Levelling Up the United Kingdom

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Civic & Government
Manchester
Levelling Up the United Kingdom
Levelling Up the 
United Kingdom
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Levelling Up,  
Housing and Communities  
by Command of Her Majesty  
2 February 2022
CP 604
© Crown copyright 2022
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Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission 
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correspondence@levellingup.gov.uk
ISBN 978-1-5286-3017-7 
E02694177 02/22
Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum
Printed in the UK by HH Associates Ltd. on behalf of the Controller of  
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
Contents
Foreword by the Prime Minister 
viii
Foreword by the Secretary of State and Andrew Haldane 
x
Executive summary 
xii
Chapter 1  The United Kingdom’s Geographical Disparities: Drivers and Potential 
Policy Approaches 
1
1.1 
A Brief History of Geographical Disparities 
1
1.2 
Geographical Disparities across the UK 
16
1.2.1 The scale of geographical disparities across the UK 
16
1.2.2 How the UK’s geographical disparities compare internationally 
19
1.2.3 Broader measures of geographical disparities  
21
1.2.4 Local level geographic disparities 
27
1.2.5 Geographical disparities over time 
30
1.2.6 Cities and productivity 
33
1.2.7 Geographic differences and social mobility 
37
1.2.8 Geographic and economic clustering 
39
1.3 
Explaining Economic Geographies 
42
1.3.1 
Economic growth theory 
42
1.3.2 New economic geography  
44
1.3.3 Social geography and infrastructure 
45
1.3.4 Institutional capital and leadership  
47
1.3.5 Complex adaptive systems  
48
1.3.6 Synthesising the approaches 
50
1.4 
Future Structural Factors Driving the UK’s Economic Geography  
51
1.4.1 The UK’s transition to Net Zero 
52
1.4.2 The impact of COVID-19 
55
1.4.3 Technological transformation  
56
i
1.5 
A Framework for Evaluating Geographical Disparities 
58
1.5.1 Human capital 
59
1.5.2 Financial capital 
66
1.5.3 Social capital 
69
1.5.4 Physical capital 
71
1.5.5 Intangible capital 
77
1.5.6 Institutional capital 
84
1.5.7 Summary and synthesis 
87
1.6 
Interdependence between the Capitals 
89
1.7 
The Role of Public Policy 
95
1.7.1 
The desirability of Local Growth Policy 
96
1.7.2 The feasibility of Local Growth Policy 
100
Chapter 2 Systems Reform 
105
2.1 
Introduction 
105
2.2 
Principles for Successful Policy Regimes 
105
2.2.1 History of public policy approaches in the UK 
106
2.2.2 Lessons from past policy approaches 
110
2.2.3 Lessons from other policy regimes 
114
2.2.4 Principles for a successful policy regime 
116
2.3 A New Policy Regime 
117
2.3.1 Medium-term missions 
117
2.3.2 Reshaping central government decision making  
122
2.3.3 Empowering local decision making 
133
2.3.4 The role of data, monitoring and evaluation 
149
2.3.5 Transparency and accountability 
156
Chapter 3 The Policy Programme 
159
3.1 
Introduction 
159
3.2 
 Boost Productivity, Pay, Jobs, and Living Standards by Growing the Private Sector 
160
3.2.1 By 2030, pay, employment and productivity will have risen in every area of the UK, with 
each containing a globally competitive city, and the gap between the top performing 
and other areas closing. 
160
3.2.2 By 2030, domestic public investment in R&D outside the Greater South East will 
increase by at least 40%, and over the Spending Review period by at least one third. 
This additional government funding will seek to leverage at least twice as much private 
sector investment over the long term to stimulate innovation and productivity growth. 
170
3.2.3 By 2030, local public transport connectivity across the country will be significantly closer 
to the standards of London, with improved services, simpler fares and integrated ticketing.  176
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
ii
3.2.4 By 2030, the UK will have nationwide gigabit-capable broadband and 4G coverage, with 
5G coverage for the majority of the population 
183
3.3 
Spread Opportunities and Improve Public Services 
186
3.3.1 By 2030, the number of primary school children achieving the expected standard in 
reading, writing and maths will have significantly increased. In England, this will mean 90% 
of children will achieve the expected standard, and the percentage of children meeting 
the expected standard in the worst performing areas will have increased by over a third.  
187
3.3.2 By 2030, the number of people successfully completing high-quality skills training will 
have significantly increased in every area of the UK. In England, this will lead to 200,000 
more people successfully completing high-quality skills training annually, driven by 
80,000 more people completing courses in the lowest skilled areas. 
193
3.3.3 By 2030, the gap in Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) between local areas where it is highest 
and lowest will have narrowed, and by 2035 HLE will rise by five years. 
200
3.4 
 Restore a Sense of Community, Local Pride and Belonging 
206
3.4.1 By 2030, pride in place, such as people’s satisfaction with their town centre and 
engagement in local culture and community, will have risen in every area of the UK, 
with the gap between top performing and other areas closing. 
207
3.4.2 By 2030, renters will have a secure path to ownership with the number of first-time 
buyers increasing in all areas; and the government’s ambition is for the number of 
non-decent rented homes to have fallen by 50%, with the biggest improvements in the 
lowest performing areas. 
221
3.4.3 By 2030, homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime will have fallen, focused 
on the worst-affected areas. 
228
3.5 
Empower Local Leaders and Communities 
233
3.5.1 By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with powers 
at or approaching the highest level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding 
settlement.  
234
Chapter 4 Next Steps 
245
4.1 
Introduction 
245
4.2 
Engagement and Informal Consultation 
245
4.3 
Future Legislation 
247
4.4 Conclusion 
248
Delivering for all parts of the United Kingdom 
249
Contents
iii
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1 
Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC 
2
Figure 1.2 Change in population of selected UK cities 1821-2021 (1821=100) 
5
Figure 1.3 Nominal (smoothed) GVA per hour worked (£), GB local authorities and 
Northern Ireland, 2019 
6
Table 1.1 
Size of the gap: Differences in GVA per hour worked in £ and percent, UK and GB 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2019 
7
Figure 1.4 Distribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries and regions, 2019 7
Figure 1.5 Median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, UK local authorities, 2021 
8
Table 1.2 
Size of the gap: Differences in median gross weekly pay in £ and percent, UK countries 
and regions/local authorities, 2021 
9
Figure 1.6 Distribution of median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, local authorities by GB 
countries and regions, 2021 
9
Figure 1.7 
Proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3 + qualifications by local authority, 
UK, 2021 
10
Table 1.3 
Size of the gap: Differences in Level 3+ qualifications population in percent, UK countries 
and regions/local authorities, 2021 
11
Figure 1.8 Distribution of the proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3+, local 
authorities by UK countries and regions, 2021 
11
Figure 1.9 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), UK local authorities, 2017-2019 
12
Table 1.4 
Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Male) in years and percent, UK 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19 
13
Figure 1.10 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), local authorities by UK countries 
and regions, 2017–2019 
13
Figure 1.11 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), UK local authorities, 2017-2019 
14
Table 1.5 
Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Female) in years and percent, UK 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19 
15
Figure 1.12 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), local authorities by UK 
countries and regions, 2017-2019 
15
Figure 1.13 Spatial patterns: Which places are most left behind? Local authorities in the bottom 
quartile for level 3+ equivalent skills in the adult population, Gross Value Added (GVA) 
per hour worked, Median Gross Weekly Pay and healthy life expectancy 
18
Figure 1.14 Regional productivity, GB countries and regions, 1900-2019 
19
Figure 1.15 Ratio of top 20% richest regions to 20% poorest regions, OECD countries, 2008 and 2018 
20
Figure 1.16 Correlation between labour productivity (GVA per hour worked) and other metrics 
21
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
iv
Figure 1.17 Measures of income and productivity compared to UK average, UK countries and 
regions, 2019 
23
Figure 1.18 Life satisfaction, UK local authorities, 2020 
25
Figure 1.19 Determinants of life satisfaction: Odds ratios of factors affecting life satisfaction, UK, 
April 2016 to March 2017 
26
Figure 1.20 GVA per filled job, local authorities by UK countries and regions, 2019 
28
Figure 1.21 
Income deprivation in Kensington and Chelsea 
28
Figure 1.22 Income deprivation in Middlesbrough 
29
Figure 1.23 Income deprivation by Moran's I, England local authorities, 2019 
29
Figure 1.24 Employment rates, British SSRs (Standard Statistical Regions), 1901 to 1971; employment 
rate (16+), UK countries and regions, 2004 to 2020 
31
Figure 1.25 Life expectancy at birth, UK countries and regions, 2001-2003 to 2016-18 
32
Figure 1.26 GVA per hour vs. population size, selected Western European cities, 2011 
33
Figure 1.27 Productivity in Core Cities compared to second-tier cities in other countries, 2016 
34
Figure 1.28 Population density in urban areas (excluding Urban areas below 10,000 people per 
square km), UK and other Western European countries 
35
Figure 1.29 Median earnings at 28 for boys who were on FSM at age 16, across local authorities in 
England where they grew up 
38
Figure 1.30 Illustrative map of the UK’s sectoral clusters and strengths 
40
Figure 1.31 Productivity (GVA per hour worked) against income (gross disposable household income 
per capita), GB local authorities, 2018 
43
Figure 1.32 Productivity and economic complexity, GB urban areas, 2019 
49
Figure 1.33 Net emissions of carbon dioxide per capita, UK local authorities, 2019 
53
Figure 1.34 Potential employment opportunities and skills needs from Net Zero transition, UK 
countries and regions 
54
Figure 1.35 Proportion of jobs at high risk of automation, England local authorities, 2017 
57
Figure 1.36 Real Human Capital per head (16-65 years old), UK countries and regions, 2018 
59
Figure 1.37 Proportion of population aged 16 to 64 with different qualifications levels, UK countries 
and regions, 2019 
60
Figure 1.38 Proportion of population aged 16 to 64 with level 3+l qualifications, GB local authority 
districts and Northern Ireland, 2020 
61
Figure 1.39 Correlation between level 3 and equivalent or higher qualifications and GCSE attainment, 
by local authority (England only) 
62
Figure 1.40 Employment Support Allowance caseload rate (working-age population), UK countries 
and regions, February 2021 
63
Figure 1.41 Overweight and obesity prevalence, England local authorities, 2019/2020 and smoking 
rates, GB local authorities 2019 
64
Figure 1.42 Share of equity and debt finance deals compared to GVA, UK countries and regions, 2021 
67
Figure 1.43 Distribution of equity activity across UK local authorities, 2011-2020 
68
Figure 1.44 Geographic location of investor-investee pairings, UK countries and regions, 2011-2020 
69
Figure 1.45 Local Trust Community Need Index Score, England local authorities, 2019 
70
List of Figures and Tables
v
Figure 1.46 Satisfaction with local area, England regions, 2020-21 
71
Figure 1.47 Jobs reachable within 60 mins for each job within five miles 
72
Figure 1.48 Ratio of house price to residence-based earnings, England and Wales local authority 
districts, 2020 
73
Figure 1.49 Capital stock per worker, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019 
75
Figure 1.50 Gross fixed capital formation compared to London, UK countries and regions, 2000-2019 
76
Figure 1.51 Foreign Direct Investment per workforce job, UK countries and regions, 2019 
77
Figure 1.52 Income from intellectual property by HE providers, UK ITL2 subregions, 2018 
78
Figure 1.53 Patent applications, UK ITL2 subregions, 2012 
79
Figure 1.54 High tech patents, UK ITL2 subregions, 2012 
80
Figure 1.55 Percentage employment in STEM jobs, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019 
81
Figure 1.56 High-tech employment, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019 
82
Figure 1.57 Management practices score, GB countries and regions, 2020 
83
Figure 1.58 R&D expenditure, UK countries and regions, 2019 
84
Figure 1.59 Percentage of adults who agree they can influence decisions affecting their local area, 
England regions, 2020/21 
85
Figure 1.60 Onward Social Fabric Score, GB local authorities and Northern Ireland, 2020 
86
Figure 1.61 Strength of LEP's local networks – Percentage of LEPs agreeing/disagreeing that the 
following bodies play a full and active role in the LEP, 2015 
87
Figure 1.62 Levelling Up Capitals Framework 
88
Figure 1.63 Shares of population cohort moving ITL1 region and employer, 2017 
90
Figure 1.64 Share of all moving graduates by institution and class of degree 2013/14 to 2014/15 
90
Figure 1.65 Mobility patterns of graduates, age 16 to age 27, 2013/14 to 2016/17 
91
Figure 1.66 Share of graduates moving regions and changing jobs and variance in the graduate 
employment rate 
93
Figure 1.67 Hypothetical increase in disposable earnings (median earnings less median rent) as a 
result of moving local authority 
93
Figure 1.68 Share of people moving region and employer, for those born outside the UK and those 
born in the UK, 1994  to 2017. 
