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Description of document: US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation documents related to “No Fly Lists” Released date: 06-September-2007 Posted date: 02-October-2007 Date/date range of document: All documents range between 19-December-2001 and 12-May-2003 Source of document: Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Requests to: Federal Bureau of Investigation Record Information/Dissemination Section 170 Marcel Drive Winchester, VA 22602-4843 FOIA Requester Service Center (RSC): (540) 868-4591 FOIPA Public Information Officer (PIO): (540) 868-4593 FOIPA Public Liaison Officer (PLO): (540) 868-4516 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington. DC. 2U535 September 6, 2007 Request No.: 1087793- 000 Subject: NO FLY LIST Dear Requester: The records that you have requested were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act for another requester. Enclosed are 248 pages of documents pertaining to your request and a copy of the explanation of exemptions. You may submit an appeal from any denial contained herein by writing to the Office of Information and Privacy. U.S. Department of Justice. 1425 New York Ave.. NW. Suite 11050. Washington. DC 20530 0001, within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal" Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified. Sincerely yours. David M. Hardy Section Chief. Recordllnformation Dissemination Section Records Management Division Enclosure(s) (b)( I) (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)( 4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7) (b)(8) (b)(9) (d)(5) 0)(2) (k)( I ) (k)(2) (k)(3 ) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7) EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order; related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( 0 ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding; material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals; information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods; investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056; required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process; material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence. FBI/~O] , "",_" ," ,~'.'''".~", ",0"'" From: To: Date: Subject: Aviation-Field-30 Wed. Dec 19,2001 4:36 PM FBI Response to FAA Name List - NEW PROCEDURES b7C -1 b6 -1 Airport Agents - Please ensure that this message is forwarded to your supervisors, command post and any other personnel who miqht respond to name list matches at airports. The attached FAA documents have also been uploaded to L I There are two name lists for which the FBI may now have to respond, instead of one - the "No Fly" list (threats to aviation) and the "Selectee" Iis~ IThe names are the same and some additional ones from the previous FAA name lists, and they continue to originate from other agenciesc:=J c:Jrom the FBI. However, there are new procedures to reduce unnecessary FBI response. The FBI and the FAA coordinated these procedures based on feedback from the field about the utility of FBI resnonse to ticket counters to identify passengers when the lists now contain more identifying information, I I I NEW PROCEDURES J I L...,o_--1' Please read the attached FAA Security Directives (SO 108-01·20 and 108-01-21) for exact language. I expect questions, so please ask. If something doesn't work as you expected. please let me know. '11 try to do an EC as soon as possible, but since the list and changes are "ouf', I wanted you to have them as soon as possible. b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 SS~ I<fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division 1..-._----JJleo.gov b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 cc: b7C -1 b6 -1 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED / HE~ I~U<5~SIF)~D ~ I _.... .. , / DA ~ - By~to')r~ LS A~ (~l- eA 03-J'11~ SUSSMAN-l ·4==. '-=-::.~~~".~:~~~..~.~:~~.::=:~::~~:=-:::::,,:::::".,:::::::::::':='.:::::::~9;:!] 1500 Southwest 1st Avenue The Honorable Earl Blumenauer The Weatherly Building 516 S.E. Morrison Street Suite 250 Portland, OR 97214 b7C -2 b6 -2 Dear Representative Blumenauer: J This letter i'l in response to your request for additional information concerniny Jand the policies and procedures surrounding the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) watch list. Nationwide policies and procedures regarding the TSA watch list are established jointly by the FBI and TSA at the headquarters level. Your concerns have been forwarded to FBI Headquarters, Counterterrorism Division, and the Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. . Additionally, on August 12,2002, this office contactedl land explained, in general terms, the procedures used by the TSA, FBI, and commercial air carriers upon discovery of a name list match. SUSSMAN-2 The Honorable Earl Blumenauer The Weatherly Building 516 S.E. Morrison Street BQft~~e Box 709 Portland, OR 97214 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7C -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b6 -2 Dear Representative Blumenauer: This letter is in res anse to your inquiry on behalf of I lis n~o=-=a~l=s=e""""'" person on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) watch list. However, the watch list does contain a person with the same last name. Therefore, commerci I air carriers are required to chec identification aga'lri---r"'7T""--r"-_...I identification of th TSA watch fist. Un-~o~u--n""'a~e""y, commercial air carriers cannot confirm I Itrue identity until such time as his Identification is checked at the ticket counter. HistoricallyI TSA procedures have required that identification checks be performed by law enforcement officers. Recent changes to TSA procedures allow commercial air carriers to conduct these checks under certain circumstances. This procedure must be completed every time Mr. I land all others with the same last name, travel via commercial aviation. While I fully appreciate Mr. ~rustration, I am sure he can ~un::'::d:r:e=-=rs~ta=ind the importance of the . enhanced security requirements. Sincerely, SUSSMAN-3 D5-30-2002 02:26pm From-SFPD AIRPORT P~TROL 6508217594 T-44 I P.DOI/DDI F-952 San Francisco Police Department To: Il....--......"....-_~~~_ Commanding Officer Airport Bureau - Day Watch b6 -4 b7C -4 IIPPROIlE:O YE~ NO From: I_........_":""":'__~=--""""="'=":"""":"'-:-- _ Airport Bureau - Day Watch Date: Friday, May 24, 2002 SUbject: Selectee and No Fly list Names b7C -4 b6 -4 o 0 o 0 [J 0 ISSUE Airport Bureau police response to the Transportation Security Administration's air-carriers No Fly and Selectee names lists. DISCUSSION .b7C On Fri I May 24, 2002, I met withI leT.S.A) and I spoke with b 6 (F.B.I.), regarding police procedures when dealing With individuals ~w~o~s~e~n~a~m~e~s~ave been entered on the Transportation Security Administration's NO FLY and SELECTEE names lists and the air-carriers reservation data banks. -1,3. -1,3 b2 -4 b7E -1 b3 -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 b3 -1 This new change in procedure, will allow airport officers to minimize the amount of time required to initially detain individuals with names thatl I Dnames on federal NO-FI.Y or SELECTEE lists. b2 - 4__ b7E -1 RECOMMENDATION b3 -1 I recommend that this new change take place to reduce time spent by officers on-scene, when responding to names on federal NO·FLY and SELECTEE lists. .. All INFORM~I!ON CONTAINED ~ / HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI~ laC)~ b f) NLS ~~ c t:::) L DAlI8 -5-D,3a.8Y -- -- . ~A.H. D3- I') '19 SUSSMAN-4 202 324 0235 p.el/06 FOMI (Rev. 6-1-97l FBI FACSIMILE COVER SHEET PRECEDENCE o Immediate o Priority r&J Routine CLASSIFICATION o Top Secret o Seeret o Cenfidential o Sensitive Ii] Unclassified Time Tl1lnsmitted: Sender', Initials: ~bSl#C Number of Pages: .....__ (including cover sheet) Attn From: FBIHQ, Domestic Terrorism Section, Rm 11795 Name of Office Subjea: Lf~~rt: /krfHlTSR4..1c£V b2 -1 b7C -1, 3 b6 -1,3 Special Handl1n~ lnstruetions: k [VLfo;..,.... _ b2 -1 b7C -1 I I ~I b6 -1 o.igin.tar\ N...., ~ l-- Telephone pJ --;:::Z:C==::=::;-\ L-._--- Ori~""ta" p""i"n.=~ ) A.pproved: _ Brief Description of Communication FaKed: '. All INroRMATION CONTAINED ~~~~~l~ I WARNlNG OAl3vUCko~t) /t}lJ AQ-J '. . A- O~- /'11 a UL' InfomUlIOR attllched co the cover sl1eet 15 U.S. Government Property. If you 11ft nOI the ,"rended reclplenr of triis -, infom'lldiun. dillClosure, reproductioll, di!llribution. or use or chis infornllltion is ?rohibited t IS.use. § 64 \ \. Ple:l~ notify the: originator or the ICIC:l1 FBI Office immediately to artlln~e for proper dispolOition. 5USSMAN-S ---- --,.,~-"(LJ~- -- -- -- - -- -- - - --- .--- --------- ---- -~---.--1_---.... APPLICATION OF THE FOURm AMENDMENt TO . AIRPORT SEARCHES Airplane~8cking or skyjacking escalated dramatically duringand after the 19608until its climax with the attacks on the World Trade Center buildings and the Pentagon. Consequently. airport security has always been a matter ofvcry senous concern, and presently, it is a matter of paramount importance. Once the security of an aixplane is compromised. it is very difficult to respond effi:lCtivety to the problem. As was so dramatically illustrated by lastyear~s tragic events, the potential for great and immediate hann to the passengers on the airplane and to the public at large is tremendous. Additionally, the hig)1jackers are extremely difficult to detect.. and in order to avoid the extreme danger highjackers can create. the highjacker must be detected before he boards the aircraft. The importLnce ofairport/airplane security, the need to deteot the highjacker, and the need to protect the public and the airline passengers have been recognized by the ooUI1s in considering how to analyze polite conduct at aiIports under the Fourth Amendment. • ...,~ .c.I" '-oi.J b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 In 1968, a Task Force was appointed. to develop an on-the-ground higbjacker detection system. This system was adopted by the FAA and continues to be employed today to provide secwity for an air travel. As its most prominent componcm. the system employs pre-flightsc~_ through the use ofnotices to the public. identification checks, application ofabighjack~ magnetOMeters, K-rays, interviews with selected passengers, and frisks or searches of cC:rtain suspicious passengers. The employment of these measures has been approved by the courts as reasonable; however, questions concerning the constitutionality ofother searches and seizures at the airport continue to arise. This presentation and paper is designed to deal primarily with those issues. The Fourth Amendment docs not prohibit all wammtless searches and seizures; instead. it prohibits only unreasonable ones. The reasonableness of wammtless searches and seizures at airports oron airplanes will be determined. in part, by balancing the imrusion itselfagainst the need for security at airports and the difficulty in ferreting out the highjacker from the throngs ofmembers of the public in airpoIts and boarding the airlines. Because the courts have determined that airport screeoing procedures arc searches, they must be justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. Five exceptions have been applied by the couns: (1) the border search exception; (2) a Teny stop and frisk; (3) the administrative search exception; (4) consent; (S) thecriticalWllC"theoT)'. Border Search Exception Because many airports have both intematioDa.1 and domestic flights, different standards for searches or seizures may be applicable at the same airport, depending on whether the flights being selViced at domestic or international. For international flights, under the border search exception. mutine searches of persons and their effects may be conducted under the same perameters as those $cBlCnes are conducted at the international borders. Those seeking admission to or exit from the United States on an international flight win be subject to a routine inspection of his person and his belongings. Any non-routine search (e.g., strip searches) must be based on reasonable suspicion. For passengers on domestic flights, the border search exception cannot be used to justify the search of a person or his belongings. All INFORMATION CONTAINED I f HE~ IS. tJ1'ICLASSIFI£D ~~~S.