Description of document:
US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation documents related to “No Fly Lists”

Released date:
06-September-2007

Posted date:
02-October-2007

Date/date range of document:
All documents range between 19-December-2001 and
12-May-2003

Source of document:
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Requests to:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Record Information/Dissemination Section
170 Marcel Drive
Winchester, VA 22602-4843

FOIA Requester Service Center (RSC):
(540) 868-4591
FOIPA Public Information Officer (PIO):
(540) 868-4593
FOIPA Public Liaison Officer (PLO): (540) 868-4516







The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and
materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org
web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as
possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The
governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person
or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly,
by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file.
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington. DC. 2U535
September 6, 2007
Request No.: 1087793- 000
Subject: NO FLY LIST
Dear Requester:
The records that you have requested were previously processed under the provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act for another requester.
Enclosed are 248 pages of documents pertaining to your request and a copy of the explanation of
exemptions.
You may submit an appeal from any denial contained herein by writing to the Office of Information
and Privacy. U.S. Department of Justice. 1425 New York Ave.. NW. Suite 11050. Washington. DC 20530­
0001, within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked
"Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal" Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your
request so that it may be easily identified.
Sincerely yours.
David M. Hardy
Section Chief.
Recordllnformation
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division
Enclosure(s)
(b)( I)
(b)(2)
(b)(3)
(b)( 4)
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(b)(8)
(b)(9)
(d)(5)
0)(2)
(k)( I )
(k)(2)
(k)(3 )
(k)(4)
(k)(5)
(k)(6)
(k)(7)
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency;
personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, ( 0 ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual;
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a
information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce
crime or apprehend criminals;
information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or
privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity
would be held in confidence;
material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant
to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian
employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished
information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service
the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person
who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
FBI/~O]
,
"",_"
," ,~'.'''".~", ",0"'"
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
Aviation-Field-30
Wed. Dec 19,2001 4:36 PM
FBI Response to FAA Name List - NEW PROCEDURES
b7C -1
b6 -1
Airport Agents - Please ensure that this message is forwarded to your supervisors, command post and
any other personnel who miqht respond to name list matches at airports. The attached FAA documents
have also been uploaded to L
I
There are two name lists for which the FBI may now have to respond, instead of one - the "No Fly" list
(threats to aviation) and the "Selectee" Iis~
IThe names are the same and some
additional ones from the previous FAA name lists, and they continue to originate from other agenciesc:=J
c:Jrom the FBI. However, there are new procedures to reduce unnecessary FBI response. The FBI
and the FAA coordinated these procedures based on feedback from the field about the utility of FBI
resnonse to ticket counters to identify passengers when the lists now contain more identifying information,
I
I
I
NEW PROCEDURES J
I
L...,o_--1' Please read the attached FAA Security Directives (SO 108-01·20 and 108-01-21) for exact
language.
I expect questions, so please ask. If something doesn't work as you expected. please let me know.
'11 try
to do an EC as soon as possible, but since the list and changes are "ouf', I wanted you to have them as
soon as possible.
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
SS~
ICivil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
1..-._----JJleo.gov
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
cc:
b7C -1
b6 -1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
/
HE~ I~U<5~SIF)~D ~
I
_....
.. ,
/
DA
~ - By~to')r~ LS A~ (~l-
eA 03-J'11~
SUSSMAN-l
·4==. '-=-::.~~~".~:~~~..~.~:~~.::=:~::~~:=-:::::,,:::::".,:::::::::::':='.:::::::~9;:!]
1500 Southwest 1st Avenue
The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
The Weatherly Building
516 S.E. Morrison Street
Suite 250
Portland, OR 97214
b7C -2
b6 -2
Dear Representative Blumenauer:
J
This letter i'l in response to your request for additional information
concerniny
Jand the policies and procedures surrounding the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) watch list. Nationwide policies and
procedures regarding the TSA watch list are established jointly by the FBI and TSA at
the headquarters level. Your concerns have been forwarded to FBI Headquarters,
Counterterrorism Division, and the Office of Public and Congressional Affairs.
. Additionally, on August 12,2002, this office contactedl
land
explained, in general terms, the procedures used by the TSA, FBI, and commercial air
carriers upon discovery of a name list match.
SUSSMAN-2
The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
The Weatherly Building
516 S.E. Morrison Street
BQft~~e Box 709
Portland, OR 97214
b6 -2
b7C -2
b7C -2
b6 -2
b7C -2
b6 -2
Dear Representative Blumenauer:
This letter is in res anse to
your inquiry on behalf of
I
lis n~o=-=a~l=s=e""""'"
person on the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) watch list.
However, the watch list does contain a
person with the same last name.
Therefore, commerci I air carriers are
required to chec
identification aga'lri---r"'7T""--r"-_...I
identification of th
TSA watch fist. Un-~o~u--n""'a~e""y,
commercial air carriers cannot confirm
I
Itrue identity until such time
as his Identification is checked at the
ticket counter.
HistoricallyI TSA
procedures have required that
identification checks be performed by law
enforcement officers. Recent changes to
TSA procedures allow commercial air
carriers to conduct these checks under
certain circumstances. This procedure
must be completed every time Mr.
I
land all others with the same last
name, travel via commercial aviation.
While I fully appreciate Mr.
~rustration, I am sure he can
~un::'::d:r:e=-=rs~ta=ind the importance of the
.
enhanced security requirements.
Sincerely,
SUSSMAN-3
D5-30-2002
02:26pm
From-SFPD AIRPORT P~TROL
6508217594
T-44 I
P.DOI/DDI
F-952
San Francisco Police Department
To: Il....--......"....-_~~~_
Commanding Officer
Airport Bureau - Day Watch
b6 -4
b7C -4
IIPPROIlE:O
YE~
NO
From: I_........_":""":'__~=--""""="'=":"""":"'-:--
_
Airport Bureau - Day Watch
Date:
Friday, May 24, 2002
SUbject: Selectee and No Fly list Names
b7C -4
b6 -4
o
0
o
0
[J
0
ISSUE
Airport Bureau police response to the Transportation Security Administration's
air-carriers No Fly and Selectee names lists.
DISCUSSION
.b7C
On Fri
I May 24, 2002, I met withI
leT.S.A) and I spoke with
b 6
(F.B.I.), regarding police procedures when dealing With individuals
~w~o~s~e~n~a~m~e~s~ave been entered on the Transportation Security Administration's NO­
FLY and SELECTEE names lists and the air-carriers reservation data banks.
-1,3.
-1,3
b2 -4
b7E -1
b3 -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
b3 -1
This new change in procedure, will allow airport officers to minimize the amount
of time required to initially detain individuals with names thatl
I
Dnames on federal NO-FI.Y or SELECTEE lists.
b2 - 4__
b7E -1
RECOMMENDATION
b3 -1
I recommend that this new change take place to reduce time spent by officers
on-scene, when responding to names on federal NO·FLY and SELECTEE lists.
..
All INFORM~I!ON CONTAINED
~
/
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI~ laC)~ b f) NLS ~~ c t:::) L
DAlI8 -5-D,3a.8Y -- -- .
~A.H. D3- I') '19
SUSSMAN-4
202 324 0235
p.el/06
FOMI (Rev. 6-1-97l
FBI FACSIMILE
COVER SHEET
PRECEDENCE
o Immediate
o Priority
r&J Routine
CLASSIFICATION
o Top Secret
o Seeret
o Cenfidential
o Sensitive
Ii] Unclassified
Time Tl1lnsmitted:
Sender', Initials: ~bSl#C
Number of Pages:
.....__
(including cover sheet)
Attn
From:
FBIHQ, Domestic Terrorism Section, Rm 11795
Name of Office
Subjea: Lf~~rt: /krfHlTSR4..1c£V
b2 -1
b7C -1, 3
b6 -1,3
Special Handl1n~ lnstruetions: k
[VLfo;..,....
_
b2 -1
b7C -1
I
I
~I
b6 -1
o.igin.tar\ N...., ~
l-- Telephone
pJ
--;:::Z:C==::=::;-\
L-._---
Ori~""ta" p""i"n.=~
)
A.pproved:
_
Brief Description of Communication FaKed:
'.
All INroRMATION CONTAINED
~~~~~l~
I
WARNlNG
OAl3vUCko~t) /t}lJ AQ-J
'.
.
A- O~- /'11 a
UL'
InfomUlIOR attllched co the cover sl1eet 15 U.S. Government Property. If you 11ft nOI the ,"rended reclplenr of triis
-,
infom'lldiun. dillClosure, reproductioll, di!llribution. or use or chis infornllltion is ?rohibited t IS.use. § 64 \ \. Ple:l~ notify the:
originator or the ICIC:l1 FBI Office immediately to artlln~e for proper dispolOition. 5USSMAN-S
---- --,.,~-"(LJ~- -- -- -- - -- -- - - --- .--- --------- ---- -~---.--1_---....
APPLICATION OF THE FOURm AMENDMENt
TO
.
AIRPORT SEARCHES
Airplane~8cking or skyjacking escalated dramatically duringand after the 19608until its
climax with the attacks on the World Trade Center buildings and the Pentagon. Consequently.
airport security has always been a matter ofvcry senous concern, and presently, it is a matter of
paramount importance. Once the security of an aixplane is compromised. it is very difficult to
respond effi:lCtivety to the problem. As was so dramatically illustrated by lastyear~s tragic events,
the potential for great and immediate hann to the passengers on the airplane and to the public at
large is tremendous. Additionally, the hig)1jackers are extremely difficult to detect.. and in order to
avoid the extreme danger highjackers can create. the highjacker must be detected before he boards
the aircraft. The importLnce ofairport/airplane security, the need to deteot the highjacker, and the
need to protect the public and the airline passengers have been recognized by the ooUI1s in
considering how to analyze polite conduct at aiIports under the Fourth Amendment.
•
...,~
.c.I"
'-oi.J
b2 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
In 1968, a Task Force was appointed. to develop an on-the-ground higbjacker detection
system. This system was adopted by the FAA and continues to be employed today to provide
secwity for an air travel. As its most prominent componcm. the system employs pre-flightsc~_
through the use ofnotices to the public. identification checks, application ofabighjack~
magnetOMeters, K-rays, interviews with selected passengers, and frisks or searches of cC:rtain
suspicious passengers. The employment of these measures has been approved by the courts as
reasonable; however, questions concerning the constitutionality ofother searches and seizures at the
airport continue to arise. This presentation and paper is designed to deal primarily with those issues.
The Fourth Amendment docs not prohibit all wammtless searches and seizures; instead. it
prohibits only unreasonable ones. The reasonableness of wammtless searches and seizures at
airports oron airplanes will be determined. in part, by balancing the imrusion itselfagainst the need
for security at airports and the difficulty in ferreting out the highjacker from the throngs ofmembers
of the public in airpoIts and boarding the airlines.
Because the courts have determined that airport screeoing procedures arc searches, they must
be justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. Five exceptions have been applied by
the couns: (1) the border search exception; (2) a Teny stop and frisk; (3) the administrative search
exception; (4) consent; (S) thecriticalWllC"theoT)'.