94
Figure 1.69 Shares of graduates remaining at home and in non-graduate jobs 
95
Table 1.6 
The Income-Equivalent Benefits of Levelling Up – an illustration 
97
Figure 1.70 GDP per capita annual growth and interregional inequality, OECD TL3 regions (excluding 
former transition economies), 2000–2017 
99
Figure 2.1 
100 years of local growth policy 
108
Table 2.1 
Levelling Up Missions 
120
Figure 2.2 Local growth funding pots introduced in the UK since 2011-12 
127
Table 2.2 
Places for Growth: Number of roles moving outside London by 2025 and 2030’ 
131
Figure 2.3 English Devolution Deal and City and Growth Deal geographies 
134
Table 2.3 Devolution Framework 
140
Table 2.4 
Illustrative private sector initiatives 
147
Figure 2.4 ONS subnational data explorer 
152
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
vi
Figure 3.1 Gigabit coverage improvements, UK countries and regions, 2019, 2021 and 2025 (forecast) 
184
Figure 3.2 4G coverage improvements, UK countries and regions, 2021 and 2026  
184
Figure 3.3 Attainment 8, England local authorities, 2018/19 
188
Figure 3.4 Education Investment Areas, England 
191
Figure 3.5 Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy, England neighbourhoods by deprivation 
decile, 2017-2019 
201
Table 3.1 
Brownfield Funding 
210
Figure 3.6 LUF and Towns Fund recipients, UK local authorities 
240
List of Figures and Tables
vii
Foreword by the 
Prime Minister
From day one, the defining mission of this government has been to 
level up this country.
To take the radical steps needed to make us more prosperous and 
more united by tackling the regional and local inequalities that unfairly 
hold back communities and to encourage private sector investment 
right across the UK.
Because while we are without doubt one of the biggest and strongest 
economies in the world we are also one of the most unbalanced. 
A country in which the place of your birth is one of the clearest 
determining factors in how you’ll get on, what opportunities will be 
open to you, even the number of years for which you can expect 
to live.
This is not a new observation. Politicians have been aware of this regional inequality for as long as it has 
existed, yet have been content to focus instead on the big picture of national growth – a waste of talent 
and a waste of this country’s economic potential.
The answer to it lies not in cutting down the tall poppies, or attempting to hobble the areas that are doing 
well. Instead I am determined to break that link between geography and destiny, so that it makes good 
business sense for the private sector to invest in areas that have for too long felt left behind.
If places that are currently underperforming start firing on all cylinders, national  GDP will rise by tens of 
billions each year. That means more growth, more jobs, and higher wages right across the UK. And if we 
can level up this country – and close our productivity gap – we will have the most prosperous economy in 
Europe.
That is the theory; this White Paper describes the practice. The practical steps this government will take in 
everything from education to art to investment that will make this a better, fairer country for us all.
It’s no small task. The challenges we face have been embedded over generations and cannot be dug out 
overnight. But this White Paper is the crucial first step in doing so. The most comprehensive, ambitious 
plan of its kind that this country has ever seen.
A vision for the future that will see public spending on R&D increased in every part of the country; 
transport connectivity reaching London-like levels within and between all our towns and cities; faster 
broadband in every community; life expectancies rising; violent crime falling; schools improving; and 
private sector investment unleashed.
viii
We’ll usher in a revolution in local democracy. Harness the incredible power of data not just at a national 
and regional level but all the way down to neighbourhoods. Introduce a whole new way of thinking in 
central government, recognising that national success alone is not enough if it masks local failings.
We’ll use the freedoms restored by Brexit – in trade, regulation, immigration, public procurement and 
more – to help businesses, communities and individuals in every part of the country.
And that is just the beginning. Because everyone knows that talent and energy and enthusiasm and flair are 
not located solely in isolated pockets of our country. They are and have always been evenly spread right 
across the UK. It is opportunity that is not.
Fixing that is the economic, social and political challenge of our time. And, with this White Paper, it is a 
challenge to which this government will continue to rise.
Foreword by the Prime Minister
ix
Foreword by the Secretary of 
State and Andrew Haldane
“Stay local, go far.” This was the rallying cry on a 
recent poster in Teesside.
Teesside is making good on that ambition, with the 
recent rebirth of its high tech, high skill, high wage 
economy under mayor Ben Houchen’s inspirational 
leadership. We see similar success stories 
throughout the country.
But this is not the whole picture of the UK. 
There are stark geographical inequalities between 
and within our cities, towns and villages. For every 
local success, there is a story of scarring and stagnation elsewhere. While talent is distributed evenly across 
the UK, opportunity is not. For many, if you want to get on you need to get out. 
Levelling up is a mission – part economic, part social, part moral – to change that for good. It is about 
unleashing opportunity, prosperity and pride in places where, for too long, it has been held back. It is 
about growing the pie and everyone sharing in the fruits of this success, increasing not only peoples’ living 
standards but the length and quality of their lives.
No single, short-term intervention can effect this change. We need to mobilise all the forces that drive 
progress and human flourishing – investment, skills, innovation, finance, trust and institutions. And we 
need to bring all sectors of society together, with the very best of government, the private sector and civil 
society working in partnership. 
It is these forces that transformed Renaissance Florence, that spurred the Industrial Revolution in Britain 
and which drive today’s super-cities like Seoul, New York and London. To level up and unite our country, 
we must follow a similar path. This requires a new model of government and governance of the UK. 
This new model is anchored around an ambitious set of missions, galvanising action across sectors to 
improve jobs, incomes, health, skills, transport, pride in place, safety and well-being across the UK. 
These clear, quantified missions mean no-one can any longer be in any doubt about what is meant by 
success in levelling up.
Meeting these missions will require a country-wide effort, with the UK Government working with all tiers 
of government, including the devolved administrations, civil society and the private sector. At the same 
time, we are rewiring Whitehall to put place at the heart of decision making, including by moving more 
civil servants outside London. It also requires a further devolution of decision-making powers to local 
leaders where decisions are often best taken. A new devolution framework provides a roadmap for 
doing so.
x
Underpinning all of this will be improved data and transparency, oversight and analytics, evaluation and 
experimentation. With local powers come local responsibilities. Monitoring local performance and policies 
is crucial if they are to be understood and responded to by local citizens and improved by local leaders 
over time. A new local government body will have oversight and drive transparency, and there will be a 
statutory responsibility on government to report on progress towards the missions.
This is a clear, measurable, actionable plan for levelling up the UK, from Aberdeen to Antrim, Newport to 
Norwich. And while the White Paper is a long-term plan for changing the UK, it also establishes some 
important first steps. They include inviting local leaders representing nine million people to begin 
negotiations to agree new devolution deals; a transformative new online UK National Academy and 55 new 
Education Improvement Areas; 20 new transformative regeneration projects; significantly increased R&D 
spending outside the Greater South East, with new Innovation Accelerators to catalyse innovation clusters; 
a transformation in the quality of housing, in particular in the private rented and social housing sectors; 
details of the £2.6bn Shared Prosperity Fund to restore pride in place across the UK; boosting investment 
in culture where it’s been absent for too long; and greater powers and money for local communities.
As this long-term programme of change is delivered, the difference will begin to be felt in communities, 
high streets, workplaces, pubs, restaurants, football grounds and theatres. People deserve to live in a 
country where life is not a postcode lottery, where by staying local you can go far. The publication of this 
White Paper marks an important step towards that goal.