{)J By(1CloQ~~'l NlS AG CA L CA.lJ 03- I '11 q SUSSMAN-6 ----- -- ---- ~u~-~c-~~~~ ~~~1~ -------NS-7D I p.e3/06 L-- _ b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 reny Stop and Frisk: Application ofthis exception is discussed in further detail below. Administrative Searches: Courts have justified the airport security screening procedures under the administrative selICh exception. The courts have held that when all passengen are subjected to secwity screeningprocedures in order to provide greater protection and security to the airport and departing aircraft, the routine screening procedures are considered administrative searches and not violative of the Fourth Amendment. When these screening procedures are used only on selected passengers, they fall outside the coverage ofthe administrative search exception. When these screening procedures are used improperly to detect the possession ofcontraband, the administrative search exception may not be used to justify the search. Consent: Any search or sei%ure can be justified on the basis ofa defendant's knowing and volUntary consent. Consent should be express, rather than implied. Agents shouldnot rely entirely upon warnings airlines generally give to passengers that their luggage or person may be searched; the court's have been divided on the issue ofwhether these gen.eml warnings can constitute at least implied consent to search. Critical Zone: The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that airports are to be considered "critical zones'" in which special Fourth Amendment considerations apply because they conSiderthe airport the one channel through which all highjackers must pass before being in a position to commit their crime and the one point where airport security officials can marshal their resources to thwart airplane violence before the lives ofan airplane's passengers are endangered. These cowts, therefore, deem reasonable more intrusive security measures if specifically tailored to increase aiIport security and to detect highjackers. The Stop ofa Person in· the Airport (prior to presenting himself for boarding): I',(~ CYn.vv..i-eA- ~ .-------- The Fourth Amendment applies to an airport stop only when a seizure occurs. If1here is no detention. there is no seizure, and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. A person has been seized only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. a reasonable personwould have believed that he was not free to leave. Whether an aiIport encounter between the police and a suspect aD10Wlt to a seizure requires a review ofall relevant circumstances, including psychological factors. Ifa reasonable person would fee free to disregard the police and to go about his business, the enoounter is consensual. Asking for an individual's airline ticket and his identification was pennissible and will not be considered a sei':::J..re, Afkh~g rOl.r'J.m~ questions concerning the reason for and destination oftravel does not implic.:::e i11~ ';:::t;illtt~" mendment. Generally, there is no sejzure when a law enforcement agent merely approaches an individual at the airport, and after identifying himself, begins to ask routine questions related to the person's identification, travel plans, and ticket information. A non threatening request to search will not convent the encounter into a seizure. SUSSMAN-7 -1 6 -1 -1 -- --- .~ ,~~~ .~ .. ~ -- --- -- --- -1~ 1 P.1214/136 Faeters considered in determining whether a seizure has occurred include: (1) location ofthe encounter; (2) physical contact with the person; (3) appearance and clothing of the o~cers; (4) number of the officers~ (5) displa.y or presence ofweapons; (6) demeanor and tone ofVOice ofthe officers; (7) length oftime inwhich documents are retained~ (8) any advise ofright to tenninate the encounter or refuse consent; (9) infonnation that the person was suspected ofcriminal activity; (l0) the length ofthe encounter, among others. When a narcotics officer identifies himself as such and advises the person that he is suspected of tnmsporting DaICotiCS, the courts willlike.ly fin.d that a seizure has occurred. If the officer retains the traveler's identification or travel documents, the encounter may be considered a seizure. - .. An~ves~ve m:tg:tti~n mus: be based on reB.Sonab~e ~usp~ci~n ~~h mus! ~e based on factors that'Wfi1il VIewed In tJielr totality amount to reasonable and arttculable SuspiCIon tlmt the pe . . Asubsequent frisk ofthe person must be based on voluntary .J.L....'OPV••sent or reasonable SUSPI • t the individual might be armed. 8tl\ ? "II , An lIIl'est must be based on probable cause. If a suspect is arrested and his luggage or personal: items are removed with the suspect. those items may be searched only on the basis of consent or probable cause, with a warrant Air Tenninal Security Scre.ening As set forth above, routine airport tenninal..entrysecurity screeninghasbeen approved by the courts as .dministrative searchesbecause their purpose is to provide security and safety ratherthan to detect crime. In order for these procedures to continue to be justifiable as administrative searches, the emphasis ofthe search must continue to befor purposes ofdet.ennining the presence of dangerous persons or articles rather than the presence of contraband or for other gencrallaw enforcement purposes. Courts have held that the placement ofitems on the x-ray conveyer belt constitutes at least implied consent to a visual and limited hand search of the items if the x-ray examination is inconclusive. Absent consent or probable cause, the scope ofthe hand search mustbe limited to that which will reveal an object that could be used to effect a highjacking or endanger other passengers or members ofthe public entering the terminal. (Caveat: this does Dot extend to searchfor money or drugs seen on x-ray examination; although a search therefore may be based upon probable cause or oonsent). Strip searches must be conducted. only on reasonable suspicion. Passengers Presenting Thems:,::xves for Boarding on the Aircraft The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that it is pennissibJe to request a search of passenger presenting himself for boarding on an airplane. The officer may indicate that if the passenger refuses. he will not be permitted into the gateway or the airplane. ff a passenger is SUSSMAN-8 b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 NS-7D ticketed and presents himselffor boarding on the airplane, he may be subjected to asearch.on mere or unsU)?ported suspiciop. Scope of search can be of sufficient scope to reveal any object or """"instrumentality that could reasonably have been used to effect an act ofairpinlcy. Again. the search cannot be one designed merely to detect contraband. Checked Luggage: Passengers have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in checked luggage. Generally, searches of checked luggage can be conducted on with consent or a warrant based. on probable cause. Where. however, there is evidence that luggage contains explosives orsomeother itemofasimilarly dangerous nature. exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless search. but the search must be based on probable cause. Checked luggage may be x-rayed. A subsequent search can be conducted to dispel suspicions ofdanger. but a general search for contraband cannot be conducted absent a warrant or consent. Becausea dog sniffofluggage is not considered asearch. luggage may be subjected to a dog sniffwithout any suspicion whatsoever. However. ifadog alerts to the presence ofcontraband. the subsequent search may be conducted only with consent or a warrant. Adog's alert to the presence of explosives may provide probable CfWSC for a warrantless search condllcted under exigent circumstances. (A dog sniffofa person is a search and cannot be conducted) Ifa person disavows ownership of luggage when presented with an opportunity to claim ownership of it, it will be considered abandoned and can then be searched. Aperson's luggage can be seized for a reasonable period oftime on the basis ofreasonable suspicion. It should not prevent passenger's continuation of travel. Luggage can be seized on the basis ofprobable cause pending the issuance ofa warrant to search; however~ ~e agents should be actively taking steps toward obtaining the warrant. Private v. Governmental Searcbes Airport security measures were~ in the Past. largely employed by private security companies employed by the airlines or by airline employees themselves. Purely private searches are not subject to Fourth Amendment protections~ therefore. where these searches or seizureS were conducted entirely by airline personnel without governmental intrusion or prompting, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. However, governmental agencies became increasingly involved in airline security, and most ofthe searches. even where conducted by airline employees or security personnel, were instigated by government agents or gvvcmment agents participated in them. In those cases, the Fourth Amendment controlled the appropriateness of the conduct. As you know. the law now requires that airport security be provided by the govermnent, and the Air Marshal program has been revived~ consequently. a Fourth Amendment analysis; wiU rarely be avoidable. Nevertheless. when airline employees are acting entirely independently. the cowts will find that a private llearch was conducted. and that the Fourth SUSSMAN-9 - ------------ --------- ------ --- JUL-18-2882 10:12 NS-7D Amendment had no application (e.g., airline employees opening suitcases to detennine ownership and then encountering contraband therein). SUSSMAN-10 b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 September 4, 2002 Mr. Michael D. Robinson Associate Under Secretary for Aviation Operations Transportation Security Administration 400 Seventh Street, SW Washington, DC 20590 Dear Mr. Robinson: Thank you for your June 27th letter, enclosing a copy ofTSA's Delegation Order concerning the placement of Federal Security Directors at all of the major airports nationwide. You asked that the Order be disseminated to each of the FBI's field offices having a need for the information. Recognizing the FBI's investigative jurisdiction with respect to criminal violations set forth in Chapter 465 of Title 49, and all aviation-related criminal violations set forth in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, our field offices will be provided copies of TSA's Delegation Order dated June 14, 2002, along with the reminder that interagency cooperation and coordination are critically important to our respective missions and responsibilities as our agencies continue to discuss pertinent jurisdictional considerations. Sincerely yours, Robert S. Mueller, III Director b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 1 - Mr. Ashley (5012) - Encs. I - Mr. D'Arnuro (5829) - Encs. 1 - 1\!r Wainstein (7427) - Encs. ) 0(5096) - Encs. 1.:_ (7326) - Encs. I 7176) - Encs. 62F-HQ-l077732 NOTE: Reply coordinated with Attorney-Advisorl ~nvestigative Law Unit, OGC. and Unit Chie~ ~ Major TheftlTransportation Cnmes nit, CID. BHM All INFORMATION CONTAINED HE~ IS UNCLASSIFIED I J ~~S-Qa _Bt~~" ~ NLS Ac;. (CA L. 03 - I ') 1ct SUSSMAN-ll ------------------------- Attachment 1 June 13, 2002 Authorities of the Federal Security Directors (FSDs) 1. Manage Aviation Security Resources. On a day-to-day basis, manage and provide operational guidance to the aviation security resources of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners, field agents, andJaw enforcement officers to which they are assigned. 