Border Search Exception Because many airports have both intematioDa.1 and domestic
flights, different standards for searches or seizures may be applicable at the same airport, depending
on whether the flights being selViced at domestic or international. For international flights, under
the border search exception. mutine searches of persons and their effects may be conducted under
the same perameters as those $cBlCnes are conducted at the international borders. Those seeking
admission to or exit from the United States on an international flight win be subject to a routine
inspection of his person and his belongings. Any non-routine search (e.g., strip searches) must be
based on reasonable suspicion. For passengers on domestic flights, the border search exception
cannot be used to justify the search of a person or his belongings.
All INFORMATION CONTAINED
I
f
HE~ IS. tJ1'ICLASSIFI£D
~~~S.{)J By(1CloQ~~'l NlS AG CA L
CA.lJ 03- I '11 q
SUSSMAN-6
----- -- ----
~u~-~c-~~~~ ~~~1~
-------NS-7D
I p.e3/06
L--
_
b2 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
reny Stop and Frisk: Application ofthis exception is discussed in further detail below.
Administrative Searches: Courts have justified the airport security screening procedures
under the administrative selICh exception. The courts have held that when all passengen are
subjected to secwity screeningprocedures in order to provide greater protection and security to the
airport and departing aircraft, the routine screening procedures are considered administrative
searches and not violative of the Fourth Amendment. When these screening procedures are used
only on selected passengers, they fall outside the coverage ofthe administrative search exception.
When these screening procedures are used improperly to detect the possession ofcontraband, the
administrative search exception may not be used to justify the search.
Consent: Any search or sei%ure can be justified on the basis ofa defendant's knowing and
volUntary consent. Consent should be express, rather than implied. Agents shouldnot rely entirely
upon warnings airlines generally give to passengers that their luggage or person may be searched;
the court's have been divided on the issue ofwhether these gen.eml warnings can constitute at least
implied consent to search.
Critical Zone: The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that airports are to be considered
"critical zones'" in which special Fourth Amendment considerations apply because they conSiderthe
airport the one channel through which all highjackers must pass before being in a position to
commit their crime and the one point where airport security officials can marshal their resources to
thwart airplane violence before the lives ofan airplane's passengers are endangered. These cowts,
therefore, deem reasonable more intrusive security measures if specifically tailored to increase
aiIport security and to detect highjackers.
The Stop ofa Person in· the Airport (prior to presenting himself for boarding): I',(~ CYn.vv..i-eA- ~
.--------
The Fourth Amendment applies to an airport stop only when a seizure occurs.
If1here is no detention. there is no seizure, and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.
A person has been seized only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident. a reasonable personwould have believed that he was not free to leave. Whether an aiIport
encounter between the police and a suspect aD10Wlt to a seizure requires a review ofall relevant
circumstances, including psychological factors. Ifa reasonable person would fee free to disregard
the police and to go about his business, the enoounter is consensual.
Asking for an individual's airline ticket and his identification was pennissible and will not be
considered a sei':::J..re, Afkh~g rOl.r'J.m~ questions concerning the reason for and destination oftravel
does not implic.:::e i11~ ';:::t;illtt~" mendment. Generally, there is no sejzure when a law enforcement
agent merely approaches an individual at the airport, and after identifying himself, begins to ask
routine questions related to the person's identification, travel plans, and ticket information. A non­
threatening request to search will not convent the encounter into a seizure.
SUSSMAN-7
-1
6 -1
-1
--
--- .~ ,~~~
.~ .. ~
-- --- -- --- -1~
1 P.1214/136
Faeters considered in determining whether a seizure has occurred include: (1) location ofthe
encounter; (2) physical contact with the person; (3) appearance and clothing of the o~cers; (4)
number of the officers~ (5) displa.y or presence ofweapons; (6) demeanor and tone ofVOice ofthe
officers; (7) length oftime inwhich documents are retained~ (8) any advise ofright to tenninate the
encounter or refuse consent; (9) infonnation that the person was suspected ofcriminal activity; (l0)
the length ofthe encounter, among others.
When a narcotics officer identifies himself as such and advises the person that he is
suspected of tnmsporting DaICotiCS, the courts willlike.ly fin.d that a seizure has occurred. If the
officer retains the traveler's identification or travel documents, the encounter may be considered a
seizure.
-
.. An~ves~ve m:tg:tti~n mus: be based on reB.Sonab~e ~usp~ci~n ~~h mus! ~e based on
factors that'Wfi1il VIewed In tJielr totality amount to reasonable and arttculable SuspiCIon tlmt the
pe
.
. Asubsequent frisk ofthe person must be based on voluntary
.J.L....'OPV••sent or reasonable SUSPI •
t the individual might be armed.
8tl\ ?
"II , An lIIl'est must be based on probable cause. If a suspect is arrested and his luggage or
personal: items are removed with the suspect. those items may be searched only on the basis of
consent or probable cause, with a warrant
Air Tenninal Security Scre.ening
As set forth above, routine airport tenninal..entrysecurity screeninghasbeen approved by the
courts as .dministrative searchesbecause their purpose is to provide security and safety ratherthan
to detect crime.
In order for these procedures to continue to be justifiable as administrative
searches, the emphasis ofthe search must continue to befor purposes ofdet.ennining the presence of
dangerous persons or articles rather than the presence of contraband or for other gencrallaw
enforcement purposes.
Courts have held that the placement ofitems on the x-ray conveyer belt constitutes at least
implied consent to a visual and limited hand search of the items if the x-ray examination is
inconclusive. Absent consent or probable cause, the scope ofthe hand search mustbe limited to that
which will reveal an object that could be used to effect a highjacking or endanger other passengers
or members ofthe public entering the terminal. (Caveat: this does Dot extend to searchfor money or
drugs seen on x-ray examination; although a search therefore may be based upon probable cause or
oonsent).
Strip searches must be conducted. only on reasonable suspicion.
Passengers Presenting Thems:,::xves for Boarding on the Aircraft
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that it is pennissibJe to request a search of
passenger presenting himself for boarding on an airplane. The officer may indicate that if the
passenger refuses. he will not be permitted into the gateway or the airplane.
ff a passenger is
SUSSMAN-8
b2 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
NS-7D
ticketed and presents himselffor boarding on the airplane, he may be subjected to asearch.on mere
or unsU)?ported suspiciop.
Scope of search can be of sufficient scope to reveal any object or
""""instrumentality that could reasonably have been used to effect an act ofairpinlcy. Again. the search
cannot be one designed merely to detect contraband.
Checked Luggage:
Passengers have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in checked luggage. Generally, searches
of checked luggage can be conducted on with consent or a warrant based. on probable cause.
Where. however, there is evidence that luggage contains explosives orsomeother itemofasimilarly
dangerous nature. exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless search. but the search must be
based on probable cause.
Checked luggage may be x-rayed. A subsequent search can be conducted to dispel
suspicions ofdanger. but a general search for contraband cannot be conducted absent a warrant or
consent.
Becausea dog sniffofluggage is not considered asearch. luggage may be subjected to a dog
sniffwithout any suspicion whatsoever. However. ifadog alerts to the presence ofcontraband. the
subsequent search may be conducted only with consent or a warrant. Adog's alert to the presence
of explosives may provide probable CfWSC for a warrantless search condllcted under exigent
circumstances. (A dog sniffofa person is a search and cannot be conducted)
Ifa person disavows ownership of luggage when presented with an opportunity to claim
ownership of it, it will be considered abandoned and can then be searched.
Aperson's luggage can be seized for a reasonable period oftime on the basis ofreasonable
suspicion. It should not prevent passenger's continuation of travel. Luggage can be seized on the
basis ofprobable cause pending the issuance ofa warrant to search; however~ ~e agents should be
actively taking steps toward obtaining the warrant.
Private v. Governmental Searcbes
Airport security measures were~ in the Past. largely employed by private security
companies employed by the airlines or by airline employees themselves. Purely private searches
are not subject to Fourth Amendment protections~ therefore. where these searches or seizureS
were conducted entirely by airline personnel without governmental intrusion or prompting, the
Fourth Amendment was not implicated. However, governmental agencies became increasingly
involved in airline security, and most ofthe searches. even where conducted by airline
employees or security personnel, were instigated by government agents or gvvcmment agents
participated in them. In those cases, the Fourth Amendment controlled the appropriateness of
the conduct. As you know. the law now requires that airport security be provided by the
govermnent, and the Air Marshal program has been revived~ consequently. a Fourth Amendment
analysis; wiU rarely be avoidable. Nevertheless. when airline employees are acting entirely
independently. the cowts will find that a private llearch was conducted. and that the Fourth
SUSSMAN-9
- ------------ --------- ------ ---
JUL-18-2882 10:12
NS-7D
Amendment had no application (e.g., airline employees opening suitcases to detennine
ownership and then encountering contraband therein).
SUSSMAN-10
b2 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
September 4, 2002
Mr. Michael D. Robinson
Associate Under Secretary
for Aviation Operations
Transportation Security Administration
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 20590
Dear Mr. Robinson:
Thank you for your June 27th letter, enclosing a copy ofTSA's Delegation Order
concerning the placement of Federal Security Directors at all of the major airports nationwide.
You asked that the Order be disseminated to each of the FBI's field offices having a need for the
information.
Recognizing the FBI's investigative jurisdiction with respect to criminal violations
set forth in Chapter 465 of Title 49, and all aviation-related criminal violations set forth in
Title 18 of the U.S. Code, our field offices will be provided copies of TSA's Delegation Order
dated June 14, 2002, along with the reminder that interagency cooperation and coordination are
critically important to our respective missions and responsibilities as our agencies continue to
discuss pertinent jurisdictional considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Robert S. Mueller, III
Director
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
1 - Mr. Ashley (5012) - Encs.
I - Mr. D'Arnuro (5829) - Encs.
1 - 1\!r Wainstein (7427) - Encs.
) 0(5096) - Encs.
1.:_
(7326) - Encs.
I
7176) - Encs.
62F-HQ-l077732
NOTE: Reply coordinated with Attorney-Advisorl
~nvestigative Law Unit, OGC.
and Unit Chie~
~ Major TheftlTransportation Cnmes nit, CID.
BHM
All INFORMATION CONTAINED
HE~
IS UNCLASSIFIED
I
J
~~S-Qa _Bt~~" ~ NLS Ac;. (CA L.
03 - I ') 1ct
SUSSMAN-ll
-------------------------
Attachment 1
June 13, 2002
Authorities of the Federal Security Directors (FSDs)
1. Manage Aviation Security Resources. On a day-to-day basis, manage and
provide operational guidance to the aviation security resources of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners, field agents, andJaw
enforcement officers to which they are assigned.
2. Screen and InspectPassengers, Property and Cargo.
A.
Passenger Aircraft. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 114(e) and TSA
regulations, policies and procedures, be responsible for the day-to-day
Federal security screening operations for passenger air transPOrtation
and intIastateafr transPortation. In"accordance with TSA regulatiQDS.
policies and procedures. providefor the screcnlng of aU passengers ..
and property, fncludiq United Statc8 mail, cargQy caay~~ and
checked baggage and oth~ articles, that will be canied abo8rda
paSsenger aircnftopemted by an air carrier or foreign air canier in air
traDsportation or intmstate air"transportati.o~ in accordance with 49
U.S.C.' 44901(a). In accordance with TSA regulad.ons~".policiC8 and
proc:edures, provides for search imd detention of persons Or property
posing a suspected risk to safety and security, in accordance with 49
U.S,C, § 44903(b).