Foreword by the Secretary of State and Andrew Haldane
xi
Executive summary
The United Kingdom is an unparalleled success story – a multi-cultural, 
multi-national, multi-ethnic state with the world’s best broadcaster; a vibrantly 
creative arts sector; a National Health Service which guarantees care for every 
citizen; charities and voluntary groups which perform a million acts of kindness 
daily; globally renowned scientists extending the boundaries of knowledge 
every year; entrepreneurs developing the products and services which bring joy 
and jobs to so many; and millions of citizens whose kindness and compassion 
has been so powerfully displayed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
But not everyone shares equally in the UK’s success. While talent is spread equally 
across our country, opportunity is not. Levelling up is a mission to challenge, and 
change, that unfairness. Levelling up means giving everyone the opportunity to 
flourish. It means people everywhere living longer and more fulfilling lives, and 
benefitting from sustained rises in living standards and well-being.
This requires us to end the geographical inequality which is such a striking 
feature of the UK. It needs to begin by improving economic dynamism and 
innovation to drive growth across the whole country, unleashing the power of 
the private sector to unlock jobs and opportunity for all. While there are 
world-leading and enterprising businesses and innovators right across the UK, 
economic growth and the higher productivity which drives it has been 
over-concentrated in specific areas, particularly the South East of England. 
A long tail of low-productivity businesses and places explain why UK 
productivity growth is too low compared to competitors.
It is vital that we preserve and enhance the economic, academic and cultural 
success stories of the UK’s most productive counties, towns and cities. But it is 
equally critical that we improve productivity, boost economic growth, 
encourage innovation, create good jobs, enhance educational attainment and 
renovate the social and cultural fabric of those parts of the UK that have 
stalled and not – so far – shared equally in our nation’s success. 
The UK Government has made progress towards spreading opportunity around the 
country since 2019, alongside mitigating the worst effects of the pandemic, with: 
•  £5bn for Project Gigabit to bring gigabit-capable broadband to 85% of the 
UK by 2025, and the £1bn Shared Rural Network deal with mobile operators 
delivering 4G coverage to 95% of the UK by the end of 2025;
•  five-year consolidated transport settlements amounting to £5.7bn in eight 
city regions outside London, £5bn of funding for buses and active travel 
over this Parliament; and £96bn for the Integrated Rail Plan delivering faster, 
more frequent and more reliable journeys across the North of England and 
the Midlands; 
The United 
Kingdom is an 
unparalleled 
success story 
Levelling up 
means giving 
everyone the 
opportunity 
to flourish 
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xii
• 
 a new schools funding formula in England ending the previous postcode 
lottery, and an extra £4bn for schools in England next year, rising to £4.7bn 
in 2024-25 
• 
 investment of £3.8bn in skills planned by 2024-25 and a Lifetime Skills 
Guarantee in England, enabling 11m adults to gain an A Level or equivalent 
qualification for free, as well as a new UK-wide adult numeracy programme 
and skills bootcamps;
• £23.3bn extra for the NHS in England over the 2021 Spending Review (SR21) 
period, a commitment to build 40 new hospitals by 2030 and an ambition 
to deliver 50,000 more nurses; 
• 
 a lower Universal Credit taper rate – down from 63% to 55% – and a higher 
National Living Wage, making work pay for millions of people, and letting 
them keep more of what they earn; 
• 
 20,000 more police officers on our streets by 2023 and a £70m Safer Streets 
Fund to improve the environment and cut offending in high-crime areas; 
• 
 control of our immigration system by ending free movement and 
introducing a new points-based immigration system, giving the UK the 
freedom to decide who comes to our country based on the skills people 
have to offer;
• 
 £1.49bn in City and Growth Deals in every part of Scotland, £791m across 
Wales and £617m for deals covering the whole of Northern Ireland; 
• 
 eight innovative Freeports bringing jobs, investment and prosperity across 
England with a commitment to deliver more Freeports in each of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland;
• 
 101 towns across England receiving £2.4bn from the Towns Fund to unleash 
their economic potential, and the £830m Future High Streets Fund 
regenerating 72 towns and high streets and helping them recover from 
the pandemic; 
• 
 a £2bn Culture Recovery Fund helping museums, theatres, cinemas and 
heritage organisations survive the pandemic; 
• 
 £4.8bn infrastructure investment in towns across the UK via the Levelling 
Up Fund;
• 
 a £150m Community Ownership Fund, giving people across the UK the 
chance to become owners of their local pubs or football grounds; 
• 
 £26bn of public capital investment for the green industrial revolution and 
transition to Net Zero; and
• 
 the movement of UK Government functions and civil servants out of 
Whitehall, ensuring levelling up is not directed from London, creating 
local jobs and taking decision-making closer to the communities the 
Government serves, including HM Treasury to Darlington, the Cabinet 
Office to Glasgow, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office 
(FCDO) to East Kilbride and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and 
Communities (DLUHC) to Wolverhampton.
Executive Summary
xiii
This paper sets out the next stages in this programme to level up the UK. 
This programme has to be broad, deep and long-term. It has to be rooted in 
evidence demonstrating that a mix of factors is needed to transform places 
and boost local growth: strong innovation and a climate conducive to private 
sector investment, better skills, improved transport systems, greater access to 
culture, stronger pride in place, deeper trust, greater safety and more resilient 
institutions. 
History illustrates what is possible by following this path. The Renaissance 
flourished in Italian city states that combined innovation in finance with 
technological breakthroughs, the cultivation of learning, ground-breaking 
artistic endeavour, a beautiful built environment and strong civic leadership. 
And the first Industrial Revolution in Britain came about through the interplay 
of innovative financial instruments, sharper rewards for enterprise, new 
institutions of learning, improvements in transportation and rivalrous emulation 
between local leaders and entrepreneurs. Those same concerted forces are 
needed to drive productivity, innovation and growth across the UK today.
This contemporary Medici model, our twenty-first century recipe for a new 
Industrial Revolution, depends on harnessing an array of interventions and 
catalysing a range of sectors. Levelling up will require us to: 
a.  boost productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the private 
sector, especially in those places where they are lagging;
b.  spread opportunities and improve public services, especially in those places 
where they are weakest;
c.  restore a sense of community, local pride and belonging, especially in those 
places where they have been lost; and
d.  empower local leaders and communities, especially in those places lacking 
local agency.
Levelling up is not about making every part of the UK the same, or pitting one 
part of the country against another. Nor does it mean dampening down the 
success of more prosperous areas. Indeed, by extending opportunity across the 
UK we can relieve pressures on public services, housing and green fields in the 
South East. And levelling up can improve well-being in the South East by 
improving productivity in the North and Midlands.  
So, it is about the success of the whole country: realising the potential of every 
place and every person across the UK, building on their unique strengths, 
spreading opportunities for individuals and businesses, and celebrating every 
single city, town and village’s culture. This will make the economy stronger, 
more equal and more resilient, and lengthen and improve people’s lives. 
The economic prize from levelling up is potentially enormous. If underperforming 
places were levelled up towards the UK average, unlocking their potential, this 
could boost aggregate UK GDP by tens of billions of pounds each year. Levelling 
up skills, health, education and wellbeing would deliver similarly-sized benefits. 
Accumulated over time, those gains could easily surpass annual UK GDP. Success 
in levelling up is about growing the economic pie, everywhere and for everyone, 
not re-slicing it.
This 
programme 
has to be 
broad, deep 
and long‑term 
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xiv
The United Kingdom’s Geographical Disparities: Drivers 
and Potential Policy Approaches
What does the economic and social geography of the United Kingdom 
look like?
The UK has larger geographical differences than many other developed countries 
on multiple measures, including productivity, pay, educational attainment and 
health. Urban areas and coastal towns suffer disproportionately from crime, 
while places with particularly high levels of deprivation, such as former mining 
communities, outlying urban estates and seaside towns have the highest levels 
of community need and poor opportunities for the people who grow up there.
These disparities are often larger within towns, counties or regions than 
between them. They are hyper-local and pockets of affluence and deprivation 
may exist in the same district. Indeed, many of the worst areas of deprivation 
are found in the UK’s most successful cities. While change is possible, in some 
cases, these differences have persisted for much of the last century. And some 
of the UK’s most successful cities – such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, 
Glasgow and Cardiff – lag behind their international comparators when it 
comes to productivity and incomes. 
What are the current and future drivers of geographical disparities? 
Over the past century, many trends have combined to create the spatial 
patterns seen across the UK today. Globalisation, technological progress, 
advances in transport, logistics and power, and the shift from heavy industry 
to knowledge-intensive sectors, as well as the rise of foreign holidays and shift 
from technical training to university education, have had a large and lasting 
impact on the economic geography of the UK. 
These dynamics of the global economy have benefited the UK overall, 
improving productivity, increasing wealth and driving up living standards 
through more innovation and competition. These dynamics, however, have not 
had the same positive economic and social impacts across the UK. While 
London and much of the South East have benefited economically, former 
industrial centres and many coastal communities have suffered. This has left 
deep and lasting scars in many of these places, damaging skills, jobs, innovation, 
pride in place, health and wellbeing. 
What are the factors that will help drive levelling up? 
Levelling up requires a focused, long-term plan of action and a clear framework 
to identify and act upon the drivers of spatial disparity. Evidence from a range 
of disciplines tells us these drivers can be encapsulated in six “capitals”.
• Physical capital – infrastructure, machines and housing.
• Human capital – the skills, health and experience of the workforce.
• 
Intangible capital – innovation, ideas and patents.
• Financial capital – resources supporting the financing of companies.
• Social capital – the strength of communities, relationships and trust.
Executive Summary
xv
• Institutional capital – local leadership, capacity and capability.
The six capitals in this framework are individually important. But their real 
significance comes in combination, when they act in a mutually reinforcing 
fashion as in Renaissance Italy or in the UK at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution. The sum of these factors is then greater than its individual parts, 
a process known as agglomeration.