2. Screen and InspectPassengers, Property and Cargo. A. Passenger Aircraft. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 114(e) and TSA regulations, policies and procedures, be responsible for the day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transPOrtation and intIastateafr transPortation. In"accordance with TSA regulatiQDS. policies and procedures. providefor the screcnlng of aU passengers .. and property, fncludiq United Statc8 mail, cargQy caay~~ and checked baggage and oth~ articles, that will be canied abo8rda paSsenger aircnftopemted by an air carrier or foreign air canier in air traDsportation or intmstate air"transportati.o~ in accordance with 49 U.S.C.' 44901(a). In accordance with TSA regulad.ons~".policiC8 and proc:edures, provides for search imd detention of persons Or property posing a suspected risk to safety and security, in accordance with 49 U.S,C, § 44903(b). B. CheckedBaggage. In accordance with 49·U.S,C~ § 44901(c),(d), and (e) andTSA regulations. policies, and procedures, as explosive detection equipment becomes available, screen all checked baggage through such equipment In those unusual circumstances where explosive detection equipment is not available, screen every piece of. checked baggage through altemative means. In accordanCe with TSA regulations, policies and procedutes, such alternative means may include one or more ofthe fonowing: .. (1) A bag-inatch program that ensures that no checked baggage is placed aboard an aircraft unless the passenger who checked the baggage is aboard the aircraft. (2) Manual sean:h. (3) Search by canine explosive detection units in combination with other means.. (4) Other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary. C. Cargo Aim;aft. Provide for the screening and inspection ofcargo that will be cl\meli on a.\\-f.;:n-i!'{i qircraft, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(~} !J:'$l TSA l'cguhtio;:.s. policies aJld procedures. 3. Assess and Coun~-e:rThrullts tJ'J Aviation. A. Liaison Functions. SelVe as a liaison for aviation security to the local intelligence and law enforcement communities. Receive, assess, distribute, and ensure utilization of intelligence and law enforcement information 1lS appropriate. SUSSMAN-12 2 ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED t ~ HE~J U..NjLASSlfIEO OA .. 0_ Byuck~"f) rJU ~6 rIO/ (!A~(}.~-I" (\ ('\ (1) Memoranda of Understanding Concerning Data. Bnter into memoranda of understanding with local offices of Federal agencies and other local entities, such as state and local law enforcement, to share or otherwise cross-check, as necessary, data on individuals identified on Federal, State and Local agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or'national security. (2) Notification Procedures Concerning potential Threats. Establish procedures for notifying the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or aircraft operator security officers of the identity of individ~sknown to pose•.or suspected of posing, a risk of air . privacy.or teaorism or athreat to aircraft operator or passenger . safety, in accordance with 49 U~S.C. 11l4(h). . (3) Identification of ~diyidua1sPosing a1bmat.·.In consultatiqn.with .' other appl'Opri~Federid state, and local.agencies'and alrcaniem, and upon notice' that an individual may be a security threat. establish policies and 'procedures that require air cairlers to notify.aPpropdate law enforcement agencies of the individual'8 identity~ prevent the individual from bo8rding an aircraft, ortakc other appropriate action wi~ respect to that individUal. . (4) Passenger Lists. On a case by case basis, and when warranted by specific security considerations. req~ passenger aircaniers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal, State, and Local agencies, for the purPose ofidentifying individuals who~y pose a threat to . aviation safety or national securi.ty. . B.Security Countermeasures. Coordinate ~d implement security countermeasute8 with appropriate departments, local offices of federal· .agencies. state and local law enforcement agencies~_airports, and air . ciuriers. Wort with the FAA with res'pec:;t to any actions or activities ~at may'Bffect aviation-or aviation safety or air carrier operations, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 114(f}(13). C. Oear. close or secure ahpol1S and related facilities. If a particular .security threat to a gate, a concOurse, a tenninal, an airport or related facilities.cannot be addressed ina way adequate to ensure. to the extent feasible, the safety of passengers, crew, 'or other individuals, the affected facilities may be cleared, closed or otherwise secW'ed. After a. security action has been taken in accoi:dance with 49 U;S.C. §' 4490S(b), provide feedback to the airport operator on el~ rensor.s f:)! the security action. D. Cancel. delay. return. or divert flights. Ifa particular security~at to a flight' or series of flights, including air piracy (as defined in 49 U.S.C.§ 46502), cannot be addressed in a'way adequate to ensure, to the extentfeasible, the safety of passengers and crew. the flight or series of flights may be cancel~ delayed, re~ed to an airport after 3 SUSSMAN-13 Transportation Security Administration (No Fly and Selectee Lists) The No Fly and Selectee Lists, both administered by TSA, often are confused with the TWL. Currently, the TWL staff is working with TSA to develop protocols to facilitate entry and/or removal of FBI subjects to/from the No Fly or selectee Lists. It should be noted, TSA is the only agency which actually can make the entries or removals. The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using commercial aviation who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to aviation, based on information provided by various sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be permitted to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. un such time the individual is removed from the list b TSA. e noted, .the air carriers a1rport aut orities are responsible for preventing a the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the b2 -4 b7E -1 ~~__T_h-:-e"'7":s_e~l:-e,:;",c_t_e~e_L_i_s_t_c_o_n_s_i_s_t,:;",S-:-O_ f-:"i_n_d_i_V-:l_'d_u_a_l,:;",s_W~h"":,o""",,:,,,"a_r_e---:-/ \ b2 - 4 J b7E -1 These individuals are screened by airport authorities in accordance with TSA Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respective air carrier and/or local airport authorities will make the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft. b2 -4 b7E -1 5U55MAN-14 Notes and Guidance for NO FLY and SELECTEE lists Prepared 3125/2002 by SS4 I Administrative-General Investigative b7C -1 b6 -;-1 b2 -4 b7E -1 NO FLY list -Used to prevent personsfrom using commercial aviation who are deemed by the FAA to be athreat to aviation, based on information received from various sources. Airport police are to perform an initiallD checkandwill hopefully eliminate the orson as amatch. \ I I Airport police wi! contact the FBI in questionable cases. A few people have been removed from the list a~er the person convinced the FBI and the FBI determinedl jthat they were not a threat to aviation. The passenger may not fly untit the FAA removes their name from the list. The aircarriers, not the FBI, prevent the passenger from boarding the "ight. The person can travel by other means. but not commercial air. The FAA removes names from th Ii n' . agency or a documentk,.,.,.......,..,....-~ ....----:~~-r----r~~~:-:-:7':'":--:-.....-:-::"'"":""" ----J I Iindicating a SUSSMAN-1S b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 SELECTEE b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 Possible Match Passenger at the Ticket Counter" When apassenger with apossible name match presents themselves at atickpt I"nllntpr. the <2.;1 Lell it: Ito.; ;:)l t thp. ~irnmt I FO for an initiallD chAcko I I b2 -4 b7E -1 Passengers who know their name is on a list requiring identification by the police can potentially arrange with the airport police before they get to the airport that day to alert the police they have a flight and when they plan on bein althe ai ort. Thus the alice can be there or atleast be nearb b2 - 4 further reducing delays. b7E -1 2 SUSSMAN-16 b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 January 22, 2003 From:I....__----I1 OGClILU, ExD ro:I ................------- b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -3 b6 -3 Enclosed is your copy of a draft MOD I received. fro~ la policy official in TSA. Not sure why he faxed it to me but, in any event, it addresses respective roles in providing input to and using the TSA's No-Fly and Selectee lists. I am not sure who in CTD has this for action but it's got to be one of you three so here it is. Anyway, If you need us on this any more, let me know bS -1,2 AllINF'ORM;inC~1CONTAINrn HE~ IS U~LASSIrIED OA ~~ - .3 BY 11(" ~QC1 G, 1 C~*03-1'?1~ 5U55MAN-24 .. -.~.-..-.-.-.-.-."."""' ..~.~--p=:~. b7C From: To: Date: SUbject: 6/271027:32PM Re: TSA & Local LEO inquiry of PC for Detention of No Fly List individuals b7C Not being a lawyer, I'm treading on common sense ground here, but I believe that "investigative detention""" is the basis for the !ocal LEO holding individuals until the FBI shows up, same as it is for non-terrorist criminal matters, such as potential Crime Aboard Aircraft violations. After you arrive, however. if there is nothing in NCIC, such as an INS status problem or any arrest warrant for the person and they want to leave, they can leave, unless you find something for which to arrest them. As a reminder, OGC also advises that the field use the 265 TURK classification for each interview conducted related to the lists. (....A lot of LEO's don't seem to like using that surrogate authority, which is why we had all those deputation issues over the last couple of years.) E5~ 16/27/02 12:40:36 PM :>>> b7C cc: TSA and local LEO are inquiring as to the PC for detaining individuals that have been identified on the No Fly or Selectee list with more than the name match. They are concerned about the legality of the detention. They need to know the PC for which they are detaining the individuals until the FBI shows up b 7 C to interview the individual. . Thanks for yoyr aST,ance ARTHURrCUMMINGS; IL _ L ~(r_----" b7C b2 b7C b7C -1 b6 -1 From: To: Date: Subject: AR IAUH M. COMM,NGSlr-----~ 5/28/02 1:43:30 PM Issue: TSA and No Fly Lists b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 Here's some background, if you have the patience to read it: Since 10/2001, when the TSA No Fly and Selectee lists came into being (aftermath of h . l, I have been attempting to make the updated lists available to the field agents on a timely basis, Le., when they are issued, because TSA has made the agen , e or respon 1n9 to possible name matches. The agents need these lists in order 10 have background and 10 info. 1 ------:-----lb5 -1 bS -1 b6 -3 b7C -3 r 2 -4 5 -1 7E -1 L- _ TSA also fails (except on one occasion) to coordinate with us when they tell the carriers whom to contact (the FBI) or when they change the Security Directives concerning response which affects FB! offices. b2-4 Despite my best efforts. the TSA just motors along and I and the agents are being whipped around the b 5 -1 ftagpole trying '0 do the light thing. Ib 7E - 1 Ib5 -1 ---------------:---- Example - today List 51 was issued; Lists 49 and 50 were issued on Friday. I believe I was here, but no mail from TSA, and I check every hour. I have raised this issue with people in TSA and here, and told the agents that getting the lists from me is now a luxury instead of a certainty. ( have lJied to arrange a meeting withl IISA b. ¢ tbat bas ••'""dssd 0""...1 ~ Again, please try to give me some time so we can meet and decide how we want to procee9. ITSA issues these lists to the air WiIIlilllli aOlllllllaimaa ""1i",,1 All INFORMATION CONTAINED I ~ H£~ 1$U~SSIF~ ~JI ~b· BY C G,f) NLS A c; (~L .CA~03 .. ( q . SUSSMAN-29 Thank~ ss~~=~---hax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division I F,ea.gov b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C Page i 10: Date: Subject: 5/29:'02 S:OS:13 PIJI New TSA Guidanc5'-Seiectee and No Fly Lists More to follow as I get ad.ditional information. SS~ ~fax) Civil AViation security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division L...