B.
CheckedBaggage. In accordance with 49·U.S,C~ § 44901(c),(d), and
(e) andTSA regulations. policies, and procedures, as explosive
detection equipment becomes available, screen all checked baggage
through such equipment In those unusual circumstances where
explosive detection equipment is not available, screen every piece of.
checked baggage through altemative means. In accordanCe with TSA
regulations, policies and procedutes, such alternative means may
include one or more ofthe fonowing:
..
(1) A bag-inatch program that ensures that no checked baggage is
placed aboard an aircraft unless the passenger who checked the
baggage is aboard the aircraft.
(2) Manual sean:h.
(3) Search by canine explosive detection units in combination with
other means..
(4) Other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.
C.
Cargo Aim;aft. Provide for the screening and inspection ofcargo that
will be cl\meli on a.\\-f.;:n-i!'{i qircraft, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. §
44901(~} !J:'$l TSA l'cguhtio;:.s. policies aJld procedures.
3. Assess and Coun~-e:rThrullts tJ'J Aviation.
A.
Liaison Functions. SelVe as a liaison for aviation security to the local
intelligence and law enforcement communities. Receive, assess,
distribute, and ensure utilization of intelligence and law enforcement
information 1lS appropriate.
SUSSMAN-12
2
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
t ~
HE~J U..NjLASSlfIEO
OA
.. 0_ Byuck~"f) rJU ~6 rIO/
(!A~(}.~-I" (\ ('\
(1) Memoranda of Understanding Concerning Data. Bnter into
memoranda of understanding with local offices of Federal
agencies and other local entities, such as state and local law
enforcement, to share or otherwise cross-check, as necessary,
data on individuals identified on Federal, State and Local agency
databases who may pose a risk to transportation or'national
security.
(2) Notification Procedures Concerning potential Threats. Establish
procedures for notifying the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), appropriate State and local law enforcement officials,
and airport or aircraft operator security officers of the identity of
individ~sknown to pose•.or suspected of posing, a risk of air
. privacy.or teaorism or athreat to aircraft operator or passenger
. safety, in accordance with 49 U~S.C. 11l4(h).
.
(3) Identification of ~diyidua1sPosing a1bmat.·.In consultatiqn.with .'
other appl'Opri~Federid state, and local.agencies'and alrcaniem, and
upon notice' that an individual may be a security threat. establish
policies and 'procedures that require air cairlers to notify.aPpropdate
law
enforcement agencies of the individual'8 identity~ prevent the
individual from bo8rding an aircraft, ortakc other appropriate action
wi~ respect to that individUal.
.
(4) Passenger Lists. On a case by case basis, and when warranted by
specific security considerations. req~ passenger aircaniers to share
passenger lists with appropriate Federal, State, and Local agencies, for
the purPose ofidentifying individuals who~y pose a threat to .
aviation safety or national securi.ty.
.
B.Security Countermeasures. Coordinate ~d implement security
countermeasute8 with appropriate departments, local offices of federal·
.agencies. state and local law enforcement agencies~_airports, and air
. ciuriers. Wort with the FAA with res'pec:;t to any actions or activities
~at may'Bffect aviation-or aviation safety or air carrier operations, in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 114(f}(13).
C.
Oear. close or secure ahpol1S and related facilities. If a particular
.security threat to a gate, a concOurse, a tenninal, an airport or related
facilities.cannot be addressed ina way adequate to ensure. to the extent
feasible, the safety of passengers, crew, 'or other individuals, the
affected facilities may be cleared, closed or otherwise secW'ed. After a.
security action has been taken in accoi:dance with 49 U;S.C. §'
4490S(b), provide feedback to the airport operator on el~ rensor.s f:)!
the security action.
D.
Cancel. delay. return. or divert flights. Ifa particular security~at to
a flight' or series of flights, including air piracy (as defined in 49
U.S.C.§ 46502), cannot be addressed in a'way adequate to ensure, to
the extentfeasible, the safety of passengers and crew. the flight or
series of flights may be cancel~ delayed, re~ed to an airport after
3
SUSSMAN-13
Transportation Security Administration
(No Fly and Selectee Lists)
The No Fly and Selectee Lists, both administered by TSA,
often are confused with the TWL.
Currently,
the TWL staff is
working with TSA to develop protocols to facilitate entry and/or
removal of FBI subjects to/from the No Fly or selectee Lists.
It
should be noted, TSA is the only agency which actually can make
the entries or removals.
The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using
commercial aviation who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to
aviation, based on information provided by various sources (such
as the FBI).
If an individual is listed on the No Fly List,
that
individual will not be permitted to board any commercial aircraft
within the U.S. un
such time the individual is removed from
the list b
TSA.
e noted, .the air carriers
a1rport aut orities are responsible for preventing a
the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the
b2 -4
b7E -1
~~__T_h-:-e"'7":s_e~l:-e,:;",c_t_e~e_L_i_s_t_c_o_n_s_i_s_t,:;",S-:-O_
f-:"i_n_d_i_V-:l_'d_u_a_l,:;",s_W~h"":,o""",,:,,,"a_r_e---:-/
\
b2 - 4
J b7E -1
These individuals are screened by airport authorities in
accordance with TSA Security Directives.
Following the screening
procedures, these individuals can use commercial air
transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again,
the
respective air carrier and/or local airport authorities will make
the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft.
b2 -4
b7E -1
5U55MAN-14
Notes and Guidance for NO FLY and SELECTEE lists
Prepared 3125/2002 by SS4
I
Administrative-General
Investigative
b7C -1
b6 -;-1
b2 -4
b7E -1
NO FLY list -Used to prevent personsfrom using commercial aviation who are deemed by the FAA
to be athreat to aviation, based on information received from various sources. Airport police are
to perform an initiallD checkandwill hopefully eliminate the orson as amatch. \
I
I
Airport police wi! contact the FBI in
questionable cases.
A few people have been removed from the list a~er the person convinced the FBI and the FBI
determinedl
jthat they were not a threat to aviation. The
passenger may not fly untit the FAA removes their name from the list. The aircarriers, not the FBI,
prevent the passenger from boarding the "ight. The person can travel by other means. but not
commercial air. The FAA removes names from th Ii
n'
.
agency or a documentk,.,.,.......,..,....-~
....----:~~-r----r~~~:-:-:7':'":--:-.....-:-::"'"":"""
----J
I
Iindicating a
SUSSMAN-1S
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
SELECTEE
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
Possible Match Passenger at the Ticket Counter" When apassenger with apossible name match
presents themselves at atickpt I"nllntpr. the <2.;1 Lell
it:
Ito.; ;:)l
t thp. ~irnmt I FO
for an initiallD chAcko I
I
b2 -4
b7E -1
Passengers who know their name is on a list requiring identification by the police can potentially
arrange with the airport police before they get to the airport that day to alert the police they have a
flight and when they plan on bein althe ai ort. Thus the alice can be there or atleast be nearb
b2 - 4
further reducing delays.
b7E -1
2
SUSSMAN-16
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
January 22, 2003
From:I....__----I1 OGClILU, ExD
ro:I
................-------
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -3
b6 -3
Enclosed is your copy of a draft MOD I received. fro~
la policy official in TSA.
Not sure why he faxed it to me but, in any event, it addresses respective roles in providing input
to and using the TSA's No-Fly and Selectee lists.
I am not sure who in CTD has this for action but it's got to be one of you three so here it is.
Anyway, If you need us on this any more, let me know
bS -1,2
AllINF'ORM;inC~1CONTAINrn
HE~ IS U~LASSIrIED
OA
~~ -
.3 BY 11(" ~QC1 G, 1
C~*03-1'?1~
5U55MAN-24
.. -.~.-..-.-.-.-.-."."""'
..~.~--p=:~.
b7C
From:
To:
Date:
SUbject:
6/271027:32PM
Re: TSA & Local LEO inquiry of PC for Detention of No Fly List individuals
b7C
Not being a lawyer, I'm treading on common sense ground here, but I believe that "investigative
detention""" is the basis for the !ocal LEO holding individuals until the FBI shows up, same as it is for
non-terrorist criminal matters, such as potential Crime Aboard Aircraft violations. After you arrive,
however. if there is nothing in NCIC, such as an INS status problem or any arrest warrant for the person
and they want to leave, they can leave, unless you find something for which to arrest them. As a
reminder, OGC also advises that the field use the 265 TURK classification for each interview conducted
related to the lists.
(....A lot of LEO's don't seem to like using that surrogate authority, which is why we had all those
deputation issues over the last couple of years.)
E5~
16/27/02 12:40:36 PM :>>>
b7C
cc:
TSA and local LEO are inquiring as to the PC for detaining individuals that have been identified on the No
Fly or Selectee list with more than the name match. They are concerned about the legality of the
detention. They need to know the PC for which they are detaining the individuals until the FBI shows up b 7 C
to interview the individual.
.
Thanks for yoyr aST,ance
ARTHURrCUMMINGS; IL
_
L
~(r_----"
b7C
b2
b7C
b7C -1
b6 -1
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
AR IAUH M. COMM,NGSlr-----~
5/28/02 1:43:30 PM
Issue: TSA and No Fly Lists
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
Here's some background, if you have the patience to read it:
Since 10/2001, when the TSA No Fly and Selectee lists came into being (aftermath of h
. l, I
have been attempting to make the updated lists available to the field agents
on
a timely basis, Le., when they are issued, because TSA has made the agen
, e or respon 1n9
to possible name matches. The agents need these lists in order 10 have background and 10 info.
1
------:-----lb5 -1
bS -1
b6 -3
b7C -3
r
2 -4
5 -1
7E -1
L-
_
TSA also fails (except on one occasion) to coordinate with us when they tell the carriers whom to contact
(the FBI) or when they change the Security Directives concerning response which affects FB! offices. b2-4
Despite my best efforts. the TSA just motors along and I and the agents are being whipped around the b 5 -1
ftagpole trying '0 do the light thing.
Ib 7E - 1
Ib5 -1
---------------:----
Example - today List 51 was issued; Lists 49 and 50 were issued on Friday. I believe I was here, but no
mail from TSA, and I check every hour. I have raised this issue with people in TSA and here, and told the
agents that getting the lists from me is now a luxury instead of a certainty.
( have lJied to arrange a meeting withl
IISA b. ¢ tbat bas ••'""dssd 0""...1
~
Again, please try to give me some time so we can meet and decide how we want to procee9.
ITSA issues these lists to the air WiIIlilllli aOlllllllaimaa ""1i",,1
All INFORMATION CONTAINED
I ~
H£~ 1$U~SSIF~
~JI ~b·
BY C
G,f) NLS A c; (~L
.CA~03 .. ( q
. SUSSMAN-29
Thank~
ss~~=~---hax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
I
F,ea.gov
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C
Page i
10:
Date:
Subject:
5/29:'02 S:OS:13 PIJI
New TSA Guidanc5'-Seiectee and No Fly Lists
More to follow as I get ad.ditional information.
SS~
~fax)
Civil AViation security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
L...-
11eo.gov
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
cc:
ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS; Aviation-CIRG&Training; Avia...