Places with rich endowments of all six capitals benefit from a virtuous circle of 
agglomeration. They are home to skilled people with high quality jobs and have 
access to outstanding schools and globally-competitive universities. They have 
good roads, trains and fast internet. Residents live in fine housing. Funding is 
available for local businesses to invest and innovate, and communities are 
bound together by good relationships and a strong sense of belonging. Local 
leaders are able to build on these foundations to deliver improvements for 
their local community. 
By contrast, where endowments of these capitals are weak or depleted, places 
are unable to attract or retain talent, businesses are less likely to invest and 
innovate, civic institutions tend to lack capacity and capability, and pride in 
local communities is depleted. This vicious and self-reinforcing cycle in some 
places has seen a depletion of skills, businesses, finance and culture, with 
communities and town centres declining for decades. These cumulative forces 
– in some places positive, in others negative – have widened geographical 
disparities in the UK over time. Without policy action, they will continue to 
do so. 
Levelling up is about aspiring for every place in the UK to have a rich 
endowment of all six capitals, so that people do not have to leave their 
community to live a good life. It means taking action to replenish the capitals 
where they are weak or depleted, transforming vicious circles into virtuous 
ones. With opportunity spread more equally across the UK, people in places 
that were once struggling would then fulfil their potential, living longer, 
healthier and happier lives. With each part of the UK achieving its potential, 
the economy as a whole would be both larger and more equal.
System Change: A New Policy Regime for Levelling Up 
There has been no shortage of attempts to tackle geographical disparities in 
the UK over the past century. These have been insufficient to close the 
widening gaps. That is because these efforts have tended to be short-term, 
lacked scale and coordination, and were hamstrung by a lack of data and 
effective oversight. Local leaders have also lacked the powers and 
accountabilities to design and deliver effective policies for tackling local 
problems and supporting local people. The direction of travel since 2010 has 
been towards greater local empowerment – with the introduction of the 
Localism Act, Police and Crime Commissioners, City Deals and democratically 
elected metro mayors. But a renewed and coordinated focus is now needed to 
take this forward.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xvi
Learning lessons from the past, a new policy regime is needed to reverse these 
embedded historical trends. At root, that is about creating the right 
information, incentives and institutions to deliver profound changes to how 
decisions are made, where they are made and who makes them. System change 
is not about a string of shiny, but ultimately short-lived, new policy initiatives. 
It is about root and branch reform of government and governance of the UK. 
It is about putting power in local hands, armed with the right information and 
embedded in strong civic institutions. 
This new policy regime is based on five mutually reinforcing pillars. 
First, the UK Government is setting clear and ambitious medium‑term 
missions to provide consistency and clarity over levelling up policy objectives. 
These will serve as an anchor for policy across government, as well as catalysing 
innovation and action by the private and civil society sectors. These missions 
are ambitions that the UK Government has for all parts of the UK. Delivering 
on them, while being fully respectful of the devolution settlements, will 
require close and collaborative work with the devolved administrations. 
The missions are rolling decade-long endeavours and will be reviewed 
periodically by the UK Government. 
Levelling Up Missions
Focus Area
Mission
Boost productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the private 
sector, especially in those places where they are lagging
Living 
Standards
By 2030, pay, employment and productivity will have risen in 
every area of the UK, with each containing a globally 
competitive city, and the gap between the top performing 
and other areas closing. 
Research & 
Development 
(R&D)
By 2030, domestic public investment in R&D outside the 
Greater South East will increase by at least 40%, and over 
the Spending Review period by at least one third. This 
additional government funding will seek to leverage at least 
twice as much private sector investment over the long term 
to stimulate innovation and productivity growth. 
Transport 
Infrastructure 
By 2030, local public transport connectivity across the 
country will be significantly closer to the standards of 
London, with improved services, simpler fares and 
integrated ticketing. 
Digital 
Connectivity
By 2030, the UK will have nationwide gigabit-capable 
broadband and 4G coverage, with 5G coverage for the 
majority of the population. 
The UK 
Government is 
setting clear 
and ambitious 
medium‑term 
missions 
Executive Summary
xvii
Levelling Up Missions
Focus Area
Mission
Spread opportunities and improve public services, especially in those places 
where they are weakest
Education
By 2030, the number of primary school children achieving 
the expected standard in reading, writing and maths will 
have significantly increased. In England, this will mean 90% 
of children will achieve the expected standard, and the 
percentage of children meeting the expected standard 
in the worst performing areas will have increased by over 
a third.
Skills
By 2030, the number of people successfully completing 
high-quality skills training will have significantly increased in 
every area of the UK. In England, this will lead to 200,000 
more people successfully completing high-quality skills 
training annually, driven by 80,000 more people completing 
courses in the lowest skilled areas.
Health
By 2030, the gap in Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) between 
local areas where it is highest and lowest will have narrowed, 
and by 2035 HLE will rise by five years.
Well-being
By 2030, well-being will have improved in every area of the 
UK, with the gap between top performing and other areas 
closing.
Restore a sense of community, local pride and belonging, especially in 
those places where they have been lost
Pride in Place 
By 2030, pride in place, such as people’s satisfaction with 
their town centre and engagement in local culture and 
community, will have risen in every area of the UK, with the 
gap between top performing and other areas closing.
Housing
By 2030, renters will have a secure path to ownership with 
the number of first-time buyers increasing in all areas; and 
the government’s ambition is for the number of non-decent 
rented homes to have fallen by 50%, with the biggest 
improvements in the lowest performing areas.1
Crime
By 2030, homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood 
crime will have fallen, focused on the worst affected areas.
Empower local leaders and communities, especially in those places lacking 
local agency
Local 
Leadership
By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a 
devolution deal with powers at or approaching the highest 
level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding 
settlement. 
1 Government will consult on the impact on the private rented market and particularly those on the lowest incomes. 
Further detail will be set out once the review of the Decent Homes Standard has concluded.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xviii
Second, central government decision‑making will be fundamentally 
reoriented to align policies with the levelling up agenda and hardwire spatial 
considerations across Whitehall. This will require greater transparency around 
the geographic allocation of funding and simplification of local growth funding. 
It will mean running levelling up through central government decision-making 
as a golden thread for which departments are held accountable. And it will 
mean extra resources being deployed to local areas, including moving 22,000 
civil servants out of London by 2030. 
Third, the UK Government will empower decision‑makers in local areas by 
providing leaders and businesses with the tools they need. A new framework 
will extend, deepen and simplify local devolution in England. Ongoing support 
will be provided to existing City and Growth deal areas in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, pan-regional partnerships like the Northern Powerhouse and 
Midlands Engine, and local private sector initiatives. The UK Government will 
support existing and embryonic private sector clusters of economic activity, 
which exist in all parts of the UK and are the wellspring of new innovation and 
job creation.
Fourth, the UK Government will transform its approach to data and 
evaluation to improve local decision-making. In the past, it has been difficult 
to see what is being spent, where and how it is being spent, and its impact. 
The Office for National Statistics’ Subnational Data Strategy aims to improve 
the UK’s subnational data, mapping local economic geographies and helping 
improve transparency and accountability to the public. The UK Government is 
making available interactive tools and maps to facilitate this process. It will also 
encourage innovative uses of real-time data at the local level, giving leaders 
across the UK the information they need to deliver, experiment and evaluate 
swiftly and effectively.  
Fifth, the UK Government will create a new regime to oversee its levelling 
up missions, establishing a statutory duty to publish an annual report analysing 
progress and a new external Levelling Up Advisory Council. The Council will 
support Ministers by advising on the design, delivery and impact of levelling up 
policy. The annual report will update the public on progress against the 
missions so that levelling up is subject to rigorous external scrutiny, including 
by Parliament. 
Over time, these five pillars acting in combination will improve the information 
and incentives facing decision-makers locally and nationally, and strengthen the 
institutions driving local transformation. And it is those shifts in the system of 
governance and government across the UK that will anchor success in meeting 
the medium-term levelling up missions. 
How will levelling up be delivered across the Union? 
Levelling up can only succeed as a shared national project. The six capitals – 
physical, human, intangible, financial, social and institutional – straddle areas 
of responsibility and tiers of government across the UK. The capitals are 
interdependent and success will only be achieved if each of them is thriving in 
a given place. For example, the UK Government can use its collective economic 
might to attract investment and job creation, but education outcomes, 
Central 
government 
decision‑
making will be 
fundamentally 
reoriented to 
align policies 
with the 
levelling up 
agenda
Executive Summary
xix
delivered by devolved administrations, are crucial to developing a workforce 
able to take advantage of these opportunities. 
Devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland recognise that 
devolved governments are best placed to deliver certain services, like health 
and education. But outcomes are a shared interest for the whole of the UK. 
Our broad UK-wide tax base already funds public services across the UK, 
ensuring for example that the NHS can deliver for people whether in Scotland, 
Wales, England or Northern Ireland. In practice, this means all layers of 
government need to come together with a common purpose. The UK 
Government is committed to facilitating collaboration and engagement 
with the devolved governments and stakeholders in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
The Policy Programme: Policy Initiatives to Level Up the 
United Kingdom 
Achieving the ambitious medium-term missions will require a new model of 
economic growth, public and private investment, a business friendly environment, 
incentives for inward investment and a high skill, high wage labour market.
The time horizon for our missions is 2030. But we also recognise that certain 
communities and people need greater support in the more immediate term. 
The policies set out here will begin to have visible effects, on high streets and 
in local communities, in the next few years. 
Boosting productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the 
private sector
A well-functioning and productive economy in every part of the UK is essential 
to levelling up. By 2030, the UK Government wants to ensure that pay, 
employment and productivity has risen in every area of the UK, with the gap 
between the top performing and other areas closing (Mission One).  
That means supporting the private sector – the real engine of wealth creation 
– to invest more, grow more and take more risks. As well as developing a more 
flexible and better regulatory model for business outside the EU, we will also 
reform outdated EU rules restricting investment from pension funds and 
others so we can see more money flow into long-term capital assets.