- 11eo.gov b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 cc: ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS; Aviation-CIRG&Training; Avia... (J1(t rL/lr;f4-- SUSSMAN-30 b7C -1 b6 -1 From: To: Date: Subject: 7/2/02 7:40PM Re: No Fly and Selectee Lists b7C -1 b6 -1 ~ r"2 F.....;.,,;;.......;.,;..;.;;.;..-------------------------------L, b5 -1,2 Re authority to hold No Fly passengers until the FBI arrivesJ I IWnw I r:~n't imanine that. I b 5 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 If the FBI. and the TSA cannot agre~ ~~5 -1, 2 I L.....-------------.....,r- Regardsl »1 /2/0211:59:21 AM>>> ..... ...,b5 -1,2 I I The specific statutory citation for the terrorist watch Iis~ b 7 C - 1 b6 -1 b5 -1,2 b5 -1,2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEM' UN . Slfl£D 1'1 .nAl ~. vUWo oato , (]A 03- ('}')~ _____...J~Fly a~d ~el:ctee.Li~ts .. I lexi I CSL....->-::===....J==:WIO-7/01/02 07:32PM >>> b5 -1,2 r-----------------------------------------, b7C -1 b6 -1 F -1,2 :============================================::::::;,b::-;5:-~1-:2 1b5 -1,2 L---:-:_~--~---':":"":'7 ...... ,....~~1b7C -1 My next move is to consult thel In the_b6 -1 DAG's office--about the issue of the legal basis for No-Fly decisions after I discuss this within OGC. b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 b5 -1,2 r----T:"~::-T.:':71 ....---_~~'::""!::L:""::-::;:r:.!'::-=::~::_::;_7:i'::&:::'~l':'::"::::""ii::"::"'i~i\"'i';"'A""i"i"\i";'v;:-'A"::::',...........b 7 C -1 I ask that ,go Into ad Itlona legal citations from the USA PATRIOT ACT b6-1 L..,.......--.~....lepertinent, but the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001. passed on November 19, 2001, mandates in Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security Information", that the Under SecretaI)' of Transportation for Security shall: (1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal-agencies or other entities to share or otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or national security; (2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or airline security officers of the identity of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety; (3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers, establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers-- (A) to use information from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and (8) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual; and (4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national security. SUSSI"1AI\I-32 Personally, I think that this about covers it, and hopefully, the FBI will be consulted on revisions to the TSA Security Directives to be more clear about who is to contact whom in what situation. f--.....,r::---:--~--~~-=---~--:-""':":":"'-~~--:-:--~--::-=":"-~--'"""":":"--------""" 2 - 4 Perhaps they need to hear a definitive statement from the FBI on these matters. b 5 -1, 2 1....-_---1 b 7 E - 1 I hope this helps. SS~ {fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division '--__---l~ b2 -1,2 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 >>> MARTIN J KING 6/27/02 5:05:03 PM >>> SSAI I As CDC of the~ I, have ~een asked to obtain some information for the United States Attorney's Office concerning the legal authority under which the FAAITSA promulgate the No Fly and Selectee lists. Personnel from the United States Attorney's Office were recently afforded a briefing rega~ No Fly and Selectee lists by S~ lAirport Liaison Agent. Following this briefing, S~eceived a request for additional information which has been forwarded to the CDC for handling. My understanding is that the U.S. Attorney's Office would like some assistance in identifying the specific statuteslregulations/executive orders or any other enabling provisions which grant authority to the FAA and/or TSA to compile and disseminate the lists. There is no known agenda attached to the request other than further informing the understanding of appropriate personnel regarding the program. b6 -1 b7C -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 I have read the "Notes and Guidance" which you prepared on 03/25/2002 and accordingly, I hope that you may be of some help in responding to the request from the United States Attorney's OfficdL b2 -1 ......_-:--_"""":"'"--:-~f your Unit mainta,ins responsive information, please forward same to my attention. I ~~C_ ~ 1 may be reached 1 CIIMMINGS·Sr- _ _ b7C -1 b6 -1 SUSSMAN-33 [_-----~e:NO~and ~elede~ Lis~s' . ~. ( .. I -Page'" ··t··... ··· b5 -1, 2 b7C -1 b6 -1 L...-----J From: To: Date: 7/6/023:44PM Subject: Re: No Fly and Selectee Lists ( 1seeing as how I had time today, waiting for the TSA lists, I thought I would reply to you. I know this mail constitutes an on oin discussion which really needs to be held in person, so people can offer their views 1. Agree. 2. Agree 3 and 5. Still not clear on your distinction. b5 -1-,2 IbS ,-------- -1,2 1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 ("S_---V/3/02 9:03:31 AM »> 1. As far as I am concerned1 1b5 -1,2 J bS - 2 YollJ1eard their COlln~~1 .",,, '·",u"ants more, such as' I r r ~5 -',2 -------------------------- rBuL what TSA os enbtled to .><pocl,s aJ All INFORMAilON CONTAlml ) } ~i;lf~~lAS~'~ffc.(e()9\<O fl ,..J L,s (A ~{(A L SUSSMAN-34 ~I! 03- 11)1)(', b7C -1 b6 -1 4. Maybe, at some POint,S Ib5 -1,2 5. In the end, even though we are dealina with lists or arouoinas of Deoole who are ioined tooether bv a b5 -1,2 D=----_ c5 107102102 07:39PM >>> b7C -1 b6 -1 b5 -1,2 We still need to address the legaL policy and procedureal questions as a total picture rather than 0"""",,,,"11 1 _ Re authority to hold No Fly passengers until the FBI' arrives I..-- Wow I can't ImaClne that I 1 b5 -1,2 b5 -1,2 b5 -1,2 bS -1,2 b7C -1 '----- r1 ls -1,2 t -1,2 1__------ ES~---'07/01/02 07:32PM >>> ~ lb5 My next move is to consult th~ lin the DAG's office--about the issue of the legal basis for No-Fly decisions after I discuss this within OGC. . b7C-1 , b6 -1 b2 -1 -1,2 bS -1,2 .........---""1'"r---r"..........-J===:::::;::=::::-::-~-:---.-:::---.-~-.--::-::---;:---::::-7':"::''':''''':~=:=-:~~ b 7 C - 1 OGC, go into additional legal citations from the USA PATRIOT ACT b6-1 L..-mtllT"TT,,",'n""rle pertinen!T,~uT"l'l:-::e~v~la=\ion and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, passed on November 19, 2001, mandates in Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security Information", that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall: (1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal agencies or other entities to share or otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or national security; (2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, appropriate State and local law enforcement officials. and airport or airline security officers of the identity of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or l<:1"n::,n5m cr ~~ ~rea.: t~. airline or passenger safety: (3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers. establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers- (A) to use information from government agencies to identify b7C -1. SUSSMA.-,-N-'.-:3-,-7--,-=-..-..=,--,--",,---~ __"',-a_ge-,-4~J b6 -1 individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and (B) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft. or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual; and (4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national security. b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 16/27/025:05:03 PM >>> ~~{ I ;~ b7C -1 i1 I b6 -1 As CDC of th I have been asked to obtain some information for the United States Attorney's Office Iconcerning the legal authority under which the FAAITSA promulgate the No Fly and Selectee lists. Personnel from the United States Attorney's Office were recently afforded a briefing reg~ding thj No Fly and Selectee lists by sA IAirport Liaisorb 7 C -1 Agent. Following this briefing, S received a request for additional information which has been b 6 - 1 forwarded to the CDC for handling. Personally, I think that this about covers it, and hopefully, the FBI will be consulted on rev~' .110'1l.IoOiL.IoW..1oI.LliiIi_--, TSA Security Directives to be more clear about who is to contact whom in what situation. I hope this helps. SS~ I(fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division ____~leo.gOV My understanding is that the U.S. Attorney's Office would like some assistance in identifying the specific statutes/regulations/executive orders or any other enabling provisions which grant authority to the FAA and/or TSA to compile and disseminate the lists. There is no known agenda attached to the request other b 7 C - 1 than further informing the understanding of appropriate personnel regarding the program. b 6 -1 I have read the "Notes and Guidance" which you prepared on 03/25/2002 and accordingly, I hope that you may be of some help in responding to the request from the United States Attorney's OfficeJ~__...I ____.....,.---"1 If your Unit maiqtains responsive information, please forward same to my attention. I may be reached a J b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 cc: ARTHUR M. CUMMINGSJ MARION Bowmanl I lL...- _ b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -3 b6 -3 b2 -4 5U55MAN-38 b7C -1 .-- b7E -1''--'' Pag.·e.·1.J· .. ___-........._ ....... -----------------.J'--'---cb6 -1 . - b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS; I"'--- ---J (/181026'39PM I I From: b Date: Subject: "-::===============================:::;-_b2 -4 r b7D -1 b7E -1 Thank you. --- ----_..._..----...-- --- ----- ._------------------......--------------------...------...---- ~;~--------...Jlalstate.gov> cc:t:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~---.J b7C -1,3,5 b7D -1 b6 -1,3,5 Subject: RE: TSA No Fly List Date: Thu. 18 Jul2002 13:51:03 -0400 I I b2-4 b7C -5 ------========================================:::!.., b 7D -1 I I ~~E~' b2 -4 '--- ---.J b7C 1,3,5 r-------------------------.......'---........----..,b7D -1 b7E -1 b6 -1,3,5 ~y~qMf.N-39 t ' ~~""""""-""-'-'b7C -1 '--_---: ----' .,. . b7E -1 b6 -1 Please advise who will attend this meeting. I may be reached a~L...- ---J1 Thanks. ~;~~fQinal MessaQef(~-~I) [maiitol--....,~leo.govJ Sent: July 06, 20022:51 PM ...-- _ Tod :JE-mail)~ I' Ccf I(E=mail)l I(E-mail) Subject: Re: TSA No Fly L":""is":""t-----.....1 b7C -1,3,5 b7D -1 b2 -2 b6 -1,3,5 c=J- sorry, I was looking on the wrong lists - it looks like there is al pn the most current Selectee List 44. ....l b7C -2,5 b6 -2,5 D b7C -2,5 b6 -2,5 b7D -1 b7C -1,3,5 b7D -1 b2 -2 b6 -1,3,5 ov> (E-mail)" F;.L..