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11/4/2019 1 The History of the Near Future What history tells us about our Age of Discord Forecast: growing political instability to the 2020s 1 2 11/4/2019 2 Three major themes • What are the deep structural forces that drive social instability and political violence? – United States from the 1970s to the present • All complex human societies experience periodic waves of political instability – a historical database of past societies falling into crisis – and emerging from it • Work in progress and future research – massively expanding the historical database of crises/recovery – building country-specific models connecting macro- to micro-dynamics 3 4 11/4/2019 3 Structural Forces Driving Social Instability and Political Violence Mechanism Brief explanation Mass mobilization potential When the supply of labor exceeds its demand, the price of labor decreases, depressing the living standards for the majority of population, thus leading to popular immiseration and growing mass-mobilization potential, but creating favorable economic conditions for the elites. Intraelite competition Favorable economic conjuncture for the elites results in increasing numbers of elites and elite aspirants, as well as runaway growth of elite consumption levels. Elite overproduction results when elite numbers and appetites exceed the ability of the society to sustain them, leading to spiraling intraelite competition and conflict. State fragility A fiscal crisis reduces the state’s control of the coercive apparatus (police and army). The state’s legitimacy crisis undermines the willingness of the elites and the population to defend state institutions against the assault by radical groups. International environment Whereas the first three mechanisms are internal, societal stability is also affected by external factors: geopolitical (e.g., foreign support for the opposition), geo-economic (shifting prices of international commodities), and geo-cultural (a successful revolution in a culturally similar country). t t t t t t G D W a C N S Well-being/Immiseration I: Why did real wages stop growing? log log log log t t t t t t t G D W A C N S Real wage, Wt , as a function of: GDP per capita Labor demand/supply ratio Extra-economic factors: norms and institutions Regression model: 5 6 11/4/2019 4 log log t t t t G W A N log log log t t t t t t G D W A N S Full model: GDP, Labor Supply/Demand, Social Norms* *proxied by real minimum wage log log log log t t t t t t t G D W A C N S 7 8 11/4/2019 5 Well-Being II: Additional Proxies • Biological well-being – average expectation of life – population stature (average heights) • (for other proxies see Ages of Discord) SC Kulkarni, A Levin-Rector, M Ezzati, CJL Murray (2011). Falling behind: life expectancy in US counties from 2000 to 2007 in an international context. Population Health Metrics 9:16 Well-Being: life expectancy 9 10 11/4/2019 6 (a) 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Height, cm (men)172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 Height, cm (women)160 162 164 166 white men black men white women black women Well-Being: Average Stature (b) 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 Height, cm166 167 168 169 170 171 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Real Wage20 40 60 80 100 120 Average Height (top scale) Real Wage (bottom scale) Well-Being: Average Stature and Real Wage 11 12 11/4/2019 7 The Effect on the Elites • Elites: small percent of the population who concentrate social power in their hands • Declining relative wages means not only immiseration of large segments of population, but also enrichment of those who consume labor – the elites and elite aspirants – elite numbers (and appetites) grow – high rate of upward social mobility year Percent of households with net worth exceeding: 1 mln 5 mln 10 mln 1983 2.9 0.29 0.08 1986 3.3 0.32 0.07 1992 3.3 0.29 0.04 1995 3.0 0.48 0.19 1998 4.7 0.74 0.23 2001 5.5 1.00 0.32 2004 5.8 1.00 0.31 2007 6.3 1.26 0.40 Proportion of multimillionaires in relation to the total population, 1983–2007 (Wolff 2010: Table 3) in constant 1995 dollars. 13 14 11/4/2019 8 “Elite Overproduction” • Growing elite numbers and consumption levels eventually overshoot the productive base – large segments of the elites find themselves lacking resources to maintain status • Since the number of power positions is limited, segments of elites/elite aspirants must be denied access to them • Rise of the counter-elites: “surplus” elites who challenge the established elites, even by violent means • As a result, elite overproduction drives up intra- elite competition and sociopolitical instability Year House Senate Both chambers Millionaires 2000 1233 191 1424 no data 2002 1299 146 1445 32 2004 1212 189 1401 30 2006 1317 166 1483 42 2008 1377 168 1545 51 2010 1897 308 2205 58 2012 1711 251 1962 48 Numbers of candidates (including the primaries) that ran for House and Senate seats: 2000–2012. (Source: Center for Responsive Politics, OpenSecrets.org) 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2012 dollars200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 Cost of Winning (thousands) Total Amount Spent (million) The average cost of winning an election to the House, 1986–2012 (in thousands of inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars) and the total amount (in millions of 2012 dollars) spent by major party candidates. Data source: The Campaign Finance Institute 15 16 11/4/2019 9 Part I: conclusions • Two major structural trends are undermining social and political stability of the US • Declining well-being of large segments of the American population drives mass-mobilization potential • Elite overproduction drives intra-elite competition and conflict Three major themes • What are the deep structural forces that drive social instability and political violence? – United States from the 1970s to the present • All complex human societies experience periodic waves of political instability – a historical database of past societies falling into crisis – and emerging from it • Work in progress and future research – massively expanding the historical database of crises/recovery – building country-specific models connecting macro- to micro-dynamics 17 18 11/4/2019 10 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Real Wage0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Real GDP per capita (2005$$)0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 GDP per capita (source: MeasuringWorth) Real wages (source: MeasuringWorth) Where do waves come from? 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Relative Wage60 80 100 120 140 160 180 data smoothed trend, h = 5 Relative Wage: Scaling Wage by GDPpc 19 20 11/4/2019 11 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Relative Wage60 80 100 120 140 160 180 data smoothed trend, h = 5 Economic inequality as a “proxy” (indirect indicator) of structural pressures for instability Summary of well-being indicators 21 22 11/4/2019 12 Elite overproduction/competition indicators The “double spiral” of well-being and elite overproduction 23 24 11/4/2019 13 Social and political instability in the US Effect of structural pressures on instability/political violence Instability Waves in France (Sorokin's Index) 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 Instability Index0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 Carolingian break-up Late Medieval Crisis XVII c. Crisis: Wars of Religion, Fronde Early Medieval Crisis: Political fragmentation, Capetian reconquest, Albigensian crusades Instability Waves in Rome -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 Index of Political Instability0 50 100 150 200 Kingdom- Republic Transition Republic-Principate Transition Principate- Dominate Transition Delving deeper into the past 25 26 11/4/2019 14 Russia 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 France England Romanov USSR Muscovy Capetian Valois Bourbon Plantagenet Tudor-Stuart United States Cycles of well-being/low inequality – immiseration/high inequality Russia 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 France England Romanov USSR Muscovy Capetian Valois Bourbon Plantagenet Tudor-Stuart United States War of the Roses Hundred Years War Wars of Religion Civil War Civil War Time of Trouble Revolution ?? Cycles of well-being/low inequality – immiseration/high inequality 27 28 11/4/2019 15 The pessimistic view: “Death is the Great Leveler” Inequality can decrease only by major, violent shocks: • Mass-mobilization warfare • Transformative revolution • State failure/collapse • Lethal pandemic Note: I see inequality as a “proxy” (indicator) of social pressures undermining stability, rather than a direct cause of it My take: a bit more optimistic • Entry into crisis (“revolutionary situation”) is relatively stereotypical – mass-mobilization, intra-elite conflict, state fragility • The exit from the crisis is hugely contingent – a “fan” of possible outcomes: from relatively mild to catastrophic 29 30 11/4/2019 16 Sample: 30 societies experiencing revolutionary situations (Europe, Russia, Middle East, India, China, US) Severity components of the outcome: Population decline Population decline > 50% Lethal epidemic Elite: massive downward mobility Elite: dispossession or extermination Ruler executed or assassinated Transformative revolution Civil war Prolonged civil wars (>100 years) Territorial fragmentation External conquest 31 32 11/4/2019 17 Three major themes • What are the deep structural forces that drive social instability and political violence? – United States from the 1970s to the present • All complex human societies experience periodic waves of political instability – a historical database of past societies falling into crisis – and emerging from it • Work in progress and future research – massively expanding the historical database of crisis/recovery – building country-specific models that integrate macro- to micro-dynamics Predicting social unrest/political violence is difficult “The Soviet Union would not break apart because Soviet generals would never permit the dissolution of the state they were sworn to defend” – Jerry Hough, a prominent Soviet expert; October 1991 Ultimately, the hope that big data will somehow yield valid forecasts through theory- free “brute force” is misplaced in the area of political violence. Erroneous Instability Ranking of "Arab Spring" Countries, 2007-2010. Source: J. Eli Margolis. 2012. Estimating State Instability, Studies in Intelligence 56. 33 34 11/4/2019 18 Multipath Forecasting (MPF) Engine • Empirically grounded in historical analysis of a massive database of past crises/recoveries • Integrating qualitative (“Thick Data”) and quantitative (“Big Data”) approaches • Translating between macro processes (structural pressures) and micro-dynamics – contending rival elite groups, state and non-state organizations (including radical ones), and individuals 35 36 11/4/2019 19 General Conclusions • Structural causes of Ages of Discord: • declining population well-being and growing popular discontent • elite overproduction, intra-elite competition and conflict • In past societies these structural conditions usually end with major outbreaks of political violence— revolutions and civil wars • We are on track for the predicted instability peak in the 2020s • the underlying structural pressures are still building 37