And also, outside the EU, the UK is putting competitive advantage in science 
and technology at the heart of a new economic model. A series of new 
Research and Development (R&D) investments will strengthen our science base 
across the country. The increase in public R&D investment to £20bn by 2024-25 
and the target for total UK R&D investment to reach 2.4% of GDP by 2027 must 
see every region of the UK experience an uplift in investment. The 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) will aim to 
invest at least 55% of its total domestic R&D funding outside the Greater 
South East by 2024‑25; the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) will 
increase National Institute for Health Research investment outside London, 
Oxford and Cambridge; and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will expand the 
regional footprint of the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (Dstl). 
These will contribute towards our ambition to increase total domestic public 
The UK 
government 
wants to ensure 
that pay, 
employment 
and 
productivity 
have risen in 
every area 
of the UK
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xx
R&D investment outside the Greater South East by at least a third over the 
Spending Review period and at least 40% by 2030, with that additional 
government funding seeking to leverage at least twice as much private sector 
investment over the long-term to stimulate innovation and productivity 
growth (Mission Two). 
In addition, the UK Government will target £100m of investment in three new 
Innovation Accelerators, private-public-academic partnerships which will aim 
to replicate the Stanford-Silicon Valley and MIT-Greater Boston models of 
clustering research excellence and its direct adoption by allied industries. 
These pilots will be centred on Greater Manchester, the West Midlands and 
Glasgow City-Region. These new clusters will be our Fourth Industrial 
Revolution Foundries, leveraging our global lead in scientific research.
We must support high-growth businesses and reverse the historic decline 
in manufacturing in the UK with more of the sort of innovation which 
characterises economies such as South Korea and Israel. The new Britishvolt 
gigafactory in Blyth, the investment by GE to establish a new wind turbine blade 
manufacturing centre at Teesworks in Redcar, the renewed commitment by 
Nissan and Envision to manufacture electric vehicles in Sunderland, and the new 
hydrogen buses being built in Ballymena, which are already on the streets of 
Aberdeen, are all examples of green manufacturing innovation bringing high-skill 
and high-wage jobs to areas which have faced economic headwinds in the past.
So we must also spread financial capital and investment to the places, projects 
and people that need it most. The £3bn the UK Government is investing in the 
next generation of British Business Bank Regional Investment Funds and the 
new Global Britain Investment Fund will improve access to finance for SMEs 
and increase globally mobile investment across the UK. This builds on progress 
made to support local banking, through more challenger banks and mutuals. 
Levelling up requires mobilising previously underutilised sources of capital. That 
is why we’re using the tax system to incentivise private sector investment, 
through Freeports, Enterprise Zones and the Super-deduction. It is also why 
the Prime Minister and Chancellor have called on the UK’s institutional 
investors to seize the moment for an “Investment Big Bang” to boost Britain’s 
long-term growth. The UK Government will go further and work with Local 
Government Pension Funds to publish plans for increasing local investment, 
including setting an ambition of up to 5% of assets invested in projects 
which support local areas. 
Outside the EU, we will harness the power of public procurement to support 
communities, moving away from the complex EU rules-based approach that 
was designed first and foremost to facilitate the EU Single Market, and 
adopting instead a new simplified approach that prioritises growth and 
productivity in the UK. We have already introduced a policy which allows 
smaller contracts to be reserved for UK suppliers and will legislate to put social 
value at the heart of government spending – weaving a thread of social 
improvement and civic responsibility through the UK Government’s £300bn 
annual expenditure on procurement. 
Cities, towns and communities must be physically and digitally connected if 
they are to thrive. We want transport networks in all our major urban centres 
These new 
clusters will be 
our Fourth 
Industrial 
Revolution 
Foundries
Executive Summary
xxi
to be significantly closer to the standard of London. We will implement the 
£96bn Integrated Rail Plan, improving the rail network in the North and 
Midlands, and invest £24bn in our busiest roads and motorways, £5.7bn in City 
Region Sustainable Transport Settlements and £5bn for buses, cycling and 
walking networks. Together, this will bring local public transport connectivity 
across the country closer to London’s standards (Mission Three). 
We will enhance digital connectivity through Project Gigabit and the Shared 
Rural Network so that by 2030, the UK Government and private sector will 
deliver nationwide gigabit-capable broadband and 4G coverage, with 5G 
coverage for the majority of the population (Mission Four).
To help address the disparities of low pay seen in areas across the country, the 
UK Government will continue to increase the National Living Wage. Meanwhile, 
the introduction of a points-based immigration system gives the UK greater 
control over who comes to this country based on their skills, aligning this to 
the needs of the economy.
The support of the private sector is essential to deliver on these missions. 
The UK Government is committed to enabling and empowering the private 
sector to increase investment, jobs and growth at a local level. 
Spreading opportunities and improving public services
Improving productivity, and spreading prosperity, crucially depends on 
enhancing people’s education and skills – giving everyone access to good 
schools and the opportunity to receive excellent education and training. 
Good health is just as important in spreading opportunity, contributing not 
only to the economy but also ensuring that everyone, wherever they live, 
can enjoy fulfilling, happy and productive lives. Strong public services not only 
support positive health and educational outcomes but also attract new talent 
and investment to an area, boosting local economies. 
The UK Government will drive further school improvement in England through 
55 new Education Investment Areas (EIAs) in places where educational 
attainment is currently weakest. The Department for Education (DfE) will 
support strong multi-academy trusts to expand into these areas and offer 
retention payments to help schools with supply challenges in these areas to 
retain the best teachers in high-priority subjects. More intensive investment 
will be available across some EIAs to tackle wider issues that may be limiting 
school improvement. The UK Government will ensure that talented children 
from disadvantaged backgrounds have access to a post-16 provider with a track 
record of progress on to leading universities by opening new 16-19 free schools 
targeted in areas where they are most needed, such as high priority EIAs.
In addition, we will create the UK National Academy. Just as the UK pioneered 
the Open University, this new digital education service will support pupils from 
all backgrounds and areas of the UK to succeed at the very highest levels. 
The UK National Academy will be free and made available online to support 
the work of schools up and down the country. It will allow students to acquire 
additional advanced knowledge and skills, offering even more opportunities for 
every child to thrive.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xxii
With the help of these reforms, we will focus on eliminating illiteracy and 
innumeracy. By 2030, our aim is that 90% of all primary school children in 
England will achieve the expected standard in reading, writing and maths, 
with the percentage of children meeting the expected standard in the worst 
performing areas improving by a third (Mission Five).
We will also step up efforts to give all students the skills employers need. 
Our reforms will aim to put local employers at the heart of skills provision; to 
strengthen locally accessible institutions, notably the national network of 
further education colleges; ensure that all individuals have lifetime access to 
training; and offer new opportunities to access high quality work and progress 
in the workplace.
The funding of courses and the governance of colleges will be overhauled in 
line with employers’ needs. Local Skills Improvement Plans, together with 
supporting funding, will be set up across England to set out the key changes 
needed in a place to make technical skills training more responsive to skills 
needs. Nine new Institutes of Technology with strong employer links will be 
established in England, helping to boost higher technical skills in STEM subjects.
We will introduce the In‑Work Progression offer to help people on low 
incomes address barriers to better employment opportunities. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) will provide £1.3bn over the SR21 
period to provide employment support for disabled people and people with 
health conditions. This builds on the National Disability Strategy, Health and 
Disability Green Paper and Health is Everyone’s Business consultation. The 
Multiply scheme will target disparities in numeracy levels across the UK, 
investing £560m in courses for adults. 
Through our skills reforms and investment, by 2030, we will aim to have 
significantly increased the number of people to have successfully completed 
high quality skills training in every part of the UK, including 200,000 more people 
successfully completing high quality skills training annually in England, driven by 
80,000 more people completing courses in the lowest skilled areas (Mission Six).
One of the gravest inequalities faced by our most disadvantaged communities 
is poor health. The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully underlined the disparities in 
health across this country. The DHSC will shortly publish a White Paper 
designed to tackle the core drivers of disparities in health outcomes. 
However, we will act now to deal with one of the biggest contributors to ill 
health: poor diet and obesity. We will take forward recommendations from 
Henry Dimbleby’s independent review towards a National Food Strategy 
including piloting Community Eatwell and a school cooking revolution. We will 
introduce a new Tobacco Control Plan and set up at least 100 Community 
Diagnostic Centres in England by 2025 to improve access to diagnostic services. 
These and other changes will contribute to narrowing the gap in Healthy Life 
Expectancy (HLE) between local areas where it is highest and lowest by 2030, 
and increasing Healthy Life Expectancy by five years by 2035 (Mission Seven). 
Taken together, these missions will help achieve the overarching ambition to 
improve well-being in every area of the UK, with the gap between top 
performing and other areas closing (Mission Eight).
Our reforms 
will aim to put 
local employers 
at the heart of 
skills provision
Executive Summary
xxiii
And because responsibility for spreading opportunity and improving public 
services sits across all tiers of government, we will work with local leaders from 
across the UK and devolved administrations to bring together evidence on 
“what works” from policies to reduce spatial disparities, particularly in areas 
where policy responsibility has been devolved and different groups have 
delivered policies in innovative ways.
Restoring a sense of community, local pride and belonging
The £2.6bn UK Shared Prosperity Fund will be used to restore local pride across 
the UK by focusing investment on three main areas for investment: improving 
communities and place, people and skills, and supporting local business. 
We will slash away the bureaucracy of the old EU regional funds. Instead, local 
leaders will be empowered to direct funding towards their own, locally 
identified priorities, whether that be promoting new outdoor markets, 
reducing litter, graffiti and anti-social behaviour, reviving high streets, 
supporting local businesses or introducing skills provision to match local labour 
market need and support those furthest from the labour market.
We will also regenerate 20 of our towns and cities by assembling and 
remediating brownfield land and working with the private sector to bring 
about transformational developments combining housing, retail and business in 
sustainable, walkable, beautiful new neighbourhoods. These new 
developments amongst others will be supported by an Office for Place which 
will pioneer design and beauty, promoting better architectural aesthetics to 
ensure they enhance existing settlements, gladden the eye and lift the heart.
We will explore what further measures can make high streets and town centres 
the thriving hearts of our communities again, including ways to incentivise 
landlords to fill vacant units. For instance, powers for local authorities to 
require landlords to rent out long-term vacant properties to prospective 
tenants, such as local businesses or community groups.