----""1'='::-==':"':'::::'"'"------------J L...-_r-----__....E-mail)..IL....----~state.gov>1 (E-mat ost.dot.gov:> ----- Sent: Friday, July 05, 2002 5:50 PM Subject: Re: TSA No Fly List Hello·D It appears that th;re is no morel pn either of the ~o lists (No Fly 73 or Selectee 44), so Mr. I J>hould have no more problems for now. However, if another! Ishould be put on the list, his name would trigger something. Your advice was the best that could be given under the circumstances. I don't knowIf FBI put him on the list or not. IL....--- I ~upervisory Special Agent Civil Aviation Security Program Special Events Management Unit, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation I I(fax) b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 faa.gov =~===PJ:;;@~state~ I(E-mail)" ~~~__......KE-mail)"~Ieo.gov b7C -1,3,5 b6 -1,3,5 b2 -2 b7C -1,2 b6 -1,2 There is a specific case involving the TSA List which is a slightly bigger problem for us. The list contains the name: I We have a MrJ Iwho is continually denied access to the automated check-in and is given the third degree every time he flies. ~~tl~?MAN-40 ~~b 7E -1 .·Pa~e. 3.J. 1.------------------------------~·b6 -1 ~.=-.-'-= ....=.. ,=-~.--'-"-'--'-'--'----=----'-"- b7C -2 b7D -1 . b6 -2 The problemrl'·OLl.Ilw...J.lW-.L..- "'"T"" ...JI' a member o.. L..~--..,....---,--.-r---....L~~..:.:.:.::~:.::..::.:; preparatory meetings related to th We h;::.av.:.:e~ad:::.v:.:i:::.se~d~ou~r ........ ..1..::::...::.::::.::.:.:..:.:.:.::., ticket using his full names which match those on his passport Le.L- ----..-J His travel agent has added his Frequent Flyer details to all his bookings an~ Provi~S MrL- ......I ..QQ.Uassport # and Country of Issue so he can checked out early throug hen he travels to the L-..J Still he get's hassled. Is there anyway way for you folks to verify whether you~ ls still a valid name, add more details or delete it? We're still tooking forward to meeting with you folks to try and come to grips with the TSA List issue. D b7C -1,5 b6 -1,5 cc: ._-------- .- SUSSMAN-41 b7C -1,5 b7D -1 b6 -1,5 b2 -2 b2 -4 b7D -1 b7E -1 I b2 -4 Ib7D -1 b7E -1 J 1 b2 -4 b7D -1 b7E -1 2.1 4.1 Fro~ r ToCL....----fFBmL...- @leo.gov> Subject: RE: TSA No Fly List Date: Tue, 18 lun 200220:46:23 -0400 HiD L _ [--- b2 -4 1....---------------------------------1 b7D -1 b7E -1 b7C -5 b6 -5 11....-- --------- [...-----""'1-'----- _ 1 b7C -5 b6 -5 I -------~---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- b2 -4 b7E -1 SUSSMAN-42 b2 -4 b7E -1 L ~f -, b7E -1 3.1 1 b2 -4 b7E -1 -b7C -1 b6 -1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- b2 -2 b7C -1,3,5 b7D -1 b6 -1,3,5 b2 -4 b7C -5 b7D -1 b7E -1 r----------------------------------.....;b6 -5 E-mail)'1 @state.gov> ~----~(E~--m.Ja·i~l)'.!:l ===:::::;:::::--:~faa.gov>, !====::::::II=::::!.=:E-mail)"@ost.dot.gov>, L.- ..J,E-mail)'1 @leo.gov> Subject: TSA No Fly Lis~_ .. Date: Tue, 18 JUll 2002 12:18:29 -0400 I I I b2 -4 b7C -5 b7D -1 "---------------------------------b7E -1 b6 -5 b7C -1 b6 -1 ,,"""""-:,__~I seems to believe that he is entitled to an immediate response to his issues, when the FBI has been waiting since Nov 20'01 for resolution to our issues asking themfo~ I I land to cooperate on crafting the Security Directives. They ignore~ ~anuary letter, and have yet to act, based on discussions held at a meeting in early June to go over these issues again. Therefore, I don't know that we should be in any rush for him, but you have to keep letting him think you're working on "it" - same tactic they use with us. c=Jls going to write the FBI a letter about what TSAwants to know from us about detaining passengers, etc. These are the points that I think need to be iterated, among any others we might add about how a person gets on the list in the first place. From: To: Date: Subject: 7/22/02 1:48PM Info for TSA Legal Request b2 -4 b7C -1,3 b7E -1 b6 -1,3 b7C -3 b6 -3 ~2 -4 L....- S_US_S_M_A_N_-_43 17E -1 1. What does the FBI want the TSA to "do" re a "No Fly" List? b2 -4 b5 -1,2 b7E -1 ~ Ib2 -4 U:!:'========================================================::::::;-b5 -1,2 c1 I b7E -1 C. I 01 2 -4 5 -1,2 7E -1 b2 -4 b5 -1,2 7E -1 Fl b G b HI b I b SUSSMAN~44 ',- .. -,~ 1 ,"Page ~ J b2 -4 b5 -1,2 ________________________________ b7C -1 6 1~~E~~l 2. What is the legal justification for what the FBI wants the TSA to do? A. The legal justification for requiring air carriers to identify passengers on threat lists (including NCIC) and for preventing passengers from boarding until and if identified as a "match" may be found in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, passed on November 19, 2001, mandates in Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security Information", that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall: (1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal agencies or other entities to share or otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or national security; (2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or airline security officers of the identity of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety; (3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers, establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers-- (A) to use information from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and (B) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to b 5 -1, 2 that individual; and b 7 E -1 b2 -4 (4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national security, sJ ci That's as far my legal brain will carry me, which may still not be far enough to properly address the issues. Thanks. ssAi I(fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division L...-__----JF'eo.gov b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 _____....~YDst~ b7C -1 b6 -1 " "."" ~age,,1J b5 -1 From: To: Date: 7/23/0210:16AM SUbject: No-Fly List b 7 C - 1 b6 -1 ___let al: This is to confirm our understanding in OGe of yesterday's meeting. We all recognize the needs: c----~--- c-J----------------' Obviously, eTD will have to address the last three of the four items listed above--although OGe will certainly help wherever we can. However, we can and should play an integral role in developing criteria. We can work on criteria in theory but we really need to learn the track record of experience so far. To that end. you agreed to consult with the coanizant oeoole in the TWL unit and other IT sources to "<>nn'lO nf tho <:>,.h 1<:>11 Let me know if your understanding is different than what I have described and please let us know how you are progressing in finding out the actual criteria used so far. Thanks!"'--- IExtl__---l b5 -1 b7C -3 b6 -3 I~C:ll&.c;'"'--- e~U:=lirMINGS,ARTHUR M·!I--__----III'--------"----- b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 From: To: Date: Subject: NO FLY INFO 8/5/027:45PM List Criteria Ipe, all[ las! meetiaa I rllllIewed me exist!n~ ---J J b5 -1 b7E -1 b2 -4 cc: b7C -1 b6 -1 All INFORMATION CONtAINED ( ~ HE~I U C SIF~ DA· • BY c.lo C~ ~ ') r\l LS AG CA L QA 03- f')llq ~s.se.m o(t:'J.oF1Y UstC~-~'.~~-~-..-... SUSSt.~A~~:7 ~P~~~f] '--- F ------". b2 - 4, 5 ~~..........c.._--",- -=--"-'-'-'-__-'---'"-"- ~~-'-==-"-'-=~- b7C -1 b7E -1,2 b6 -1 From: To: Date: Subject: ~6:52PM L-jissem of No Fly List b2 -4 5 This is probably a tricky question depending on to whom you wish to give it and why. If you have an b 7 E -1, 2 FAA/TSA repl lit might be~discuss~ them and let me know what they say. I've been answering this question for otherL-J but eachL-.jsituation may be different. I think it should be disseminable to liaison contacts responsible for aViation-security mattersI I b2 -4 b7C -1 b7E -1 b6 -1 ~/5/02 1:11 :06 AM »> Hopefully. you can look at the purpose of the list. and go from there. Thanks for your question. If you run into problems or other questions, please let me know. e I Can we dissseminate this list t~L. _ »~ ] 08/01102 05:58AM >>> I've received acouple If questions from labout the lists. such as whether the names are in other databases, etc. I'll answer as I can and cc everYone, and then try to compile a comprehensive info sheet at some point. For example,l b2 -4,5 b7C-1 b7E -1,2 b6 -1 ...-_...-----------------....__..-------------.......------_...----------------------.._------_..._-------------- Please forward this mail as appropriate within your offices and to CP/Duty Agent. Thank you. - Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information. b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 ssA I(fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section ,.Ioo.I.u.II.I.~rterrorism Division leo.ov '-- .....J~~ssemof No Fly,List, ---'---"'--'-'-'-'-'--'"-'b 2 - 4 , 5 b7C -1 b7E -1,2 b6 -1 SUSSMAN--48 ' 'J' , Page,> From: To: Date: Subject: ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS 11.....-__-----------' 8/7/~PM Re:LJissem of No Fly List This is probably a tricky question depending on to whom you wish to give it and why. If you have an FAAfTSA repl lit might be best to discuss this with them and let me know what they say. I've been answering this question for otherc::=J but eachI ~ituation may be different. b2 -4 b5 -1 b7E -1 b2 -4,5 b7E -1,2 t db h t b6 -1 II b h S S Fl :;D~------"~8/05 6:52 PM »> All, the No yand electee lists are contro ed )v t eTA and as such will be dlssemina e >v t a organizationI I 1deas? b7C -1 I think it should be disseminable tol ~esponsible for aviation-security matters! I b2 -4 b7C -1 b7E -1 b6 -1 Hopefully, you can look at the purpose of the list, and go from there. into problems or other questions, please let me know. 6.--- 18/5/02 1:11 :06 AM >>> Can we dissseminate this list tol"--- _ Thanks for your question. If you run >~ 108/01/02 05:58AM »> I've received a couple of questions fronj jabout the lists, such as whether the names are in other databases, etc. I'll answer as I can and cc everyone, and then try to compile a comprehensive info sheet at some point. For example! Please forward this m,Ji4 as appropriate within your offices and to CP/Duty Agent. Thank you. b2 4,5 b7C -1 b7E -1,2 b6 -1 .... Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information. These lists and general guidance for FBI response to possible name matches on TSA lists may be found ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ltEm~ U~~LASSlfILO - f., DA . BY u..e.- 0« Co I) eAj03-'')I)~ ssA I(fax) Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division ____Flea.gov ee· b2 -1,2,4 b7C -1,3,5 b7E -1 b6 -1,3,5 q.Pa~e2 ] ~No Fly .~ist ,f=lr~cedures. ----- From: To: Date: Subject: b2 -4 b7C -1 ----------------~7E-1 r6 -1 9/18/024:41PM No Fly list Procedures To your knowledge, have the TSA and the FBI a reed to a chan e in res onse matches on the No Fly List, Le" ifTS I'm sure that if there had been such a major ange In proce ure, you would have let me know. I've seen no Security Directive to that effect and I can't imagine it. Anyway, I ask because I think SIOC may have inadvertantly misadvised one field office to that effect, and that office has asked for clarification. As far as I know, and please correct me if I'm wrong, the process, in a nutshell, is still as follows: FBI agents get contacted bv the local nolice or air carrip.r tn ,I I r b2 -1, 4 b7E -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 Is that still the procedure? Thanks.D ssA ~ (fax) civil AViatIon Security Program, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division __--..l~leo.gOV b2 -1,2 b7C -1 b6 -1 I~C~C;----~L _ b7C -1,3 b6 -1,3 -----~i"IT"M~~- -- SUSSMAN-61 b7C -1 b6 -1 From: To: Date: Subject: o 10/10/028:07PM Re: NO-fly List b2 -4 b7E -1 First of all, thanks to Tom Bush - I have him fooled, ell? :.,) 1. Q. We have found out that there are POSSiblityl ~O-FIY lists being maintained and utilized at the airport. A. There is only one No Fly List - it is capable of being printed and the TSA maintains it, based on info from FBI, CIA and other intel sources. The current list is #115, and it is about 41 pages long b2-4 right now. b7E -1 2. Q. The "_0. - WI" knn'AI nf ....... T~1\. FBI and thl'! ...;..I;~ ...