(J1(t
rL/lr;f4--
SUSSMAN-30
b7C -1
b6 -1
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
7/2/02 7:40PM
Re: No Fly and Selectee Lists
b7C -1
b6 -1
~
r"2
F.....;.,,;;.......;.,;..;.;;.;..-------------------------------L, b5 -1,2
Re authority to hold No Fly passengers until the FBI arrivesJ
I
IWnw I r:~n't imanine that. I
b 5 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
If the FBI. and the TSA cannot agre~
~~5 -1, 2
I
L.....-------------.....,r-
Regardsl
»1
/2/0211:59:21 AM>>>
.....
...,b5 -1,2
I
I The specific statutory citation for the terrorist watch Iis~
b 7 C - 1
b6 -1
b5 -1,2
b5 -1,2
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEM'
UN . Slfl£D
1'1
.nAl ~.
vUWo oato ,
(]A 03- ('}')~
_____...J~Fly a~d ~el:ctee.Li~ts ..
I
lexi
I
CSL....->-::===....J==:WIO-7/01/02 07:32PM >>>
b5 -1,2
r-----------------------------------------, b7C -1
b6 -1
F
-1,2
:============================================::::::;,b::-;5:-~1-:2
1b5 -1,2
L---:-:_~--~---':":"":'7 ......
,....~~1b7C -1
My next move is to consult thel
In the_b6 -1
DAG's office--about the issue of the legal basis for No-Fly decisions after I discuss this within OGC.
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
b5 -1,2
r----T:"~::-T.:':71 ....---_~~'::""!::L:""::-::;:r:.!'::-=::~::_::;_7:i'::&:::'~l':'::"::::""ii::"::"'i~i\"'i';"'A""i"i"\i";'v;:-'A"::::',...........b
7 C -1
I ask that
,go Into ad Itlona legal citations from the USA PATRIOT ACT b6-1
L..,.......--.~....lepertinent, but the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001. passed on
November 19, 2001, mandates in Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security
Information", that the Under SecretaI)' of Transportation for Security shall:
(1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal-agencies or other entities to share or
otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may
pose a risk to transportation or national security;
(2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or airline security officers of the identity
of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline
or passenger safety;
(3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers, establish policies
and procedures requiring air carriers--
(A) to use information from government agencies to identify
individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and
(8) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law
enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate
action with respect to that individual; and
(4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal
agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national
security.
SUSSI"1AI\I-32
Personally, I think that this about covers it, and hopefully, the FBI will be consulted on revisions to the
TSA Security Directives to be more clear about who is to contact whom in what situation.
f--.....,r::---:--~--~~-=---~--:-""':":":"'-~~--:-:--~--::-=":"-~--'"""":":"--------""" 2 - 4
Perhaps they need to hear a definitive statement from the FBI on these matters.
b 5 -1, 2
1....-_---1
b 7 E - 1
I hope this helps.
SS~
{fax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
'--__---l~
b2 -1,2
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
>>> MARTIN J KING 6/27/02 5:05:03 PM >>>
SSAI
I
As CDC of the~
I, have ~een asked to obtain some information for the United States
Attorney's Office
concerning the legal authority under which the FAAITSA
promulgate the No Fly and Selectee lists. Personnel from the United States Attorney's Office were
recently afforded a briefing rega~ No Fly and Selectee lists by S~
lAirport Liaison
Agent. Following this briefing, S~eceived a request for additional information which has been
forwarded to the CDC for handling.
My understanding is that the U.S. Attorney's Office would like some assistance in identifying the specific
statuteslregulations/executive orders or any other enabling provisions which grant authority to the FAA
and/or TSA to compile and disseminate the lists. There is no known agenda attached to the request other
than further informing the understanding of appropriate personnel regarding the program.
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
I have read the "Notes and Guidance" which you prepared on 03/25/2002 and accordingly, I hope that
you may be of some help in responding to the request from the United States Attorney's OfficdL
b2 -1
......_-:--_"""":"'"--:-~f your Unit mainta,ins responsive information, please forward same to my attention. I
~~C_ ~ 1
may be reached 1
CIIMMINGS·Sr-
_
_
b7C -1
b6 -1
SUSSMAN-33
[_-----~e:NO~and ~elede~ Lis~s'
.
~.
(
..
I
-Page'"
··t··...
···
b5 -1, 2
b7C -1
b6 -1
L...-----J
From:
To:
Date:
7/6/023:44PM
Subject:
Re: No Fly and Selectee Lists
(
1seeing as how I had time today, waiting for the TSA lists, I thought I would reply to you. I know this
mail constitutes an on oin discussion which really needs to be held in person, so people can offer their
views
1. Agree.
2. Agree
3 and 5. Still not clear on your distinction.
b5 -1-,2
IbS
,--------
-1,2
1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
("S_---V/3/02 9:03:31 AM »>
1. As far as I am concerned1
1b5 -1,2
J
bS -
2 YollJ1eard their COlln~~1 .",,,
'·",u"ants more, such as'
I
r
r
~5 -',2
--------------------------
rBuL what TSA os enbtled to .>All INFORMAilON CONTAlml
)
}
~i;lf~~lAS~'~ffc.(e()9\,..J L,s (A ~{(A L SUSSMAN-34
~I! 03- 11)1)(',
b7C -1
b6 -1
4. Maybe, at some POint,S
Ib5 -1,2
5. In the end, even though we are dealina with lists or arouoinas of Deoole who are ioined tooether bv a
b5 -1,2
D=----_
c5
107102102 07:39PM >>>
b7C -1
b6 -1
b5 -1,2
We still need to address the legaL policy and procedureal questions as a total picture rather than
0"""",,,,"11
1
_
Re authority to hold No Fly passengers until the FBI' arrives
I..--
Wow I can't ImaClne that
I
1
b5 -1,2
b5 -1,2
b5 -1,2
bS -1,2
b7C -1
'-----
r1
ls -1,2
t -1,2
1__------
ES~---'07/01/02 07:32PM >>>
~
lb5
My next move is to consult th~
lin the
DAG's office--about the issue of the legal basis for No-Fly decisions after I discuss this within OGC.
.
b7C-1
,
b6 -1
b2 -1
-1,2
bS -1,2
.........---""1'"r---r"..........-J===:::::;::=::::-::-~-:---.-:::---.-~-.--::-::---;:---::::-7':"::''':''''':~=:=-:~~
b 7 C - 1
OGC, go into additional legal citations from the USA PATRIOT ACT b6-1
L..-mtllT"TT,,",'n""rle pertinen!T,~uT"l'l:-::e~v~la=\ion and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, passed on
November 19, 2001, mandates in Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security
Information", that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall:
(1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal agencies or other entities to share or
otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may
pose a risk to transportation or national security;
(2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
appropriate State and local law enforcement officials. and airport or airline security officers of the identity
of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or l<:1"n::,n5m cr ~~ ~rea.: t~. airline
or passenger safety:
(3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers. establish policies
and procedures requiring air carriers-
(A) to use information from government agencies to identify
b7C -1. SUSSMA.-,-N-'.-:3-,-7--,-=-..-..=,--,--",,---~
__"',-a_ge-,-4~J
b6 -1
individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and
(B) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law
enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft. or take other appropriate
action with respect to that individual; and
(4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal
agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national
security.
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
16/27/025:05:03 PM >>>
~~{
I
;~
b7C -1
i1
I
b6 -1
As CDC of th
I have been asked to obtain some information for the United States
Attorney's Office
Iconcerning the legal authority under which the FAAITSA
promulgate the No Fly and Selectee lists. Personnel from the United States Attorney's Office were
recently afforded a briefing reg~ding thj No Fly and Selectee lists by sA
IAirport Liaisorb 7 C -1
Agent. Following this briefing, S
received a request for additional information which has been
b 6 - 1
forwarded to the CDC for handling.
Personally, I think that this about covers it, and hopefully, the FBI will be consulted on rev~' .110'1l.IoOiL.IoW..1oI.LliiIi_--,
TSA Security Directives to be more clear about who is to contact whom in what situation.
I hope this helps.
SS~
I(fax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
____~leo.gOV
My understanding is that the U.S. Attorney's Office would like some assistance in identifying the specific
statutes/regulations/executive orders or any other enabling provisions which grant authority to the FAA
and/or TSA to compile and disseminate the lists. There is no known agenda attached to the request other b 7 C - 1
than further informing the understanding of appropriate personnel regarding the program.
b 6 -1
I have read the "Notes and Guidance" which you prepared on 03/25/2002 and accordingly, I hope that
you may be of some help in responding to the request from the United States Attorney's OfficeJ~__...I
____.....,.---"1 If your Unit maiqtains responsive information, please forward same to my attention. I
may be reached a
J
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
cc:
ARTHUR M. CUMMINGSJ
MARION Bowmanl
I
lL...-
_
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -3
b6 -3
b2 -4
5U55MAN-38
b7C -1
.-- b7E
-1''--''
Pag.·e.·1.J·
..
___-........._ .......
-----------------.J'--'---cb6 -1
.
-
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS; I"'---
---J
(/181026'39PM
I
I
From:
b
Date:
Subject:
"-::===============================:::;-_b2 -4
r
b7D -1
b7E -1
Thank you.
--- ----_..._..----...-- --- -----
._------------------......--------------------...------...----
~;~--------...Jlalstate.gov>
cc:t:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~---.J
b7C -1,3,5
b7D -1
b6 -1,3,5
Subject: RE: TSA No Fly List
Date: Thu. 18 Jul2002 13:51:03 -0400
I
I
b2-4
b7C -5
------========================================:::!.., b 7D -1
I
I ~~E~'
b2 -4
'---
---.J b7C 1,3,5
r-------------------------.......'---........----..,b7D -1
b7E -1
b6 -1,3,5
~y~qMf.N-39
t
'
~~""""""-""-'-'b7C -1
'--_---:
----'
.,.
. b7E -1
b6 -1
Please advise who will attend this meeting. I may be reached a~L...-
---J1 Thanks.
~;~~fQinal MessaQef(~-~I) [maiitol--....,~leo.govJ
Sent: July 06, 20022:51 PM ...--
_
Tod
:JE-mail)~
I'
Ccf
I(E=mail)l
I(E-mail)
Subject: Re: TSA No Fly L":""is":""t-----.....1
b7C -1,3,5
b7D -1
b2 -2
b6 -1,3,5
c=J- sorry, I was looking on the wrong lists - it looks like there is al
pn the most current
Selectee List 44.
....l
b7C -2,5
b6 -2,5
D
b7C -2,5
b6 -2,5
b7D -1
b7C -1,3,5
b7D -1
b2 -2
b6 -1,3,5
ov>
(E-mail)"
F;.L..----""1'='::-==':"':'::::'"'"------------J
L...-_r-----__....E-mail)..IL....----~state.gov>1
(E-mat
ost.dot.gov:>
-----
Sent: Friday, July 05, 2002 5:50 PM
Subject: Re: TSA No Fly List
Hello·D
It appears that th;re is no morel
pn either of the ~o lists (No Fly 73 or Selectee 44), so Mr.
I
J>hould have no more problems for now. However, if another!