Ensuring natural beauty is accessible to all will be central to our planning 
system, with improved Green Belts around towns and cities, supported by 
Local Nature Recovery Strategies reflected in plan making, and woodland 
creation supported across the UK.
Building on this White Paper, we will publish the second report on rural proofing 
in England this spring. This report will set out how government departments are 
working to support levelling up in rural areas, through targeted approaches where 
needed, and how we are strengthening the rural economy, developing rural 
infrastructure, delivering rural services and managing the natural environment.
For levelling up to mean something to people in their daily lives, we need to 
reach into every community in the country, from city centres to rural areas, in 
order to start to rebuild social capital and self-reliance in our most abandoned 
neighbourhoods. This needs to flow through central and local government, 
through MPs and their local offices, philanthropists, volunteers, schools, GPs 
and other community leaders. We will pilot a set of Community Covenant 
approaches: new agreements between councils, public bodies and 
communities themselves to empower communities to shape the regeneration 
of their areas and improve public services.
The £2.6bn 
UK Shared 
Prosperity Fund 
will be used to 
restore local 
pride across 
the UK  
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xxiv
Community-led regeneration cannot be achieved with a stop-start funding 
stream that first builds hope, then destroys it, leaving people less optimistic 
and trusting, and feeling more disempowered than ever. We will consider a 
Community Wealth Fund, financial inclusion and other social investment as 
part of our consultation on £880m in Dormant Assets funding, and focus 
lottery cash to reach into the most deprived small areas of the country. In this 
spirit of civic renewal, we will also ensure that access to sporting and cultural 
excellence is spread more equitably across the UK.  
With the Football Foundation in England, and Football Associations in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, we are delivering grassroots pitches across the 
UK – this year the UK Government has contributed funding to enable over 800 
new grass pitches and 60 new artificial grass pitches in England alone. The UK 
Government has committed £205m to build on this across the UK over the 
next three years. This will ensure local clubs and school teams have the 
facilities they need to thrive. We have also endorsed in principle the main 
recommendation of the Fan Led Review of Football Governance that football 
requires a strong, independent regulator, and have written to Football 
Authorities to ask what action they will take immediately to protect local 
identities, traditions and facilities.
We will also ensure that great cultural institutions play their part in spreading 
access to excellence. As we significantly increase cultural spending outside 
the capital, 100% of the Arts Council England funding uplift announced at SR21 
will be directed outside London, with support for theatre, museums and 
galleries, libraries and dance in towns which have been deprived of investment 
in the past. We will explore how more flagship national cultural institutions can 
support the strength of our historic cultural heritage in great cities such as 
Stoke and Manchester.
Further, £560m will be invested in young people for new and improved youth 
facilities, services and experiences in England where they are needed most, 
launching a new National Youth Guarantee so that by 2025 every young person 
in England will have access to regular out of school activities, adventures away 
from home and opportunities to volunteer. We will ensure the Duke of 
Edinburgh Award is offered to every state secondary school in England. We will 
give more students the transformative opportunity to join the cadets, providing 
more support to the state school sector to increase Combined Cadet Force 
participation. This will include linking funding of cadet units in private schools 
with a requirement to ensure support for the expansion of cadet forces in state 
schools and open access to nearby state school students.
Government will also lead by example, relocating more senior civil service 
roles out of London. We have already established a new economic campus in 
Darlington, a Home Office hub in Stoke and DLUHC’s second headquarters in 
Wolverhampton. More civil service roles will move to locations across the UK, 
including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast, Manchester, Newcastle, 
Birmingham, Bristol and Leeds, as key decision-makers are re-deployed to be 
closer to those they serve. The White Paper reinforces our commitment to the 
Places for Growth programme and confirms departments’ detailed numbers 
and locations for relocation of roles to 2025 and 2030.
Executive Summary
xxv
Our aim with these reforms is to improve pride in place in every area of the UK, 
with the gap between top performing and other areas narrowing (Mission Nine). 
Poor housing quality, overcrowding and a reliance on temporary accommodation 
for vulnerable families also contribute to unnecessarily poor health and quality 
of life for many. We will take action on two fronts. First, building more housing in 
England, including more genuinely affordable social housing. Second, we will 
launch a new drive on housing quality to make sure homes are fit for the 
21st century. 
We will ensure home ownership is within the reach of many more people. 
The Help to Buy scheme launched last year is focussing entirely on first time 
buyers and we will build on the success of the Mortgage Guarantee Scheme by 
working with the lending industry to maximise the availability of low deposit 
mortgages. Alongside this, we will improve the home buying and selling 
process, working with the industry to ensure the critical information buyers 
need to know is available digitally wherever possible from trusted and 
authenticated sources. We will also scrap the 80/20 funding rule that focused 
investment in Greater London, and instead invest in more homes in the North 
and Midlands to relieve pressure on the South East.
To deliver our mission to improve housing conditions, we will introduce new 
legislation to improve the quality and regulation of social housing, give 
residents performance information so that they can hold their landlord to 
account and ensure that when residents make a complaint, landlords take quick 
and effective action to put things right. And we will publish a landmark White 
Paper in the spring to consult on introducing a legally binding Decent Homes 
Standard in the Private Rented Sector for the first time ever, explore a 
National Landlord Register and bring forward other measures to reset the 
relationship between landlords and tenants, including through ending section 
21 “no fault evictions”.
This will all help to ensure that by 2030, renters will have a secure path to 
ownership with the number of first-time buyers increasing in all areas; and our 
ambition is for the number of non-decent rented homes to have fallen by 50% 
with the biggest improvements in the lowest performing areas (Mission Ten).
We are intent on tackling the crime, drug abuse and anti-social behaviour which 
blight so many communities. We are investing £50m from the Safer Streets 
Fund every year of the SR21 period to give Police and Crime Commissioners and 
local authorities in England and Wales the resources they need to tackle crime 
and anti-social behaviour. Through this, by 2030, we will have reduced homicide, 
serious violence and neighbourhood crime, focused on the worst-affected areas 
(Mission Eleven).
We will also clamp down on the factors that damage people’s pride in their 
area and expect that people will give back to their communities when they 
are found to have broken the law. Too many communities are blighted by 
anti-social behaviour and criminality, sometimes committed by children. 
We will therefore work with partners across the youth justice system to 
make sure 16- and 17-year olds who commit crimes pay their community back 
with visible labour to improve the local environment.
We will 
introduce new 
legislation to 
improve the 
quality and 
regulation of 
social housing
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xxvi
Empowering local leaders and communities
Mayors have already shown how strong local leadership can enhance economic 
and other opportunities in urban areas, and we will ensure that the model is 
strengthened, extended and adopted more widely. With a direct mandate, 
fixed term, convening power, a clear incentive to demonstrate economic 
improvement and accountability for extending opportunity, mayors work for 
their communities. And meaningful devolution of power and responsibility for 
economic growth to an accountable local leader has been proven to help once 
declining areas to recover. 
We will extend, deepen and simplify devolution across England so that by 
2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with 
powers at or approaching the highest level of devolution with a simplified, 
long-term funding settlement (Mission Twelve).
We want to usher in a devolution revolution, introducing a new model for 
counties with mayors or “governors”. We will open negotiations on trailblazer 
deeper devolution deals with the West Midlands and Greater Manchester 
combined authorities. These deals will act as the blueprint for other mayoral 
combined authorities (MCAs) to follow, with bids for more powers welcome. 
We will likewise recast the geography of MCAs, where necessary, to ensure 
there is greater economic coherence. We will further invite nine areas to agree 
new County Deals and seek to agree further MCA deals, extending devolution 
to much more of England. 
It is also important that devolution is accompanied by sharper and clearer 
accountability. Across the local government sector, we will strengthen transparency 
for local people and publish rigorous, comparable data on performance. A new 
independent body will be set up to drive this, empowering citizens, strengthening 
local leaders’ knowledge of their services, and increasing central government’s 
understanding of the sector. And we will support local leaders to make a difference 
in their communities by simplifying the disparate funding landscape so that local 
leaders can better support economic growth, as well as bringing local leaders into 
the heart of government decision-making with a new role for mayors and strong 
local leaders in the shaping of local growth strategy. 
Next Steps
Levelling up is a long-term endeavour. It is a programme of change that 
requires a fundamental shift in how central and local government, the private 
sector and civil society operate. The UK Government will embark on a process 
of sustained and systematic engagement and consultation with a wide range of 
stakeholders, including devolved administrations, on the White Paper. 
We will be setting out further detail on a number of these policy 
commitments in future publications. In addition, we will introduce legislation 
to Parliament to underpin in statute the changes fundamental to levelling up, 
alongside wider planning measures. 
This White Paper is the catalyst for delivering a long-term programme of 
change to unlock the potential of people and places in every part of the UK. 
This will create jobs, drive productivity, improve people’s quality of life and 
help restore their pride in the places where they live. 
We will extend, 
deepen and 
simplify 
devolution 
across England 
Executive Summary
xxvii
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
xxviii
1
Chapter 1  
The United Kingdom’s 
Geographical Disparities: 
Drivers and Potential 
Policy Approaches
To reduce spatial disparities, it is first important to understand what causes 
them. This chapter draws on historical, theoretical and empirical evidence to 
explain the drivers of spatial disparities, in the UK and internationally. It then 
sets out a framework for assessing and understanding these disparities; the 
benefits of addressing them; and how public policy might most effectively 
do so. 
1.1 
A Brief History of Geographical Disparities
All natural and social systems undergo slow-moving fluctuations over the 
course of decades or even centuries. These long waves of expansion and 
contraction are driven by shifts in the natural environment, technology and 
behaviour. Economic systems are no exception.2 As economies expand and 
contract over time, so do the economic fortunes of the places and 
communities embedded in them. 
