N Browser ot S er // DNS cache WV UT PQ RS OO n S er ::u u u u u u u u u u u .iitk.ac.in DNS server OO n ernet l HQ base .iitk.ac.in database OO at iitk.ac.in Administrator WV UT PQ RS OO hhPPPPPPPP \d 6> DNS server software listed in Wikipedia: BIND, Microsoft DNS, djbdns, Dnsmasq, Simple DNS Plus, NSD, PowerDNS, MaraDNS, ANS, Posadis, Secure64 DNS. DNS database-management tools listed by 2008 Salomon: BPP, DNS Boss, DNStool, gencidrzone, h2n, makezones, NSC, nsupdate, SENDS, updatehosts, Utah Tools, webdns, zsu. Plus hundreds of homegrown tools written by DNS registrars etc. DNSSE every D Whene a DNS precom signatu Often c for the Exampl can pro (2005 N Tool re probabl