~ A.I r r I 3. a, These list are not comprehensive and not centralized. A. The lists will never be comprehensive and centralized, as they have different purposes and are maintained by different agencies. However, one day they will all be checked simultaneously (I will be retired by then!) 3. a. Some subjects appear are one list but not the others. A. I would imagine that the No Fly List contains~ names that are also in VGTOF, but not all No Fly names are in VGTOF, although they should be. There will never be consistency due to input mechanisms; etc. and purpose of "lists." 5. Q. Ple::lc:ll'> ..rl\lic:.. h~... ._- OF!t th", ..... ~- .,- ~~ ... .., Nn.l=lt I ic:f ASAP. AJ r 4. Q. Some of the lists are old and not current. A. Throw old lists away and ask the agencies for new.'!sts. I keep you up to date as best as I c~n with the TS1\ list. VGTOF is as current as the entoes I I I b2 -4 b7C -3 b7E -1 L--------------::===================J-------' b6 -3 6. Q. au EC, Dated 10/09/02, titledI i Iis a directive to field offices confirming that all SUbjects have been appropnately watchlisted. We have contacted TSA today. 10/10/02 to verify if our subjects have been place on the list and again determine p~evbwe oW tL _ ALl INFOR:II';;iC:,; C,)NfAINED HtR~ ~;>U\SSlfllQ J / OAT -v~W BYUc..eO~GlJ NLS IACo CAL 03- 1')')9 I' . ,C_''-'-"-b2 - 4 b7C -1,3 b7E -1 b6 -1,3 SUSSM1i:~-62 c=J I have to leave for the evening - I hope this helps somewhatD »~ 110/10/0212:12:44 PM »> o Hello from St. Louis. Our New SAC, Tom Bush spoke highly of you yesterday. ~w:] ·hwo in S:" l.ouis have a problem and are wondering if you Gould help uS out. We have found out there are pOSSiblityj INO-Fly lists being maintained and utilized at the airport. The agencies having lists. as we know of are TSA, FBI and the airlines. These list are not comprehensive and not centralized. Some subjects appear are one list but not the others. Some of the lists are old and not current. We are realty confused. a SIOC an FBIHQ attempting to place these St. Louis SUbjects on the NO-Fly lists, again with no success. as been the most b1ll2fyi but we have not ~et been able 10 :1 'he subjects ~ aced on the lists. au EC. Dated 10/09/02, titledI I is a directive to field offices confirming that all subjects have been appropriately wachhsted. We. ave contacted TSA today. 10/10/02 to verify if our subjects have been place on the list and again determine that they have not. Please advise how we can get these people on the No-Fly List ASAP. b2--4 I b7C -1,3 Thanks b7E -1 b6 -1,3 cc: Aviation-CAS Program; THOMAS E. BUSH; TSA LIST PROCESS SUSSMAN-63 b2 -5 ______t~!SAN()FIYf~~.~ seleCt~.,-e-,-B_O_I_is_fs=.",-,~-==~~~~_::~~.-~~ ~:-~ :======:,,--,--~,,--~~",------c,,--,--,,-_'.e-','~p.e-a-,-g-,-e-,,-1l From: To: Date: Subject: ~ IAviation Field 25 10/25/02 6:37PM TSA No Fly 123 & Selectee 80 lists b2 -4,5 b7E -1,2 I've received some questions about how r1should handle the lists. This is my best guidance, but if someone has something additional to off~se let us know. If the goal is to not let identical matches board flights, and it is the air carrier's responsibility to do that, we have to figure out ways to help the air carriers determine if a possible match is an exact match. If the rr carrier identifies a possible match, they are supposed tal I don't know what optionsc=Jhave to discuss identification with air carrier personnel or if they prefer, or have, to go to the local police at the airport to assist them, but someone is going to have to compare the passenger's identification to the list data. That can be over the phone or in person. TSA controls dissemination of the list and the FBI is only supposed to disseminate within its own organ~tion 1 ------..._--------------------------------------------------------------------- Please forward/disseminate as appropriate b2 -4 b7E -1 - Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information. rese lists ~nd genera!oujdance fur FBI rer;;.~ 19 possjble1::'::'':'' on !SA lilWi w"" b.~d SUSSMAN-64 From: To: Date: Subject: o 10/7/024:40PM b7C -1 Re: the TSA No Fly list b 6 -1 The question has arisen many times already. Persons are placed on the list based on a variety criteria, including the following, which all focus being a known or suspected terrorist, planning or suspected of lannin a terrorist act etc AND os;n a threat to aviation. When ou ask if an ersons on the list are I don't think so, I~ -- I I I b2 -4 b7C -1,3 b7E -1 b6 -1,3 I -----J I I -----J 6 ...l11017,02 10:56:33 AM »> ou know what factor(s) are used inplacing individuals names on the list? For example: I would like to know for future reference in case the question L.:::=:::---------------l b2 -4 b7E -1 Thanks, ICC: J~----- From: To: Date: Subject: HiD 9(30/028:01PM Re: No-Fly Question b7C -1 b6 -1 SUSSMAN-65 b7C -1 b6 -1 I didn't see this article so thanks for sending. The TSA maintains the No Fly List, but the content is generated by FBI, CIA and probably other intel entities. I'll read the article in depth tomorrow. o eJ-----..,~/30/02 9:47:51 AM »> b7C -1 b6 -1 Re the attached article. Who does "maintain" or is "responsible" for the no-fly list? No-Fly Blacklist Snares Political Activists The San Francisco Chronicle By Alan Gathright September 28, 2002 SAN FRAI\lCISCO, CA -- A federal uNo Fly" list, intended to keep terrorists from boarding planes, is snaring peace activists at San Francisco International and other U. S. airports, triggering complaints that civil liberties are being trampled. And while several federal agencies acknowledge that they contribute names to the congressionally mandated list, none of them, when contacted by The Chronicle, could or would say which agency is responsible for managing the list. One detainment forced a group of 20 Wisconsin anti-war activists to miss their flight, delaying their trip to meet with congressional representatives by a day. That case and others are raising qu~stions about the criteria federal authorities use to place people on the list -- and whether people who exercise their constitutional right to dissent are being lumped together with terrorists. "What's scariest to me is that there could be this gross interruption of civil rights and nobody is really in charge," said Sarah Backus, an organizer of the Wisconsin group. "That's really 1984-ish." Federal law enforcement officials deny targeting dissidents. They suggested that the activists were stopped not because their names are on the list, but because their names resemble those of suspected criminals or terrorists. Congress mandated the list as part of last year's Aviation and Transportation Security Act, after two Sept. 11 hijackers on a federal 'Watch list" used their real names to board the jetliner that crashed into the Pentagon. The alerts about the two men, however, were not relayed to the airlines. The detaining of activists has stirred concern among members of Congress and civil liberties advocates. They want to know what safeguards exist to prevent innocent people from being branded "a threat to civil aviation or national security." NO ACCOUNTABILITY And they are troubled by the bureaucratic nightmare that people stumble into as they go from one government agency to another in a maddening search to find out who is the official keeper of the nO-fly list. "The problem is that this list has no public accountability: People don't know why their names are put on or how to get their names off," said Jayashri Srikantiah, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. 'We have heard complaints from people who triggered the list a first time and then were cleared by security to fly. But when they fly again, their name is triggered again." Several federal agencies -- including the CIA, FBI, INS and State Department •• contribute names to the list. But no one at those agencies could say who is responsible for managing the list or who can remove names of people who have been cleared by authorities. Transportation Security Administration spokesman David Steigman initially said his agency did not have a no-fly list, but after conferring with colleagues, modified his response: His agency does not contribute to the no- fly list, he said, but simply relays names collected by other federal agencies to airlines and airports. "We are just a funn'el," he said, estimating that fewer than 1,000 names are on the list. "TSA has access to it. We do not maintain it." He couldn't say who does. Oden said a National Guardsman gral;lQ~p.!lrHAl(~~en she tried to help a security screener searching her bags with a stuck zipper. The midatl:f-agMCfWdn¥cJ'r't, who said she was conservatively dressed and wore no anti-war buttons, said the guardsman seemed to know her activist background. "He started spouting this pro-war nonsense: 'Don't you understand that we have to get them before they get us? Don't you understand what happened on Sept. 11?" Airport officials said at the time that Oden was barred from boarding because she was uncooperative with security procedures, which she denies, Instead, Oden pointed out that the American Airlines ticket clerk -- who marked j'i0r bOGI'~inspas~ If);;;'] an "S" .- had acknowledged she wasn't picked by random. "You were going to be se<;rci',ed fl{l (na\ter what. Your name was checked on the list," he said, according to Oden. "The only reason I could come up with is that the FBI is reactivating their old anti-war activists' files,· said Oden. who protested the Vietnam War as a young office worker in Washington, D.C. "It is intimidation. It's just like y'ears ~go when the FBI built a file about me and they called my landlord and my co-workers.... They did that with everyone in the anti-war movement." A TOOL FOR TERROR In his testimony before Congress, Mueller described the watch list as an necessary tool for tracking individuals who had not committed a crime but were suspected of terrorist links. "It is critically important," he said, "that we-have state and locals (police) identify a person has been stopped, not necessarily detained, but get us the information that the person has been stopped at a particular place." None of this makes the peace activists feel any safer -- about flying or about their right to disagree with their government. "It's probably bad for (airport) security," said Sister Virgine. "Stopping us took a lot of staff away from checking out what else was going on in that airport." Ultimately, she said, "To not have dissent in a country like this would be an attack on one of our most precious freedoms. This is the essence of being an American citizen - the right to dissent." cc: PROCESS ITERRORIST WATCH LIST Unit; TSA LIST L- ----- into VGTOF. b2 -4 b7E -1 Tbe Terrorism Watth List b2 -4 ...-----------------------------..., b7E -1 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (No Fly and Selectee Lists) The No Fly List is used to prevent indiViduals from using commercial aviation who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to civil aviation based on infonnation provided by various sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be pennitted to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the local FBl office will be contacted to cond~ct a thorough interview of the individual to make a positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI. b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 The Selectee List consists of individuals who are ese 10 IVI ua s are screened by airport authorities in accordance with TSA Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respective air carrier and/or local airport authorities will make the final detennination regarding who boards an aircraft. b7E -1 Additions to the No Fly and Selectee lists are based on recommendations from the u.s. Intelligence Communityl lthe FBI and CIA). Removals are based on AllINFOrfMATlO" CONTAINED ~~~S'~~~If1~C.toOO1 b I} N LS lilt ,-ICJ L ~&l-03-1 '1 fl9I SUSSI'vlAN-67 b2 -4 b7E -1 recommendations from the originators of the information. 