Ishould be put
on the list, his name would trigger something. Your advice was the best that could be given under the
circumstances. I don't knowIf FBI put him on the list or not.
IL....---
I
~upervisory Special Agent
Civil Aviation Security Program
Special Events Management Unit, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
I
I(fax)
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
faa.gov
=~===PJ:;;@~state~
I(E-mail)"
~~~__......KE-mail)"~Ieo.gov
b7C -1,3,5
b6 -1,3,5
b2 -2
b7C -1,2
b6 -1,2
There is a specific case involving the TSA List which is a slightly bigger problem for us. The list contains
the name: I
We have a MrJ
Iwho is
continually denied access to the automated check-in and is given the third degree every time he flies.
~~tl~?MAN-40
~~b 7E -1
.·Pa~e. 3.J.
1.------------------------------~·b6
-1 ~.=-.-'-=
....=.. ,=-~.--'-"-'--'-'--'----=----'-"-
b7C -2
b7D -1
. b6 -2
The problemrl'·OLl.Ilw...J.lW-.L..-
"'"T""
...JI'
a member o.. L..~--..,....---,--.-r---....L~~..:.:.:.::~:.::..::.:;
preparatory meetings related to th
We h;::.av.:.:e~ad:::.v:.:i:::.se~d~ou~r
........
..1..::::...::.::::.::.:.:..:.:.:.::.,
ticket using his full names which match those on his passport Le.L-
----..-J
His travel agent has added his Frequent Flyer details to all his bookings an~ Provi~S MrL-
......I
..QQ.Uassport # and Country of Issue so he can checked out early throug
hen he travels to the
L-..J Still he get's hassled. Is there anyway way for you folks to verify whether you~
ls still a
valid name, add more details or delete it? We're still tooking forward to meeting with you folks to try and
come to grips with the TSA List issue.
D
b7C -1,5
b6 -1,5
cc:
._-------- .-
SUSSMAN-41
b7C -1,5
b7D -1
b6 -1,5
b2 -2
b2 -4
b7D -1
b7E -1
I
b2 -4
Ib7D -1
b7E -1
J
1 b2 -4
b7D -1
b7E -1
2.1
4.1
Fro~
r
ToCL....----fFBmL...-
@leo.gov>
Subject: RE: TSA No Fly List
Date: Tue, 18 lun 200220:46:23 -0400
HiD
L
_
[---
b2 -4
1....---------------------------------1 b7D -1
b7E -1
b7C -5
b6 -5
11....--
---------
[...-----""'1-'-----
_
1
b7C -5
b6 -5
I
-------~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b2 -4
b7E -1
SUSSMAN-42
b2 -4
b7E -1
L
~f -,
b7E -1
3.1
1 b2 -4
b7E -1
-b7C -1
b6 -1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
b2 -2
b7C -1,3,5
b7D -1
b6 -1,3,5
b2 -4
b7C -5
b7D -1
b7E -1
r----------------------------------.....;b6 -5
E-mail)'1
@state.gov>
~----~(E~--m.Ja·i~l)'.!:l ===:::::;:::::--:~faa.gov>,
!====::::::II=::::!.=:E-mail)"@ost.dot.gov>,
L.-
..J,E-mail)'1
@leo.gov>
Subject: TSA No Fly Lis~_ ..
Date: Tue, 18 JUll 2002 12:18:29 -0400
I
I
I
b2 -4
b7C -5
b7D -1
"---------------------------------b7E -1
b6 -5
b7C -1
b6 -1
,,"""""-:,__~I seems to believe that he is entitled to an immediate response to his issues, when the FBI has
been waiting since Nov 20'01 for resolution to our issues asking themfo~
I
I
land to cooperate on crafting the Security Directives. They ignore~
~anuary letter,
and have yet to act, based on discussions held at a meeting in early June to go over these issues again.
Therefore, I don't know that we should be in any rush for him, but you have to keep letting him think you're
working on "it" - same tactic they use with us.
c=Jls going to write the FBI a letter about what TSAwants to know from us about detaining passengers,
etc. These are the points that I think need to be iterated, among any others we might add about how a
person gets on the list in the first place.
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
7/22/02 1:48PM
Info for TSA Legal Request
b2 -4
b7C -1,3
b7E -1
b6 -1,3
b7C -3
b6 -3
~2 -4
L....-
S_US_S_M_A_N_-_43
17E -1
1. What does the FBI want the TSA to "do" re a "No Fly" List?
b2 -4
b5 -1,2
b7E -1
~
Ib2 -4
U:!:'========================================================::::::;-b5 -1,2
c1
I b7E -1
C.
I
01
2 -4
5 -1,2
7E -1
b2 -4
b5 -1,2
7E -1
Fl
b
G
b
HI
b
I
b
SUSSMAN~44 ',-
..
-,~
1
,"Page ~ J
b2 -4
b5 -1,2
________________________________ b7C -1
6
1~~E~~l
2. What is the legal justification for what the FBI wants the TSA to do?
A. The legal justification for requiring air carriers to identify passengers on threat lists (including NCIC)
and for preventing passengers from boarding until and if identified as a "match" may be found in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, passed on November 19, 2001, mandates in
Section 101, (a), §114 (h) entitled "Management of Security Information", that the Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security shall:
(1) enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal agencies or other entities to share or
otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may
pose a risk to transportation or national security;
(2) establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or airline security officers of the identity
of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline
or passenger safety;
(3) in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers, establish policies and
procedures requiring air carriers--
(A) to use information from government agencies to identify individuals
on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and
(B) if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement
agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to b 5 -1, 2
that individual; and
b 7 E -1
b2 -4
(4) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal
agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national
security,
sJ
ci
That's as far my legal brain will carry me, which may still not be far enough to properly address the issues.
Thanks.
ssAi
I(fax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
L...-__----JF'eo.gov
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
_____....~YDst~
b7C -1
b6 -1
" "."" ~age,,1J
b5 -1
From:
To:
Date:
7/23/0210:16AM
SUbject:
No-Fly List
b 7 C - 1
b6 -1
___let al: This is to confirm our understanding in OGe of yesterday's meeting. We all recognize the
needs:
c----~---
c-J----------------'
Obviously, eTD will have to address the last three of the four items listed above--although OGe will
certainly help wherever we can. However, we can and should play an integral role in developing criteria.
We can work on criteria in theory but we really need to learn the track record of experience so far.
To that end. you agreed to consult with the coanizant oeoole in the TWL unit and other IT sources to
"<>nn'lO nf tho <:>,.h 1<:>11
Let me know if your understanding is different than what I have described and please let us know how you
are progressing in finding out the actual criteria used so far.
Thanks!"'---
IExtl__---l
b5 -1
b7C -3
b6 -3
I~C:ll&.c;'"'---
e~U:=lirMINGS,ARTHUR M·!I--__----III'--------"----- b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
NO FLY INFO
8/5/027:45PM
List Criteria
Ipe, all[ las! meetiaa I rllllIewed me exist!n~
---J
J
b5 -1
b7E -1
b2 -4
cc:
b7C -1
b6 -1
All INFORMATION CONtAINED
(
~
HE~I
U C SIF~
DA·
•
BY c.lo C~ ~ ') r\l LS AG CA L
QA 03- f')llq
~s.se.m o(t:'J.oF1Y UstC~-~'.~~-~-..-...
SUSSt.~A~~:7 ~P~~~f]
'---
F
------". b2 - 4, 5
~~..........c.._--",-
-=--"-'-'-'-__-'---'"-"-
~~-'-==-"-'-=~-
b7C -1
b7E -1,2
b6 -1
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
~6:52PM
L-jissem of No Fly List
b2 -4 5
This is probably a tricky question depending on to whom you wish to give it and why. If you have an
b 7 E -1, 2
FAA/TSA repl
lit might be~discuss~ them and let me know what they say.
I've been answering this question for otherL-J but eachL-.jsituation may be different.
I think it should be disseminable to liaison contacts responsible for aViation-security mattersI
I
b2 -4
b7C -1
b7E -1
b6 -1
~/5/02 1:11 :06 AM »>
Hopefully. you can look at the purpose of the list. and go from there. Thanks for your question. If you run
into problems or other questions, please let me know.
e I
Can we dissseminate this list t~L.
_
»~
] 08/01102 05:58AM >>>
I've received acouple If questions from
labout the lists. such as whether the names are in other
databases, etc. I'll answer as I can and cc everYone, and then try to compile a comprehensive info sheet
at some point. For example,l
b2 -4,5
b7C-1
b7E -1,2
b6 -1
...-_...-----------------....__..-------------.......------_...----------------------.._------_..._--------------
Please forward this mail as appropriate within your offices and to CP/Duty Agent. Thank you.
- Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and
responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security
Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information.
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
ssA
I(fax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
,.Ioo.I.u.II.I.~rterrorism Division
leo.ov
'--
.....J~~ssemof No Fly,List,
---'---"'--'-'-'-'-'--'"-'b 2 - 4 , 5
b7C -1
b7E -1,2
b6 -1
SUSSMAN--48 '
'J'
, Page,>
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
ARTHUR M. CUMMINGS
11.....-__-----------'
8/7/~PM
Re:LJissem of No Fly List
This is probably a tricky question depending on to whom you wish to give it and why. If you have an
FAAfTSA repl
lit might be best to discuss this with them and let me know what they say.
I've been answering this question for otherc::=J but eachI
~ituation may be different.
b2 -4
b5 -1
b7E -1
b2 -4,5
b7E -1,2
t db h t
b6 -1
II
b h
S
S
Fl
:;D~------"~8/05 6:52 PM »>
All, the No yand electee lists are contro ed )v t eTA and as such will be dlssemina e >v t a
organizationI
I
1deas?
b7C -1
I think it should be disseminable tol
~esponsible for aviation-security matters!
I
b2 -4
b7C -1
b7E -1
b6 -1
Hopefully, you can look at the purpose of the list, and go from there.
into problems or other questions, please let me know.
6.---
18/5/02 1:11 :06 AM >>>
Can we dissseminate this list tol"---
_
Thanks for your question. If you run
>~
108/01/02 05:58AM »>
I've received a couple of questions fronj
jabout the lists, such as whether the names are in other
databases, etc. I'll answer as I can and cc everyone, and then try to compile a comprehensive info sheet
at some point. For example!
Please forward this m,Ji4 as appropriate within your offices and to CP/Duty Agent. Thank you.
b2
4,5
b7C -1
b7E -1,2
b6 -1
.... Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and
responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security
Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information.
These lists and general guidance for FBI response to possible name matches on TSA lists may be found
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
ltEm~ U~~LASSlfILO - f.,
DA
.
BY u..e.- 0« Co I)
eAj03-'')I)~
ssA
I(fax)
Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
____Flea.gov
ee·
b2 -1,2,4
b7C -1,3,5
b7E -1
b6 -1,3,5
q.Pa~e2 ]
~No Fly .~ist ,f=lr~cedures.