Differences in the economic geography of a nation or locality at any one point 
in time, and changes in economic geographies over time, are an inevitable 
feature of dynamic, evolving economies. To some extent, these changes can be 
desirable as economies adapt to new circumstances and seize new 
opportunities. For that reason, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter 
called this dynamic process “creative destruction”.3
The history of economic growth, nationally and subnationally, shines a light 
both on the opportunities it presents for places expanding but also the 
challenges for places contracting. It illustrates the natural undulations in 
economic performance over time and the cumulative growth process in 
expanding cities and communities. It also illustrates the long-term economic 
scars left when places contract. At the spatial scale, change is often as 
destructive as it is creative.
2 
Economists call these long cycles Kondratiev waves. Kondratiev, N. D. The Major Economic Cycles (in Russian). The Long 
Wave Cycle. Richardson & Snyder, 1984.
3 
Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. Harper & Brothers. 1942. Note: Throughout this chapter, UK-wide 
data is used where it is available on a consistent basis. 
As economies 
expand and 
contract over 
time, so do the 
economic 
fortunes of the 
places and 
communities 
embedded in 
them
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
2
Figure 1.1 Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC4
7000 BC
5000 BC
3600 BC
3500 BC
2500 BC
2300 BC
2100 BC
1650 BC
1300 BC
1000 BC
700 BC
3800 BC
6500 BC
4000 BC
3700 BC
3550 BC
3100 BC
2400 BC
2250 BC
1800 BC
1360 BC
1200 BC
900 BC
650 BC
Jericho
Çatalhöyük
Tell Brak
Uruk
Dobrovody
Eridu
Maydanets
Talianki
Abydos
Memphis
Lagash
Mohenjo-daro
Girsu
Akkad
Ur
Mari
Avaris
Thebes
Yinxu
Chengzhou (Luoyang)
Linzi
Pi-Ramses
Nineveh
Haojing (Xi’an)
500 BC
460 BC
200 AD
575 AD
800 AD
1100 AD
1180 AD
1300 AD
1400 AD
1700 AD
1925 AD
200 BC
479 BC
300 BC
100 BC
500 AD
600 AD
935 AD
1160 AD
1210 AD
1350 AD
1500 AD
1850 AD
2000 AD
Babylon
Pataliputra
Ctesiphon
Kaifeng
Hangzhou
Ayutthaya
Rajagriha
Rome
Baghdad
Polonnaruwa
Jinling
New York (urban area)
Carthage
Constantinople
Cordova
Merv
Beijing
Tokyo (urban area)
Sravasti
Alexandria
Daxing (Chang’an)
Fez
Cairo
London
Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC
4 
 The Guardian. From Jericho to Tokyo: the world’s largest cities through history. Exploring Urban Data Hub. 
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
3
As social animals, humans have always congregated in groups. These 
communities were typically found close to natural resources and seaways, for 
food and trade. The earliest known permanent settlement to be classified as 
urban was Jericho around 10,000 years ago (Figure 1.1). The city had natural 
irrigation from the Jordan River, allowing it to produce and export the most 
expensive essential oil in the ancient world. This enabled Jericho to become 
a hub not only for commerce and trade, but for people and skills, culture 
and finance. 
Constantinople was the capital of the Roman/Byzantine Empire (330-1204 and 
1261-1453), the Latin Empire (1204-1261) and the Ottoman Empire (1453-1922).5 
Its growth followed a similar model. Built on the Bosphorus Strait, it was easily 
accessible to other parts of the Roman Empire via the Mediterranean Sea, 
Black Sea and Danube River. It too became a magnet for commerce, culture 
and finance. 
The strategic importance of London’s location was first recognised by the 
Romans, with the town of Londinium established around AD 47-50.6 
Its location on the deepest and second longest river in the UK allowed 
large military and trading vessels access to the world’s seaways. This quickly 
established London as a multicultural hub for people, commerce, finance and 
culture, a position (unusually by historical standards) that it has retained for 
2,000 years.
Across Europe, the Renaissance period in Italy and the Golden Age in Holland 
offered examples of similar periods of transformative, city-centric growth.7 
In both cases the recipe was a familiar one – the magnetic attraction of people, 
culture, commerce and finance spreading ideas, innovation and ultimately 
growth. Indeed, in deference to the role of the Medicis in driving success in 
15th century Renaissance Italy, this creative crucible is sometimes referred to as 
the “Medici effect”.8 This process was replicated throughout pre-Industrial 
history. By the time of the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century, similar 
patterns of growth had been in place for several millennia. Cities emerged and 
grew rapidly as creative and commercial hubs were formed and built 
cumulatively, and persisted for centuries. But it was not permanent, and few of 
the world’s largest cities of the pre-Industrial past are in the world’s top 100 
today and a number are now small and poor by global standards.
5 
See Turnbull, S. The Walls of Constantinople AD 324-1453. Osprey Publishing. 2004. and World History Encyclopaedia. 
Constantinople Timeline. 
6 Williams, T. The foundation and early development of Roman London: A social context. Antiquity, 64(244), 599-607. 1990.
7 
Fouquet, R., Broadberry, S. Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
pp. 227-44. 2015.
8 
The Medici effect is innovation that happens when diverse industries, cultures and disciplines intersect, bringing ideas from 
one field into another. See Johansson, F. The Medici Effect: Breakthrough Insights at the Intersection of Ideas, Concepts, 
and Cultures. Harvard Business Review Press. 2004. 
Few of the 
world’s largest 
cities of the 
pre‑Industrial 
past are in the 
world’s top 100 
today
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
4
After the Industrial Revolution, these spatial forces continued, but widened 
and deepened due to the world’s first-ever period of sustained economic 
growth. This was led by industrial cities, which transformed the world’s 
economic geography. In 1750, more than 50% of the world’s industrial output 
was produced in China and India, compared to 18% in Western Europe. The 
following 80 years saw Western Europe’s industrial output more than double 
and the UK’s rise seven-fold.9 
Subnationally, the Industrial Revolution saw the emergence of large industrial 
cities. These were typically still located close to waterways and natural resources 
such as coal. But these benefits were now amplified by the needs of industry. 
The rapid growth in industrial cities followed a similar spatial pattern to the past, 
with a convergence of business, finance, people and culture. But as economies 
grew as never before, this process of clustering of assets and people occurred at 
a greater pace and scale than had ever happened previously.
By 1900, all 20 of the US’s largest cities were on major waterways.10 Europe was 
now home to half the world’s urban population and more than half of its 100 
largest cities, including industrial centres such as Hamburg, Munich, Milan, 
Rotterdam, Turin and Lille.11 In the UK, the industrial powerhouses of 
Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool were all among the world’s 20 
largest cities, with their populations rising tenfold (Figure 1.2).12 
Since the turn of the 20th century, the forces of globalisation and 
technological progress had once again reshaped the world’s economic 
geography. Advances in transport, logistics and energy had reduced the cost 
advantages traditionally offered by industrial cities. And increasing globalisation 
meant that manufacturing businesses have often found it cheaper to offshore 
lower skilled, more routine activities such as assembly production lines.13 
That has resulted in a seismic shift away from heavy industrial cities in 
advanced economies. At the end of the 19th century, Detroit was a hotbed of 
innovation. Its economic power peaked in 1950 when it became the third 
richest city in the US.14 As car production has shifted towards cheaper 
competitors, Detroit has been losing residents for 50 years. Its population 
today is the same as a century ago. A third of its residents now live below the 
poverty line, even if in more recent times, regeneration efforts are helping the 
city turn the corner.15 
9 
Crafts, N. & Venables, A. Globalization in History: A Geographical Perspective. Globalisation in Historical Perspective. 
University of Chicago Press. 2003. 
10 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier. 
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
11 
Satterthwaite, D. The world’s 100 largest cities from 1800 to 2020, and beyond. International Institute for Environment and 
Development. 2020.
12 GB Historical GIS / University of Portsmouth. Cardiff District through time, Population Statistics, Total Population. 
A Vision of Britain through Time.; Census of Ireland 1911. The Online Historical Population Reports Accessed: via Histpop in 
Dec 2021. 
13 
Swinney, P., Thomas, E. A century of cities: Urban economic change since 1911. Centre for Cities. 2015.
14 Moretti, E. The new geography of jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2012.
15 Moretti, E. The new geography of jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2012.
Globalisation 
and 
technological 
progress had 
once again 
reshaped the 
world’s 
economic 
geography 
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
5
Figure 1.2 Change in population of selected UK cities 1821-2021 (1821=100)16
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Belfast
Edinburgh
Leeds
Sheffield
Manchester
Bristol
Liverpool
Glasgow
Birmingham
London
1821
183
1
184
1
185
1
1861
187
1
188
1
1891
190
1
191
1
192
1
193
1
194
1
195
1
196
1
197
1
198
1
199
1
20
01
20
11
20
20
Population (1821 = 100)Change in Population of Selected UK Cities, 1821-2020 (1821 = 100) 
This pattern has been replicated elsewhere. Eight of the ten largest US cities in 1950 have lost at least a 
sixth of their population. Six of the 16 largest cities in 1950 – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans, 
Pittsburgh and St. Louis – have lost more than half their population. In Europe, cities like Liverpool, 
Glasgow, Rotterdam, Bremen and Vilnius are all much smaller than a century ago.17 At its peak in 1937, 
Liverpool had 867,000 residents. Since then, it has lost nearly half its population (Figure 1.2).18 
In place of these fallen industrial powerhouses, a new generation of knowledge-intensive super-cities 
emerged during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.19 This includes London, New York, San Francisco and 
Tokyo. These super-cities have benefited from a modern-day version of the Medici effect, with a creative 
and commercial critical mass developing through the clustering of people, business, finance and culture. 
Digital technologies have made agglomeration effects more powerful than at any time in the past as 
globalisation has reduced the barriers on cross border trade and investment.20 
16 
 GB Historical GIS / University of Portsmouth. Population Statistics. Taken from UK Census data 1801-2011, Total Population. 
A Vision of Britain through Time.; ONS. Estimates of the population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Mid 2020. Note – data not available on a consistent basis for all years. Changes in the population of 
selected UK cities might reflect changes to the geography used to report these figures. Census figures for Belfast for 1926 
and 1937 have been moved to 1921 and 1941.
17 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier. 
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
18 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier. 
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
19 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 
Revision. United Nations. 2019. 