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) I I I bl ==================::L1 .....J b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 .---------------------------------,oh 7E -1 SUSSMAN-68 The Terrorism Watch List b2 -4 b7E -1 Transportation Security Administration (No Fly and Seledee Lists) The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using commercial aviation who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to aviation, based on information provided by various sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be permitted to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the local FBI office will be contacted to conduct a thorough interview of the individual to make a positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI. b2 - 4 The Selectee List consists of individuals ese In IVI ua s are screene y atrport aut onttes In accor ance WIt T A Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respeCtive air carrier and/or local airport authorities will make the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft. b2 -4 b7E -1 I b2 -4 b7E -1 l.- _ Att INFORMATION CONTAINED I ~~!e.U~~~I~C'09\b') I\JL.s I~<o I(-A-L..--- C' ~ i 03 .. I ') f') 9 b2 -4 b7E -1 5U55MAN-69 · . The Terrorism Watch List b2 -4 b7E -1 Transportation Security Administration (No Fly and Selectee Lists) The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using commercial aviation who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to aviation, based on information provided by various sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be penniUed to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the local FBI office will be contacted to conduct a thorough interview of the individual to make a positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI. The Selectee List consists of individuals ese an IVI ua s are screene y airport au onties In accOf ance Wit TSA Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respective air carrier and/or local airport authorities will make the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft. b2 -4 b7E -1 b2 -4 b7E -1 ~2 -4 ~7E -1 1.- ---1 SUSSMAN-70 '-- Fuestions Rep\y.&t : I" == b7C -1,6 b6 -1,6 b7C -1,6 b2 -2 b7C -1,3,5,6 b6 -1,3,5,6 b2 -2 References: Subject: Re:":N':"'"o-;F=:'ly~li;-st;---------------------_...J Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 00:58:41 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: texUplain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700 Disposition-Notification-T01 Jg}leo.gov> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4801.1700 Dea~ _ Fro"tu .....WI:l°·gov> To: esa.com> Bcc customs.treas.gov>, state.gov>, Please understand that' am only one of many persons involved in this b 6 -1, 6 process, but, as I have tried with other citizens facing the same situation, I will try to respond to your Questions since you were referred to me by the -""'. FAA. For starters, let me say that the U.S. government and the airlines are continually working to streamline the identification of passengers while affording maximum security. Passenger cooperation plays a big role, so we very much appreciate that you recognize the overall issue. Even though your marketers name may match or be dose enough to a name on the No Fly List to warrant additional scrutiny, her own identification, once examined by airline or law enforcement pers.onnel, should be sufficient to distinguish her from the actual person on the list. I think that the airlines, law enforcement and the passenger all hope that this examination process is short, but everyone also wants to be sure that the passenger is not the person on the list. Although there is no government documentation available at this time which a person can carry with them to say that they are not the person on a list, I can only suggest that your marketer contact the airline(s) with whom she deals to inquire if there is something she can do to assist them in distinguishing herself frm'irlhe listnam,,~.in adV3:lCe and again at the ticket counter/gate, to faci\it3:'e the PfOC:9.>~;. I'm not at liberty to discuss how the No Fly List works, and I don't believe that there is any public information at this time regarding the list. You may wish to review the Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed by Congress on 11/19/2001, for insight on the requirements for checking airline 5U55MAN-71 __......~q§tions Reply.tXt ________...1 passenger information. =ua,::==:==::. : Page 21 The idea of having a database or clearing house that could be searched or to which names could be submitted is one that has been raised by many people and that I imagine will be the subject of debate for some time. I hope I have assisted you and, again, thank you for your cooperation as we face these challenges. I IsuperviSOry Special Agent Civil AVlaflon Security Program, FBI Headquarters-Room 11795 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20535 I ~fax) b2 -1 b7C -1,6 b6 -1,6 ---- 0r:.r~iL::.:.::~~=l£:::."";;';" --, From To··r-;.;.a--....".o:-r-----:-----------....I Sent: ednesday, August 07, 20024:19 PM Subject: No Fly List j- b7C -1,6 b6 -1,6 b2 -2 > I was given your contact information by someone at the FAA concerning the > "no-fly" list. I manage a company that conducts background checks for > employers. My interest stems from the experiences of one of our marketers > who is routinely subjected to close scrutiny because her name pops up on > this "no-fly" list. We aren't complaining, just curious about the list. > > Is there some type of document someone could carry showing they aren't the > person wanted on the list? How does the list work? Is there any public > information available regarding the list? > > On a side note, our industry (there are many companies that do what we do), > screens hundreds of thousands of people each week who are applying for jobs > in the US. It would be a great tool for the US to have some sort of > database or clearing house for wanted peTsons that we could either search or > submit names for searches. > > Thanks, > b6 -6 b7C -6 SUSSMAN-72 ~ al.- ~pri.txt ===: b2 -2 : tage 11 Fro @Ieo.gov To:'r:===Ibmi~~~ Cc: L..-,...- ---L ..... b7C -1,2,3,6 b6 -1,2,3,6 Bec tsa.dot.gov SubJec: e:I-... --I Date: Mon, 29 Jul2002 15:46:48 -0400 Deal.... _ Thank you for your email to exPlai~erienceat Jacksonville Airport. Please understand that it-i~ho is on the No Fly list, but similarly named people who may pose a danger to aviation. As you might imaginel !experience is repeated across the country with the more common names. both in Arabic and English. It's difficult to be too cautious. Procedurally, when people with names similar to names on the list present themselves at the ticket counter with their identification, airlines are given the option of determining for themselves that the passenger is not the person on the list. Some airlines either don't have the capability or don't accept the option to make the determination. and therefore they must contact the airport police for a decision. If the police were checking databases, it's possible the didn't want to render a decision until they were absolutely sure of wh as, or wasn't. Unless there is a real question as to whethe is the same as someone on the list, clearance should not take more an minutes. I just got off the phone wit~ ~nd it sounds like a problem with the airlines at Jacksonville airport, becaus4 ladvee didn't have the same problem at Dulles in D.C. I provide with some guidance for contacting the airlines with whom he has a requent Flyer number, and also for initiating contact himself with the airport police prior to arrival at the airport, to give them a heads-up. In the meantime, I kno~ ~poke with someone today at the Jacksonville FBI office, but I didn't recognize the name of the person he spoke with. Therefore, I will be contacting two, experienced aviation security agents in our Jacksonville office for follow-up at the airport to see if there is a problem which can be easily rectified. Sincerely, I ISupervisory Special Agent Civil Aviation Security Program Special Events Management Unit, Room 11795 Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation ----- O~igiQal Message ---- From: I To: 1~:..!::::==:::;;,le:-o:-QQ-:v-:-------------- cc:1 Sen7."t.M"o=n:":jdi'::a7":'y.-Ji:"u:;:ly~2~9~,"'l2:';OOn02'l"'f2~:3i'!3"'Pp'l"ll:MT'""--------------- b7C -2,6 b6 -2,6 b7C -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b6 -2 b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -2 b7C -6 b6 -6 All INFORMATION CONTAINED I ~~~ ~U~~~~1i( Ip O;l b') NLS A<0 IC4 l. C~. 03-1 'J'1q 5U55MAN-73 __--.- Fepiy.txt Subject1,--- _ b7C -1,2 b6 -1,2 2 age21 The FAA referred me to you regarding a "No Fly List" in which our Medical Directo~ ~ has inadvertently been put on. As he was leaving Jacksonville this morning, he was detained for forty-five (45) minutes (and almost missed his flight to New Orleans) to be run through every computer database that was available by the local authorities. The local authorities suggested that he call th~ FBI to have his removed from this so-called "No Fly List". The TSA and FAA were also notified by both '-:-_-:-----Jloffice personnel, as well as myself. After numerous calls, transfers, etc., we were directed back to the FBI. I lis a very well-known and respected physician here the Jacksonville, FL area (please refer to his website~.....--:'_~~~- Quite often, he is required to travel out of state for seminars, business, personal and other hospital related issues; and it is imperative that he not be continually detained by the authorities. After the 9/11 terrorists attacks. we understand the need for increased security; however, we hope th~ Iwill not have to endure the humiliation and delay in travel that he experienced this morning. His passport number iS~ IHis date of birth is:I..... ____ On Monday, July 29thJ lwill be meeting with the local FBI here in Ji;tcksonville, FL. If there is any further light you can shed on this incident, it would be greatly appreciated. b7C -2,6 b6 -2,6 b7C -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b6 -2 5U55MAN-74 ______----JtReTNOFIY List question : . .. From: r b7C -1 To: l Date: Fri, Jan 31, 2003 4:56 PM b 6 -1 SUbject: Re: No Fly List question ~ - not SSA anything .. ) No, not at this point as I can't see the formica pattem on my desk due to paper gluttage. I trust the ec is worthy and appropriate. However, please remember the following if you wish to proceed: L.".""I"II"I'!lrr-rrl~~=~"II':":"'"==-:===~='E""""----------------b2 -4 b7E -1 As a guide - If a CIA wishes to place a person on the No Fly List, the person • A t If the CIA still feels that strongly, then...with the concurrence and assistance of your HQ Substantive Desk SSA, prepare: erson. This will need to be at the FOUO for official use b2 -4 [ lb7E-l b2 -4 L..-r:!:============================r b7E -1 Or---------------- 5. Once obtained, this information is forwarded to the TSA for placement on the NO Fly list. Once this person is on the list. he will not fly within the US, nor will he be able to fly out of the US or from any airport I I dl.....