-----
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
b2 -4
b7C -1
----------------~7E-1
r6 -1
9/18/024:41PM
No Fly list Procedures
To your knowledge, have the TSA and the FBI a reed to a chan e in res onse
matches on the No Fly List, Le" ifTS
I'm
sure that if there had been such a major
ange In proce ure, you would have let me know. I've seen no
Security Directive to that effect and I can't imagine it. Anyway, I ask because I think SIOC may have
inadvertantly misadvised one field office to that effect, and that office has asked for clarification. As far as
I know, and please correct me if I'm wrong, the process, in a nutshell, is still as follows:
FBI agents get contacted bv the local nolice or air carrip.r tn
,I
I
r
b2 -1, 4
b7E -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
Is that still the procedure? Thanks.D
ssA
~ (fax)
civil AViatIon Security Program, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
__--..l~leo.gOV
b2 -1,2
b7C -1
b6 -1
I~C~C;----~L
_
b7C -1,3
b6 -1,3
-----~i"IT"M~~- --­
SUSSMAN-61
b7C -1
b6 -1
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
o
10/10/028:07PM
Re: NO-fly List
b2 -4
b7E -1
First of all, thanks to Tom Bush - I have him fooled, ell? :.,)
1. Q. We have found out that there are POSSiblityl
~O-FIY lists being maintained and
utilized at the airport.
A. There is only one No Fly List - it is capable of being printed and the TSA maintains it, based on
info from FBI, CIA and other intel sources. The current list is #115, and it is about 41 pages long b2-4
right now.
b7E -1
2. Q. The
"_0.
-
WI" knn'AI nf ....... T~1\. FBI and thl'! ...;..I;~ ...~
A.I
r
r
I
3. a, These list are not comprehensive and not centralized.
A. The lists will never be comprehensive and centralized, as they have different purposes and are
maintained by different agencies. However, one day they will all be checked simultaneously (I will
be retired by then!)
3. a. Some subjects appear are one list but not the others.
A. I would imagine that the No Fly List contains~ names that are also in VGTOF, but not all
No Fly names are in VGTOF, although they should be. There will never be consistency due to
input mechanisms; etc. and purpose of "lists."
5. Q. Ple::lc:ll'> ..rl\lic:.. h~... ._- OF!t th", ..... ~-
.,- ~~ ... .., Nn.l=lt I ic:f ASAP.
AJ
r
4. Q. Some of the lists are old and not current. A. Throw old lists away and ask the agencies for
new.'!sts. I keep you up to date as best as I c~n with the TS1\ list. VGTOF is as current as the
entoes I
I
I
b2 -4
b7C -3
b7E -1
L--------------::===================J-------' b6 -3
6. Q. au EC, Dated 10/09/02, titledI
i
Iis a
directive to field offices confirming that all SUbjects have been appropnately watchlisted. We have
contacted TSA today. 10/10/02 to verify if our subjects have been place on the list and again determine
p~evbwe oW
tL
_
ALl INFOR:II';;iC:,; C,)NfAINED
HtR~ ~;>U\SSlfllQ
J
/
OAT -v~W BYUc..eO~GlJ NLS IACo CAL
03- 1')')9
I'
.
,C_''-'-"-b2 - 4
b7C -1,3
b7E -1
b6 -1,3
SUSSM1i:~-62
c=J I have to leave for the evening - I hope this helps somewhatD
»~
110/10/0212:12:44 PM »>
o Hello from St. Louis. Our New SAC, Tom Bush spoke highly of you yesterday.
~w:] ·hwo in S:" l.ouis have a problem and are wondering if you Gould help uS out. We have found out
there are pOSSiblityj
INO-Fly lists being maintained and utilized at the airport. The
agencies having lists. as we know of are TSA, FBI and the airlines. These list are not comprehensive and
not centralized. Some subjects appear are one list but not the others. Some of the lists are old and not
current. We are realty confused.
a
SIOC an
FBIHQ attempting to place these St. Louis SUbjects on the NO-Fly lists, again
with no success.
as been the most b1ll2fyi but we have not ~et been able 10 :1 'he subjects
~
aced on the lists. au EC. Dated 10/09/02, titledI
I
is a directive to field offices confirming that all subjects have been appropriately wachhsted. We.
ave contacted TSA today. 10/10/02 to verify if our subjects have been place on the list and again
determine that they have not. Please advise how we can get these people on the No-Fly List ASAP. b2--4
I
b7C -1,3
Thanks
b7E -1
b6 -1,3
cc:
Aviation-CAS Program; THOMAS E. BUSH; TSA LIST PROCESS
SUSSMAN-63
b2 -5
______t~!SAN()FIYf~~.~ seleCt~.,-e-,-B_O_I_is_fs=.",-,~-==~~~~_::~~.-~~ ~:-~ :======:,,--,--~,,--~~",------c,,--,--,,-_'.e-','~p.e-a-,-g-,-e-,,-1l
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
~
IAviation Field 25
10/25/02 6:37PM
TSA No Fly 123 & Selectee 80 lists
b2 -4,5
b7E -1,2
I've received some questions about how r1should handle the lists. This is my best guidance, but if
someone has something additional to off~se let us know.
If the goal is to not let identical matches board flights, and it is the air carrier's responsibility to do that, we
have to figure out ways to help the air carriers determine if a possible match is an exact match. If the rr
carrier identifies a possible match, they are supposed tal
I
don't know what optionsc=Jhave to discuss identification with air carrier personnel or if they prefer, or
have, to go to the local police at the airport to assist them, but someone is going to have to compare the
passenger's identification to the list data. That can be over the phone or in person.
TSA controls dissemination of the list and the FBI is only supposed to disseminate within its own
organ~tion 1
------..._---------------------------------------------------------------------
Please forward/disseminate as appropriate
b2 -4
b7E -1
- Recipients of this mail have either been designated as Airport Liaison Agents or have duties and
responsibilities which necessitate, or are enhanced by, awareness of Transportation Security
Administration (TSA - formerly FAA) security information.
rese lists ~nd genera!oujdance fur FBI rer;;.~ 19 possjble1::'::'':'' on !SA lilWi w"" b.~d
SUSSMAN-64
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
o
10/7/024:40PM
b7C -1
Re: the TSA No Fly list
b 6 -1
The question has arisen many times already. Persons are placed on the list based on a variety criteria,
including the following, which all focus being a known or suspected terrorist, planning or suspected of
lannin a terrorist act etc AND os;n a threat to aviation. When ou ask if an
ersons on the list are
I don't think so,
I~
--
I
I
I
b2 -4
b7C -1,3
b7E -1
b6 -1,3
I
-----J
I
I
-----J
6
...l11017,02 10:56:33 AM »>
ou know what factor(s) are used inplacing individuals names on the list? For example:
I would like to know for future reference in case the question
L.:::=:::---------------l b2 -4
b7E -1
Thanks,
ICC: J~-----
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
HiD
9(30/028:01PM
Re: No-Fly Question
b7C -1
b6 -1
SUSSMAN-65
b7C -1
b6 -1
I didn't see this article so thanks for sending. The TSA maintains the No Fly List, but the content is
generated by FBI, CIA and probably other intel entities. I'll read the article in depth tomorrow.
o
eJ-----..,~/30/02 9:47:51 AM »>
b7C -1
b6 -1
Re the attached article. Who does "maintain" or is "responsible" for the no-fly list?
No-Fly Blacklist Snares Political Activists
The San Francisco Chronicle
By Alan Gathright
September 28, 2002
SAN FRAI\lCISCO, CA -- A federal uNo Fly" list, intended to keep terrorists from boarding planes, is
snaring peace activists at San Francisco International and other U. S. airports, triggering complaints that
civil liberties are being trampled.
And while several federal agencies acknowledge that they contribute names to the congressionally
mandated list, none of them, when contacted by The Chronicle, could or would say which agency is
responsible for managing the list. One detainment forced a group of 20 Wisconsin anti-war activists to
miss their flight, delaying their trip to meet with congressional representatives by a day. That case and
others are raising qu~stions about the criteria federal authorities use to place people on the list -- and
whether people who exercise their constitutional right to dissent are being lumped together with terrorists.
"What's scariest to me is that there could be this gross interruption of civil rights and nobody is really in
charge," said Sarah Backus, an organizer of the Wisconsin group. "That's really 1984-ish."
Federal law enforcement officials deny targeting dissidents. They suggested that the activists were
stopped not because their names are on the list, but because their names resemble those of suspected
criminals or terrorists. Congress mandated the list as part of last year's Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, after two Sept. 11 hijackers on a federal 'Watch list" used their real names to board the
jetliner that crashed into the Pentagon. The alerts about the two men, however, were not relayed to the
airlines. The detaining of activists has stirred concern among members of Congress and civil liberties
advocates. They want to know what safeguards exist to prevent innocent people from being branded "a
threat to civil aviation or national security."
NO ACCOUNTABILITY
And they are troubled by the bureaucratic nightmare that people stumble into as they go from one
government agency to another in a maddening search to find out who is the official keeper of the nO-fly
list. "The problem is that this list has no public accountability: People don't know why their names are put
on or how to get their names off," said Jayashri Srikantiah, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties
Union of Northern California. 'We have heard complaints from people who triggered the list a first time
and then were cleared by security to fly. But when they fly again, their name is triggered again."
Several federal agencies -- including the CIA, FBI, INS and State Department •• contribute names to the
list. But no one at those agencies could say who is responsible for managing the list or who can remove
names of people who have been cleared by authorities. Transportation Security Administration
spokesman David Steigman initially said his agency did not have a no-fly list, but after conferring with
colleagues, modified his response: His agency does not contribute to the no- fly list, he said, but simply
relays names collected by other federal agencies to airlines and airports. "We are just a funn'el," he said,
estimating that fewer than 1,000 names are on the list. "TSA has access to it. We do not maintain it." He
couldn't say who does.
Oden said a National Guardsman gral;lQ~p.!lrHAl(~~en she tried to help a security screener searching
her bags with a stuck zipper. The midatl:f-agMCfWdn¥cJ'r't, who said she was conservatively dressed and
wore no anti-war buttons, said the guardsman seemed to know her activist background. "He started
spouting this pro-war nonsense: 'Don't you understand that we have to get them before they get us? Don't
you understand what happened on Sept. 11?" Airport officials said at the time that Oden was barred from
boarding because she was uncooperative with security procedures, which she denies,
Instead, Oden pointed out that the American Airlines ticket clerk -- who marked j'i0r bOGI'~inspas~ If);;;'] an
"S" .- had acknowledged she wasn't picked by random. "You were going to be se<;rci',ed fl{l (na\ter what.
Your name was checked on the list," he said, according to Oden. "The only reason I could come up with is
that the FBI is reactivating their old anti-war activists' files,· said Oden. who protested the Vietnam War as
a young office worker in Washington, D.C. "It is intimidation. It's just like y'ears ~go when the FBI built a
file about me and they called my landlord and my co-workers.... They did that with everyone in the
anti-war movement." A
TOOL FOR TERROR
In his testimony before Congress, Mueller described the watch list as an necessary tool for tracking
individuals who had not committed a crime but were suspected of terrorist links. "It is critically important,"
he said, "that we-have state and locals (police) identify a person has been stopped, not necessarily
detained, but get us the information that the person has been stopped at a particular place." None of this
makes the peace activists feel any safer -- about flying or about their right to disagree with their
government.
