Introduction
1. In this evaluation, which is the first by the In-
dependent Evaluation Office (IEO), we examine the
issue of the prolonged use of IMF resources, which
has been the subject of external criticism and inter-
nal concern. Some critics have argued that prolonged
use constitutes a departure from the IMF’s traditional
mandate of providing temporary balance of payment
support and suggests a lack of effectiveness of IMF-
supported programs. Others have argued that fre-
quent recourse to IMF arrangements is less of a
problem than critics contend, that it can take place
for good reasons in countries with deep-seated ad-
justment problems, and that it can be fully compati-
ble with the IMF’s mandate. We analyze the various
reasons that have caused prolonged use to expand
over the last three decades, be they related to IMF
lending policies, to specific characteristics of the
countries concerned, to shortcomings in program de-
sign and implementation, or to broader institutional
factors. In so doing, we inevitably touch upon some
issues that have been at the heart of recent controver-
sies about the effectiveness of IMF-supported pro-
grams. Given the IEO’s mandate, the focus is on the
role of the IMF, but we are not suggesting that the
IMF is responsible for all problems that contributed
to prolonged adjustment difficulties. Clearly, the
governments of the countries themselves bear pri-
mary responsibility for their policies.
2. We used a combination of methodological ap-
proaches in the evaluation, including empirical and
econometric analyses of the broader group of pro-
longed users; three main country case studies (of
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Senegal); two more
limited case studies of “graduators” from prolonged
use (Jamaica and Morocco); interviews with a wide
range of stakeholders in the countries studied and
with IMF staff; and a series of questionnaires to pro-
longed users’ authorities, official and private credi-
tors, and IMF mission chiefs.
3. We find that the increase in prolonged use is
p