-- _ b2 -4 b7E -1 I hope this helps. Please call me if you need further gUidance/assistance. SS~ Coun~t-ert"":"e-r-r'01-,":'"';s-n-l~D-!v":'"is"':'"ic-":1-- Civil Aviation Security Program L:::j m1179 BIHQ Desk Cell b2 -1 b7C -1 b6 -1 AtllNFORMATION CONTAINED H~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED l 0 .. 1- '1 N L5/A <0 I~ I DA ·10-0>6'( U C,. 0 ~ \,,) C~.a: O~-, r'l"~ SUSSMAN-75 ______t!§f}elE§tee list : - Page ~ I . From: To: Date: Subject: I -=Th:-u-.-=-M~a-r~27=-,-::2~0':":03~10~:1~4:-AM Re: selectee list b7C -1 b6 -1 b6 -1 Right on .. Sorry about the attachments - the computer gremlins were at work aaain.. b7C -1 O....- 103/2710:10AM»> From how I understand it the Selectee List is thd I L--;::::::======~:-::-::-:-:-~:-:- ....J-----------_.....I b2 - 4 »>1 103/26 6:49 AM >>> I know what the procedures are for the No Flv. but what are the Drocedures for Dlacina an indivirh J~I nn b 7 C -1 the Selectee List. b7E -1 b6 -1 SUSSMAN-76 ------ ----- ~-- , (Rev. 08-28-2000) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION To: crimina"nvestjQlive From: Office of the General Counsel Re:1 08/23/2002 b2 -3 Precedence: ROUTINE To: Criminal Investigative Counter Terrorism Date: 08/23/2002 Attn: VCMOS Attn: DTICPS SC Tom Carey SEMU ITOS-I/II SC Andrew Arena 581 _ SC Charles Frahm b7C -1 b6 -1 From: Office of the General Counsel ~~~:~tlye I aw Ilojt IextlL....-_....J Approved By: Steele Charles M Drafted By~:_~I=======;-__ Case 10 #1 I(Pending) b 2 - 3 Title: CRIMES INVOLVING CIVIL AVIATION; FBI INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION b7C -1 b6 -1 b2 -1 Synops.is: To oroyjde a lenal oDjnion from the Office of the General CallOsel (oqC) concernlngl JI-------------------J Administrative: This document is a privileged FBI attorney communication and may not be disseminated outside the FBI without aGe approval. Also, to read the footnotes in this document, it may be required to download and print the document in WordPerfect. Details: I 2 All INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE~ I~NCLASSIFltD DAle • \J3BY(lCI'~<01NLSI Rroj CJ:J, 0.3- I ') 19 Go L 5U55MAN-77 b5 -1. 2 b5 -1,2 ..~ (Rev. O~-2~-2000) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of thA r,eneral Counsel Rei r8/23/2002 b2-3 The TSA was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant conclusion that security at the Nation's airports needed to be improved. ATSA amends various sections of Title 49 of the United States Code to assign responsibility to the TSA to provide security for civil aviation and to conduct airport screening operations. TSA Statutory Authority ATSA created the TSA as an entity within the Department of Transportation and designated an Under Secretary of Transportation for Security as the responsible official in charge of the new agency.2 The Under Secretary's statutory responsibilities that most pertain to the issue at hand include: (1) Carrying out the provisions in Chapter 449 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code, relating to civil aviation security, and related research and development activities; (2) Airport screening operations; and (3) Receiving, assessing, and distributing intelligence information related f f, b5 -1,2 b5 -1,2 t b5 -1,2 .. ~--""-I -- lAt this writing, TSA is likely to become part of the proposed Department of Homeland Security when legislation to that effect is assed by the Congress and signed by the ~resident. 3 ~~JUri~:~p:d. •.. ,. ----..... b7C-1 --_._~_._~----~~~~-------------------, b6 -1 (Rev. 08-28.20(0) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of the General Counsel Re: I 108/23/2002 b2 -3 to transportation security. Chapter 449 of Title 49, entitled "Security," addresses all aspects of aviation security, including: screening passengers and cargo; receiving and evaluating threats to aviation; research and development of modem security systems and facilities; and regulation of security of foreign carriers and foreign airports that serve passengers bound for the U.S. In addition, ATSA grants the Under Secretary permissive (as opposed to mandatory) authority to designate federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) and empowers these LEOs to exercise standard law enforcement powers when engaged in "official duties of the Administration as required to fulfill the responsibilities under [ATSAJ." These powers include authority to carry firearms, make arrests without warrant for any federal offense committed in their presence or for which they have probable cause, and seek and execute federal warrants for arrest or search and seizure of evidence. ATSA also requires the Under Secretary to provide guidelines by which to exercise these law enforcement powers in consultation with the Attorney General. The proposed guidelines have been submitted to the Department of Justice for review. Finally, ATSA continues the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program (formerly part of the Federal Aviation Administration) by authorizing the TSA to deploy FAMs aboard aircraft for what are clearly reactive law enforcement functions. FBI Statutory Authority The FBI's general enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 533, grants the agency the authority to investigate any violation of the criminal laws of the United States. As noted previously, 28 U.S.C. § 538 specifically empowers the FBI to investigate the primary crimes-aboard-aircraft violations in Title 49, which are set forth in Chapter 465, entitled: ·Speclal Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States." These include Section 46502, Aircraft piracy; Section 46504, Interference with flight crew members and attendants; Section 46505, Carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft; Section 46505 which lists a variety of common-law crimes (e.g., murder, robbery) committed within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States~ and Section 46507, False information and threats. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 538 also grants the FBI specific investigative jurisdiction for the offense listed at 49 U.S.C. § 46314, Entering aircraft or airport area in violation of security requirements. The FBI's general investigative authority also includes the aviation-related J The special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (5) as any aircraft belonging in whole or 1n part to the United States or any citizen or corporation thereof while fi·,C!-:. a i.:ccT.i\':t is in flight over U.S. territory or over the high seas. 4 SUSSMAN-79 ----._----------- (Rev. 08-28-2000) b7C -1 -----_.__._--- b6 -1 b2 -3 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of the General Counsel Re:1 I08/23/2002 authority for any offense for which a LEO is granted the power to arrest, then virtually every federal LEO would have investiaative iurisdiction over everv federal felonv.s b5 -1,2 Federal Air Marshals The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program is also part of the TSA's statutory authority. FAMs, however, are primarily a reactive and a deterrent force whose members are LEOs and are armed and placed on selected flights to react to in-flight incidents of air piracy and other violent acts that threaten th in' - the lives of those aboard. b5 -1,2 Analysis b5 -1,2 the lawful ability to react promptly and respond appropriately to a report of emergent criminal activity without concern for jurisdictional distinctions or civil liability. I I.~~_. 6 ~ SUS_~S~M~AN~-~80~~~.u . I I: I I r t ~ . b5 -1,2f f b2 -3 ~{0ftm1nallnyestlgj~~iiif::~~:~~n~~~~;~~~~TION I i I I I I I "'----_1 ts~j~ris.~p'~p. b7C -1 b6 -1 j I I I I I I I~-.-__~.~ ..~ .. =""'~.~~~~. SUSSMAN-8t ,------ I I b6 -1 ~~--~-------~~~------, (Rev_ 08-28-2000) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION To: criminallnvestiaajiVe From: Office of the General Counsel Re:1 08/23/2002 b2 -3 bS -1,2 OGC is available to assist in these efforts and in any other capacity to resolve l'UriSdictional issues with the TSA. Point of ~ontact at 0Ge is tssistant General Counse IInvestigative Law Unit, atL...-_____ b 7 C -1 b6 -1 b2 -1 10 5U55MAN-82 ?S Page 34 of 41 SUSSMAN-83 part 108 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall conduct a review of reductions in unauthorized access at these airports. '(2) Computer-assisted passenger prescreening system- '(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, or any successor system-- '(i) is used to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft; and '(ii) includes procedures to ensure that individuals selected by the system and their carry-on and checked baggage are adequately screened. '(B) MODIFICAnONS- The Secretary of Transportation may modify any requirement under the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System for flights that originate and tenninate within the same State, if the Secretary detennines that-- '(i) the State has extraordinary air transportation needs or concerns due to its isolation and dependence on air transportation; and '(ii) the routine characteristics of passengers, given the nature of the market, regularly triggers primary selectee status.'. SEC. 137. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF AVIAnON SECURITY TECHNOLOGY. (a) FUNDING- To augment the programs authorized in section 44912(a)(I) of title 49, United States Code, there is authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 and such swns as are necessary for each fiscal year thereafter to the Transportation Security Administration, for research, development" testing, and evaluation of the following technologies which may enhance aviation security in the future. Grants to industry, academia, and Government entities to carry out the provisions of this section shall be available for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for-- (l) the acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of explosives detection technology for checked baggage, specifically, technology that is-- (A) more cost-effective for deployment for explosives detection in checked baggage at small- to medium-sized airports, and is currently under development as part of the Argus research program at the Transportation Security Administration; (B) faster, to facilitate screening of all checked baggage at larger airports; or (C) more accurate, to reduce the number offalse positives requiring additional security measures; (2) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation ofDew screening technology for carry-on items to provide more effective means of detecting and identifying weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of mass destruction, including advanced x-ray technology; (3) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of threat screening technology for other categories of items being loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, catering, and duty-free items; (4) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of threats carried on persons boarding aircraft or entering secure areas, including detection of weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of mass destruction; (5) acceleration of research, development, testing and evaluation of integrated systems of airport security enhancement. including quantitative methods of assessing security factors at airports selected for testing such systems; (6) expansion of the existing program of research, development, testing, and evaluation of improved methods of education, training, and testing of key airport security personnel; and (7) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of aircraft hardening materials, and techniques to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to terrorist attack. 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