"It's probably bad for (airport) security," said Sister Virgine. "Stopping us took a lot of staff away from
checking out what else was going on in that airport." Ultimately, she said, "To not have dissent in a
country like this would be an attack on one of our most precious freedoms. This is the essence of being
an American citizen - the right to dissent."
cc:
PROCESS
ITERRORIST WATCH LIST Unit; TSA LIST
L-
-----
into VGTOF.
b2 -4
b7E -1
Tbe Terrorism Watth List
b2 -4
...-----------------------------..., b7E -1
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
(No Fly and Selectee Lists)
The No Fly List is used to prevent indiViduals from using commercial aviation
who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to civil aviation based on infonnation provided by various
sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be
pennitted to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is
removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the
local FBl office will be contacted to cond~ct a thorough interview of the individual to make a
positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are
responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI.
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
The Selectee List consists of individuals who are
ese 10 IVI ua s are screened by airport authorities in accordance with TSA
Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial
air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respective air carrier and/or
local airport authorities will make the final detennination regarding who boards an aircraft.
b7E -1
Additions to the No Fly and Selectee lists are based on recommendations from the
u.s. Intelligence Communityl
lthe FBI and CIA). Removals are based on
AllINFOrfMATlO" CONTAINED
~~~S'~~~If1~C.toOO1 b I} N LS lilt ,-ICJ L
~&l-03-1 '1 fl9I
SUSSI'vlAN-67
b2 -4
b7E -1
recommendations from the originators of the information.
1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS)
I
I
I
bl ==================::L1
.....J b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
.---------------------------------,oh 7E -1
SUSSMAN-68
The Terrorism Watch List
b2 -4
b7E -1
Transportation Security Administration
(No Fly and Seledee Lists)
The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using commercial aviation
who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to aviation, based on information provided by various
sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be
permitted to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is
removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the
local FBI office will be contacted to conduct a thorough interview of the individual to make a
positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are
responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI. b2 - 4
The Selectee List consists of individuals
ese In IVI ua s are screene
y atrport aut onttes In accor ance WIt T A
Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial
air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respeCtive air carrier and/or
local airport authorities will make the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft.
b2 -4
b7E -1
I
b2 -4
b7E -1
l.-
_
Att INFORMATION CONTAINED
I
~~!e.U~~~I~C'09\b') I\JL.s I~C' ~ i 03 .. I ') f') 9
b2 -4
b7E -1
5U55MAN-69
· .
The Terrorism Watch List
b2 -4
b7E -1
Transportation Security Administration
(No Fly and Selectee Lists)
The No Fly List is used to prevent individuals from using commercial aviation
who are deemed by TSA to be a threat to aviation, based on information provided by various
sources (such as the FBI). If an individual is listed on the No Fly List, that individual will not be
penniUed to board any commercial aircraft within the U.S. until such time as the individual is
removed from the list by TSA. If an individual on the No Fly List is identified at an airport, the
local FBI office will be contacted to conduct a thorough interview of the individual to make a
positive identification. It should be noted, the air carriers and/or local airport authorities are
responsible for preventing a passenger on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, not the FBI.
The Selectee List consists of individuals
ese an IVI ua s are screene
y airport au onties In accOf ance Wit TSA
Security Directives. Following the screening procedures, these individuals can use commercial
air transportation and should not be denied boarding. Again, the respective air carrier and/or
local airport authorities will make the final determination regarding who boards an aircraft.
b2 -4
b7E -1
b2 -4
b7E -1
~2 -4
~7E -1
1.-
---1
SUSSMAN-70
'--
Fuestions Rep\y.&t
:
I" ==
b7C -1,6
b6 -1,6
b7C -1,6
b2 -2
b7C -1,3,5,6
b6 -1,3,5,6
b2 -2
References:
Subject: Re:":N':"'"o-;F=:'ly~li;-st;---------------------_...J
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 00:58:41 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: texUplain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
Disposition-Notification-T01
Jg}leo.gov>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4801.1700
Dea~
_
Fro"tu
.....WI:l°·gov>
To:
esa.com>
Bcc
customs.treas.gov>,
state.gov>,
Please understand that' am only one of many persons involved in this
b 6 -1, 6
process, but, as I have tried with other citizens facing the same situation,
I will try to respond to your Questions since you were referred to me by the
-""'.
FAA. For starters, let me say that the U.S. government and the airlines are
continually working to streamline the identification of passengers while
affording maximum security. Passenger cooperation plays a big role, so we
very much appreciate that you recognize the overall issue.
Even though your marketers name may match or be dose enough to a name on
the No Fly List to warrant additional scrutiny, her own identification, once
examined by airline or law enforcement pers.onnel, should be sufficient to
distinguish her from the actual person on the list. I think that the
airlines, law enforcement and the passenger all hope that this examination
process is short, but everyone also wants to be sure that the passenger is
not the person on the list. Although there is no government documentation
available at this time which a person can carry with them to say that they
are not the person on a list, I can only suggest that your marketer contact
the airline(s) with whom she deals to inquire if there is something she can
do to assist them in distinguishing herself frm'irlhe listnam,,~.in adV3:lCe
and again at the ticket counter/gate, to faci\it3:'e the PfOC:9.>~;.
I'm not at liberty to discuss how the No Fly List works, and I don't believe
that there is any public information at this time regarding the list. You
may wish to review the Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed by
Congress on 11/19/2001, for insight on the requirements for checking airline
5U55MAN-71
__......~q§tions Reply.tXt
________...1
passenger information.
=ua,::==:==::.
:
Page 21
The idea of having a database or clearing house that could be searched or to
which names could be submitted is one that has been raised by many people
and that I imagine will be the subject of debate for some time.
I hope I have assisted you and, again, thank you for your cooperation as we
face these challenges.
I
IsuperviSOry Special Agent
Civil AVlaflon Security Program, FBI Headquarters-Room 11795
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20535
I
~fax)
b2 -1
b7C -1,6
b6 -1,6
---- 0r:.r~iL::.:.::~~=l£:::."";;';"
--,
From
To··r-;.;.a--....".o:-r-----:-----------....I
Sent:
ednesday, August 07, 20024:19 PM
Subject: No Fly List
j-
b7C -1,6
b6 -1,6
b2 -2
> I was given your contact information by someone at the FAA concerning the
> "no-fly" list. I manage a company that conducts background checks for
> employers. My interest stems from the experiences of one of our marketers
> who is routinely subjected to close scrutiny because her name pops up on
> this "no-fly" list. We aren't complaining, just curious about the list.
>
> Is there some type of document someone could carry showing they aren't the
> person wanted on the list? How does the list work? Is there any public
> information available regarding the list?
>
> On a side note, our industry (there are many companies that do what we
do),
> screens hundreds of thousands of people each week who are applying for
jobs
> in the US. It would be a great tool for the US to have some sort of
> database or clearing house for wanted peTsons that we could either search
or
> submit names for searches.
>
> Thanks,
>
b6 -6
b7C -6
SUSSMAN-72
~
al.-
~pri.txt ===:
b2 -2
:
tage 11
Fro
@Ieo.gov
To:'r:===Ibmi~~~
Cc: L..-,...-
---L
.....
b7C -1,2,3,6
b6 -1,2,3,6
Bec
tsa.dot.gov
SubJec: e:I-...
--I
Date: Mon, 29 Jul2002 15:46:48 -0400
Deal....
_
Thank you for your email to exPlai~erienceat Jacksonville
Airport. Please understand that it-i~ho is on the No Fly
list, but similarly named people who may pose a danger to aviation. As you
might imaginel
!experience is repeated across the country with
the more common names. both in Arabic and English. It's difficult to be too
cautious. Procedurally, when people with names similar to names on the list
present themselves at the ticket counter with their identification, airlines
are given the option of determining for themselves that the passenger is not
the person on the list. Some airlines either don't have the capability or
don't accept the option to make the determination. and therefore they must
contact the airport police for a decision. If the police were checking
databases, it's possible the didn't want to render a decision until they
were absolutely sure of wh
as, or wasn't. Unless there is a
real question as to whethe
is the same as someone on the list,
clearance should not take more an minutes.
I just got off the phone wit~
~nd it sounds like a problem with
the airlines at Jacksonville airport, becaus4
ladvee
didn't have the same problem at Dulles in D.C. I provide
with
some guidance for contacting the airlines with whom he has a requent Flyer
number, and also for initiating contact himself with the airport police
prior to arrival at the airport, to give them a heads-up.
In the meantime, I kno~
~poke with someone today at the
Jacksonville FBI office, but I didn't recognize the name of the person he
spoke with. Therefore, I will be contacting two, experienced aviation
security agents in our Jacksonville office for follow-up at the airport to
see if there is a problem which can be easily rectified.
Sincerely,
I
ISupervisory Special Agent
Civil Aviation Security Program
Special Events Management Unit, Room 11795
Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Planning Section
Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
----- O~igiQal Message ----­
From: I
To: 1~:..!::::==:::;;,le:-o:-QQ-:v-:--------------
cc:1
Sen7."t.M"o=n:":jdi'::a7":'y.-Ji:"u:;:ly~2~9~,"'l2:';OOn02'l"'f2~:3i'!3"'Pp'l"ll:MT'""---------------
b7C -2,6
b6 -2,6
b7C -2
b6 -2
b7C -2
b6 -2
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -2
b7C -6
b6 -6
All INFORMATION CONTAINED
I
~~~ ~U~~~~1i( Ip O;l b') NLS A<0 IC4 l.
C~. 03-1 'J'1q
5U55MAN-73
__--.-
Fepiy.txt
Subject1,---
_
b7C -1,2
b6 -1,2
2 age21
The FAA referred me to you regarding a "No Fly List" in which our Medical
Directo~
~ has inadvertently been put on. As he was
leaving Jacksonville this morning, he was detained for forty-five (45)
minutes (and almost missed his flight to New Orleans) to be run through
every computer database that was available by the local authorities. The
local authorities suggested that he call th~ FBI to have his removed from
this so-called "No Fly List". The TSA and FAA were also notified by both
'-:-_-:-----Jloffice personnel, as well as myself. After numerous calls,
transfers, etc., we were directed back to the FBI.
I
lis a very well-known and respected physician here the
Jacksonville, FL area (please refer to his website~.....--:'_~~~-­
Quite often, he is required to travel out of state for seminars, business,
personal and other hospital related issues; and it is imperative that he
not be continually detained by the authorities. After the 9/11 terrorists
attacks. we understand the need for increased security; however, we hope
th~
Iwill not have to endure the humiliation and delay in travel
that he experienced this morning.
His passport number iS~
IHis date of birth is:I.....
____
On Monday, July 29thJ
lwill be meeting with the local FBI here in
Ji;tcksonville, FL. If there is any further light you can shed on this
incident, it would be greatly appreciated.
b7C -2,6
b6 -2,6
b7C -2
b6 -2
b7C -2
b6 -2
5U55MAN-74
______----JtReTNOFIY List question
:
.
..
From:
r
b7C -1
To:
l
Date:
Fri, Jan 31, 2003 4:56 PM
b 6 -1
SUbject:
Re: No Fly List question
~ - not SSA anything .. )
No, not at this point as I can't see the formica pattem on my desk due to paper gluttage.