20 OECD. Foreign direct investment and reverse technology spillovers: The effect on total factor productivity. 2015.; Tranos E., 
Ioannides, Y.M. Ubiquitous digital technologies and spatial structure; an update. PLoS ONE 16(4): e0248982. 2021. 
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
6
Productivity
Productivity varies substantially across and within regions. Although London and the South East are the 
only regions above the UK average, they also host some of the UK’s least productive local authorities. 
Local authorities in Scotland, the Midlands and the North West are also some of the most productive.
Figure 1.3 Nominal (smoothed) GVA per hour worked (£), GB local authorities and 
Northern Ireland, 2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
7
Table 1.1 Size of the gap: Differences in GVA per hour worked in £ and percent, UK and GB 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2019
Lowest performing  
Difference compared to UK 
average in £ and (%)
Highest performing  
Difference compared to 
UK average in £ and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
Northern Ireland  
£6.41 (-18.24%)
London  
£11.23 (+31.95%)
Sub‑regional (district/ 
unitary local authorities, 
Great Britain only)
Powys  
£14.90 (-42.39%)
Runnymede  
£27.20 (+77.38%)
Figure 1.4 Distribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries and 
regions, 2019
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Ea
st
Ea
st 
Midla
nd
s
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
 Ea
st
No
rth
 W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
 an
d 
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
sDistribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries 
and regions, 2019
Source: ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: February 2020. 2020.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
8
Earnings
Incomes track productivity closely, with average pay in the South East and London significantly above the 
national average. However, there is significant variation within regions. In the East of England median 
weekly pay in South Cambridge and St Albans is nearly double that of Norfolk, whilst median pay in 
Monmouthshire/Sir Fynwy in Wales is higher than half of London’s local authorities.
Figure 1.5 Median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, UK local authorities, 2021
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
9
Table 1.2 Size of the gap: Differences in median gross weekly pay in £ and percent, UK countries 
and regions/local authorities, 2021
Lowest performing  
Difference compared to UK 
average in £ and (%)
Highest performing  
Difference compared to 
UK average in £ and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East  
-£41 (-8.21%)
London  
£109 (21.59%)
Sub‑regional (county/ 
unitary local 
authorities)
Ards and North Down
-£128 (-25.3%)
Westminster  
£267 (52.97%)
Figure 1.6 Distribution of median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, local authorities by 
GB countries and regions, 2021
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
Ea
st
Ea
st 
Midla
nd
s
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
 Ea
st
No
rth
 W
es
t
Sout
h E
ast
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
Yorks
hir
e a
nd 
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
Source: ONS. Earnings and hours worked, place of residence by local authority: ASHE Table 8. 2021
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
10
Skills
The North East is the lowest performing region with seven out of twelve Local Authorities falling in the 
bottom quartile of the UK distribution. The East Midlands has the largest within region variation, with the 
population of Rushcliffe having a level 3+ attainment rate of 77.2% compared to 37% for Bolsover.
Figure 1.7 Proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3 + qualifications by local 
authority, UK, 2021
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
11
Table 1.3 Size of the gap: Differences in Level 3+ qualifications population in percent, UK 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2021
Lowest performing  
Difference compared to UK 
average (%)
Highest performing  
Difference compared to 
UK average (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East  
(-6.1%)
London  
(+9.8%)
Sub‑regional (district/ 
unitary local authorities, 
Great Britain only)
Bolsover  
(-24.2%)
City of London  
(+38.8%)
Figure 1.8 Distribution of the proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3+, local 
authorities by UK countries and regions, 2021
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Ea
st
Ea
st 
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
 Ea
st
No
rth
 W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
 an
d 
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
Distribution of the proportion f the population aged 16-64 with level 3+, 
local authorities by UK counties and regions, 2021
Source: ONS. Annual Population Survey: All people aged 16-64 with Level 3+ skills, by local authority. NOMIS. 2021. 
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
12
Health
At the national level, male and female healthy life expectancy between 2017 and 2019 was highest in 
England (63.2 and 63.5) and lowest in Scotland (61.7, 61.9). At a local level, people in the top decile (least-
deprived) areas of the UK can expect to live around a decade longer than people in the bottom decile 
(most-deprived) areas.
Figure 1.9 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
13
Table 1.4 Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Male) in years and percent, UK 
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
Lowest performing  
Difference compared to 
UK average in years and (%)
Highest performing  
Difference compared to UK 
average in years and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East  
-3.5 years (-5.61%)
South East  
+2.4 years (+3.85%)
Sub‑regional (county/ 
unitary local authorities)
Blackpool  
-9.2 years (-14.59%)
Rutland  
+8.6 years (+13.64%)
Figure 1.10 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), local authorities by UK 
countries and regions, 2017–2019
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Ea
st
Ea
st 
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
 Ea
st
No
rth
 W
es
t
So
ut
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
 an
d 
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
North
er
n I
re
lan
d
Distribution of healthy life expctancy t birh (Male), local authorities by UK 
countries and regions, 2017 - 2019
Source: ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
14
Figure 1.11 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
15
Table 1.5 Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Female) in years and percent, 
UK countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
Lowest performing  
Difference compared to 
UK average in years and (%
Highest performing  
Difference compared to UK 
average in years and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East  
-4.2 years (6.70%)
South East  
+2.6 years (4.06%)
Sub‑regional (county/ 
unitary local authorities)
Blackpool  
-8.0% years (12.61%)
Orkney Islands  
+11.7 years (18.6%)
Figure 1.12 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), local authorities by UK 
countries and regions, 2017-2019
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Ea
st
Ea
st 
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
 Ea
st
No
rth
 W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
 an
d 
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
North
er
n I
re
lan
dDistribution of healthy life expctancy at birh (Female), local authorities by UK 
countries and regions, 217 - 2019
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper 
16
1.2 Geographical Disparities across the UK
These global economic growth dynamics have been mirrored in the UK over 
recent decades, with long waves of expansion and contraction. But these 
dynamics appear to have been both more powerful and persistent in the UK 
than in some other countries. They also appear to have left deep and long-
lasting economic and social scars. The result has been larger spatial differences 
across the UK than elsewhere, which have persisted and widened over time. 
This section outlines the nature and evolution of these spatial differences.
This section shows that the UK displays large spatial disparities compared to 
most other OECD countries (1.2.1), with a large gap between London and most 
other regions – in both absolute and relative terms (1.2.2) – contributing to 
substantial differences in living standards (1.2.3). These differences are long-lived 
and mean that the UK is not taking full advantage of the economic 
potential that all parts of the country have to offer. This in turn holds back 
aggregate productivity and growth and imposes costs on both poorly and 
well-performing places alike. These differences are also typically hyper-local 
and differences within UK regions or cities are often larger than differences 
between regions on most performance metrics (1.2.4). It is also clear that while 
the UK has a large number of clusters of innovative economic activity (1.2.8), its 
second tier cities underperform international counterparts (1.2.6). All of these 
differences in place performance matter since they have a lasting impact on 
the life outcomes of the people who grow up there (1.2.7), not just in economic 
terms but across a wide range of social indicators. 
1.2.1 The scale of geographical disparities across the UK
Across a broad range of economic and social metrics, geographic differences in 
the UK are large in absolute terms and have widened over recent decades. 
Figures 1.3 to 1.12 plot four different areas of performance of the UK at the local 
authority level: productivity, pay, educational attainment and health. For each of 
these areas, there is a relatively high degree of geographic similarity, with the 
most productive places generally having higher earnings, longer life expectancy 
and higher levels of skills. . As the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities 
emphasised, geography is a key factor affecting equality of opportunity and 
social mobility.21
The differences between the best and worst performing areas are large. For 
productivity at the regional level, the gap between the highest (London) and 
lowest (Northern Ireland) is around 60%. In general, productivity tends to be 
higher in larger city-regions due to economies of scale and scope. Nonetheless, 
even this pattern is not entirely uniform.
Even in high productivity cities, such as London, there are areas with low 
productivity. Haringey and Lewisham have productivity levels of 91% and 82% 
of the UK average respectively.22 In some of the UK’s other large cities, such as 
Birmingham and Sheffield, productivity also lies below the national average.23 
Cities are not always highly productive.
21 The independent report of the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities. 2021. 
22 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
23 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
Across a broad 
range of 
economic and 
social metrics, 
geographic 
differences in 
the UK are large
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
17
Nor are towns and rural areas always underperforming. Some towns and rural 
areas are thriving in productivity terms. For example, Darlington has the same 
level of productivity as central Manchester.24 
These differences in productivity are mirrored, broadly, in measures of pay and 
skills. Pay in the top region for earnings (London at £823 per week) is 1.5 times 
greater than the lowest region (the North East at £550 per week).25 The difference 
in the proportion of the adult population with a level 3 qualification or 
equivalent between these two regions is almost 16 percentage points.26 
These differences are larger still at a more local level. Nearly half of adults aged 
16-64 have a qualification at level 4 or above in York compared to a quarter 
in Doncaster.27
Some of the most striking spatial disparities are in health. The difference in 
healthy life expectancy at birth for females between England and Scotland is 
only 1.6 years.28 But at a local level, these differences are much larger. Females 
born in Wokingham can expect to live twelve years longer in good health than 
those born in Southampton.29 This is mirrored in other health-based metrics, 
such as the incidence of obesity and smoking.30 
Figure 1.13 combines these four performance measures. There are clear 
typologies of places that have poor socioeconomic outcomes. These include 
coastal communities previously associated with tourism, parts of the North 
and Midlands with industrial legacies, and rural parts of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s cities tend to perform better in general, but often 
harbour both some of the best and the worst-performing areas.
24 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
25 ONS. Apr-June 2021 gross weekly earnings data – not seasonally adjusted. Gross weekly earnings of full-time employees 
by region. 2021.
26 ONS. Annual Population Survey, 2004-2021. Data from: Jan-Dec, 2020. UK Data Service. 2021. 
27 ONS. Annual Population Survey, 2004-2021. Data from: Jan-Dec, 2020. UK Data Service. 2021.
28 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019.
29 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019. 
30 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019. 
Even in high 
productivity 
cities, such as 
London, there 
are areas 
with low 
productivity