I trust the ec is worthy and appropriate. However, please remember the following if you wish to proceed:
L.".""I"II"I'!lrr-rrl~~=~"II':":"'"==-:===~='E""""----------------b2 -4
b7E -1
As a guide - If a CIA wishes to place a person on the No Fly List, the person
• A t
If the CIA still feels that strongly, then...with the concurrence and assistance of your HQ Substantive Desk
SSA, prepare:
erson. This will need to be at the FOUO for official use
b2 -4
[
lb7E-l
b2 -4
L..-r:!:============================r b7E -1
Or----------------
5. Once obtained, this information is forwarded to the TSA for placement on the NO Fly list. Once this
person is on the list. he will not fly within the US, nor will he be able to fly out of the US or from any airport
I
I
dl.....--
_
b2 -4
b7E -1
I hope this helps. Please call me if you need further gUidance/assistance.
SS~
Coun~t-ert"":"e-r-r'01-,":'"';s-n-l~D-!v":'"is"':'"ic-":1--
Civil Aviation Security Program
L:::j
m1179
BIHQ
Desk
Cell
b2 -1
b7C -1
b6 -1
AtllNFORMATION CONTAINED
H~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
l 0 .. 1- '1 N L5/A <0 I~ I
DA
·10-0>6'( U C,.
0
~
\,,)
C~.a: O~-, r'l"~
SUSSMAN-75
______t!§f}elE§tee list
: -
Page ~ I
. From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
I
-=Th:-u-.-=-M~a-r~27=-,-::2~0':":03~10~:1~4:-AM
Re: selectee list
b7C -1
b6 -1
b6 -1
Right on ..
Sorry about the attachments - the computer gremlins were at work aaain..
b7C -1
O....-
103/2710:10AM»>
From how I understand it the Selectee List is
thd
I
L--;::::::======~:-::-::-:-:-~:-:-
....J-----------_.....I b2 - 4
»>1
103/26 6:49 AM >>>
I know what the procedures are for the No Flv. but what are the Drocedures for Dlacina an indivirh J~I nn
b 7 C -1
the Selectee List.
b7E -1
b6 -1
SUSSMAN-76
------ -----
~--
,
(Rev. 08-28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
To: crimina"nvestjQlive From: Office of the General Counsel
Re:1
08/23/2002
b2 -3
Precedence: ROUTINE
To:
Criminal Investigative
Counter Terrorism
Date: 08/23/2002
Attn: VCMOS
Attn: DTICPS
SC Tom Carey
SEMU
ITOS-I/II
SC Andrew Arena
581
_
SC Charles Frahm
b7C -1
b6 -1
From: Office of the General Counsel
~~~:~tlye I aw Ilojt
IextlL....-_....J
Approved By:
Steele Charles M
Drafted By~:_~I=======;-__
Case 10 #1
I(Pending) b 2 - 3
Title:
CRIMES INVOLVING CIVIL AVIATION;
FBI INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION
b7C -1
b6 -1
b2 -1
Synops.is: To oroyjde a lenal oDjnion from the Office of the General CallOsel (oqC)
concernlngl
JI-------------------J
Administrative: This document is a privileged FBI attorney
communication and may not be disseminated outside the FBI without
aGe approval.
Also, to read the footnotes in this document, it
may be required to download and print the document in
WordPerfect.
Details: I
2
All INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE~ I~NCLASSIFltD
DAle
• \J3BY(lCI'~<01NLSI Rroj
CJ:J, 0.3- I ') 19
Go L
5U55MAN-77
b5 -1. 2
b5 -1,2
..~
(Rev. O~-2~-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of thA r,eneral Counsel
Rei
r8/23/2002
b2-3
The TSA was created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001 (ATSA) following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant
conclusion that security at the Nation's airports needed to be improved. ATSA amends
various sections of Title 49 of the United States Code to assign responsibility to the
TSA to provide security for civil aviation and to conduct airport screening operations.
TSA Statutory Authority
ATSA created the TSA as an entity within the Department of
Transportation and designated an Under Secretary of Transportation for Security as the
responsible official in charge of the new agency.2 The Under Secretary's statutory
responsibilities that most pertain to the issue at hand include:
(1) Carrying out the provisions in Chapter 449 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code,
relating to civil aviation security, and related research and development activities;
(2) Airport screening operations; and
(3) Receiving, assessing, and distributing intelligence information related
f
f,
b5 -1,2
b5 -1,2
t
b5 -1,2
..
~--""-I --
lAt this writing, TSA is likely to become part of the proposed
Department of Homeland Security when legislation to that effect is
assed
by the Congress and signed by the ~resident.
3
~~JUri~:~p:d. •.. ,.
----.....
b7C-1
--_._~_._~----~~~~-------------------,
b6 -1
(Rev. 08-28.20(0)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of the General Counsel
Re: I
108/23/2002
b2 -3
to transportation security.
Chapter 449 of Title 49, entitled "Security," addresses all aspects of
aviation security, including: screening passengers and cargo; receiving and evaluating
threats to aviation; research and development of modem security systems and facilities;
and regulation of security of foreign carriers and foreign airports that serve passengers
bound for the U.S.
In addition, ATSA grants the Under Secretary permissive (as opposed to
mandatory) authority to designate federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) and
empowers these LEOs to exercise standard law enforcement powers when engaged in
"official duties of the Administration as required to fulfill the responsibilities under
[ATSAJ." These powers include authority to carry firearms, make arrests without warrant
for any federal offense committed in their presence or for which they have probable
cause, and seek and execute federal warrants for arrest or search and seizure of
evidence. ATSA also requires the Under Secretary to provide guidelines by which to
exercise these law enforcement powers in consultation with the Attorney General. The
proposed guidelines have been submitted to the Department of Justice for review.
Finally, ATSA continues the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program (formerly
part of the Federal Aviation Administration) by authorizing the TSA to deploy FAMs
aboard aircraft for what are clearly reactive law enforcement functions.
FBI Statutory Authority
The FBI's general enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 533, grants the agency
the authority to investigate any violation of the criminal laws of the United States. As
noted previously, 28 U.S.C. § 538 specifically empowers the FBI to investigate the
primary crimes-aboard-aircraft violations in Title 49, which are set forth in Chapter 465,
entitled: ·Speclal Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States." These include Section
46502, Aircraft piracy; Section 46504, Interference with flight crew members and
attendants; Section 46505, Carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft; Section
46505 which lists a variety of common-law crimes (e.g., murder, robbery) committed
within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States~ and Section 46507, False
information and threats. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 538 also grants the FBI specific
investigative jurisdiction for the offense listed at 49 U.S.C. § 46314, Entering aircraft or
airport area in violation of security requirements.
The FBI's general investigative authority also includes the aviation-related
J The special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States is defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 7
(5) as any aircraft belonging in whole or 1n part to the
United States or any citizen or corporation thereof while fi·,C!-:. a i.:ccT.i\':t
is in flight over U.S.
territory or over the high seas.
4
SUSSMAN-79
----._-----------
(Rev. 08-28-2000)
b7C -1
-----_.__._---
b6 -1
b2 -3
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
To: Criminal Investigative From: Office of the General Counsel
Re:1
I08/23/2002
authority for any offense for which a LEO is granted the power to arrest, then virtually
every federal LEO would have investiaative iurisdiction over everv federal felonv.s
b5 -1,2
Federal Air Marshals
The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program is also part of the TSA's statutory
authority. FAMs, however, are primarily a reactive and a deterrent force whose
members are LEOs and are armed and placed on selected flights to react to in-flight
incidents of air piracy and other violent acts that threaten th in'
-
the lives of those aboard.
b5 -1,2
Analysis
b5 -1,2
the lawful ability to react promptly and respond appropriately to a
report of emergent criminal activity without concern for jurisdictional
distinctions or civil liability.
I
I.~~_.
6
~
SUS_~S~M~AN~-~80~~~.u
. I
I:
I
I
r
t
~ .
b5 -1,2f
f
b2 -3
~{0ftm1nallnyestlgj~~iiif::~~:~~n~~~~;~~~~TION
I­
i
I
I
I
I
I
"'----_1 ts~j~ris.~p'~p.
b7C -1
b6 -1
j
I
I
I
I
I
I
I~-.-__~.~
..~
.. =""'~.~~~~.
SUSSMAN-8t
,------­
I
I
b6 -1
~~--~-------~~~------,
(Rev_ 08-28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
To: criminallnvestiaajiVe From: Office of the General Counsel
Re:1
08/23/2002
b2 -3
bS -1,2
OGC is available to assist in these efforts and in any other capacity to
resolve l'UriSdictional issues with the TSA. Point of ~ontact at 0Ge is tssistant General
Counse
IInvestigative Law Unit, atL...-_____
b 7 C -1
b6 -1
b2 -1
10
5U55MAN-82
?S
Page 34 of 41
SUSSMAN-83
part 108 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Transportation shall conduct a review of reductions in unauthorized access at these airports.
'(2) Computer-assisted passenger prescreening system-
'(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System, or any successor system--
'(i) is used to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft; and
'(ii) includes procedures to ensure that individuals selected by the system and their carry-on and checked
baggage are adequately screened.
'(B) MODIFICAnONS- The Secretary of Transportation may modify any requirement under the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System for flights that originate and tenninate within the same State, if the
Secretary detennines that--
'(i) the State has extraordinary air transportation needs or concerns due to its isolation and dependence on air
transportation; and
'(ii) the routine characteristics of passengers, given the nature of the market, regularly triggers primary selectee
status.'.
SEC. 137. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF AVIAnON SECURITY TECHNOLOGY.
(a) FUNDING- To augment the programs authorized in section 44912(a)(I) of title 49, United States Code, there is
authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 and such swns as are
necessary for each fiscal year thereafter to the Transportation Security Administration, for research, development" testing,
and evaluation of the following technologies which may enhance aviation security in the future. Grants to industry,
academia, and Government entities to carry out the provisions of this section shall be available for fiscal years 2002 and 2003
for--
(l) the acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of explosives detection technology for checked
baggage, specifically, technology that is--
(A) more cost-effective for deployment for explosives detection in checked baggage at small- to medium-sized
airports, and is currently under development as part of the Argus research program at the Transportation Security
Administration;
(B) faster, to facilitate screening of all checked baggage at larger airports; or
(C) more accurate, to reduce the number offalse positives requiring additional security measures;
(2) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation ofDew screening technology for carry-on items to
provide more effective means of detecting and identifying weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of mass
destruction, including advanced x-ray technology;
(3) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of threat screening technology for other categories of
items being loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, catering, and duty-free items;
(4) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of threats carried on persons boarding aircraft or
entering secure areas, including detection of weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of mass destruction;
(5) acceleration of research, development, testing and evaluation of integrated systems of airport security enhancement.
including quantitative methods of assessing security factors at airports selected for testing such systems;
(6) expansion of the existing program of research, development, testing, and evaluation of improved methods of
education, training, and testing of key airport security personnel; and
(7) acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of aircraft hardening materials, and techniques to
reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to terrorist attack.
All INFORf,AAY''''
.
' .• "
VI
,·,I~ ((t""'i!~ED
~!~ l U_~~~51ff£D
I
I
D~BM<" lnOO1lof") NLS (A" ~L
httn://30.5.1 OO.249/on~tJnnort/faa~lInnort/ci::ltafilp.~1AVi::l~~/dn11/'JOTr::mo::nnrt~tinnO/_')(l~",,..
,nRlOl