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Air France Flight 8969 Air France Flight 8969 Hijacking summary Date 24 December 1994 Type Hijacking Site Houari Boumedienne Airport, Algiers, Algeria Marseille Provençe Airport, Marseille, France Passengers 220 (excluding the 4 hijackers) Crew 12 Injuries 13 passengers, 3 members of the crew, 9 members of the GIGN Fatalities 7 (including the 4 hijackers) Survivors 229 Aircraft type Airbus A300B2-1C (c/n 104) Operator Air France Tail number F-GBEC Flight origin Houari Boumedienne Airport Destination Charles De Gaulle International Airport Air France Flight 8969 was an Air France flight that was hijacked on 24 December 1994 by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) at Al- giers, where they killed three passengers. When the aircraft reached Marseilles, the GIGN, an intervention group of the French Gendarmerie, stormed the plane and killed all four hijackers. The GIA’s plan appeared to foreshadow the 11 September attacks.[1] Thomas Sancton of TIME magazine described the event as "one of the most successful anti- terrorist operations in history."[2] The flight At the time of the hijacking, Algeria was in a state of civil war. Aircraft going to Algiers faced the possibility of missile attacks. As a result Air France’s flights to Algiers had crews entirely made of people who volun- teered for the route. Air France had asked government officials if it absolutely had to continue flying to Algeria; as of the time of the hijacking there had been no replies. Bernard Dhellemme was the captain of the flight.[3] Jean-Paul Borderie was the copilot, and Alain Bossuat was the navigator.[2] The Airbus A300B2-1C, tail number F-GBEC, went on its first flight on 28 February 1980.[4] Hijacking 24 December On 24 December 1994, at Houari Boumedi- enne Airport, Algiers, Algeria, four armed men dressed as Algerian presidential police boarded Air France Flight 8969 bound to de- part for Charles De Gaulle Airport, Paris at 11:15 A.M.[3] The men had blue uniforms with Air Algérie logos. Their presence origin- ally did not cause alarm.[2] They began in- specting the passengers’ passports. Claude Burgniard, a flight attendant, recalled noti- cing that the "police" were armed; she con- sidered this as unusual as the Algerian police were not usually armed while performing checks. The Algerian military felt suspicion when it noticed that the Air France flight had what appeared to be an unauthorized delay, so members began surrounding the aircraft. Zahida Kakachi, a passenger, recalled seeing a group of Algerian special forces, known as "ninjas," outside the aircraft. Kakachi re- called hearing one of the "police" say "tabout," a word for "infidel," upon seeing the "ninjas" gathering outside of the A300; there- fore she discovered that they were terrorists. The four men revealed that they were not po- lice.[3] An Algerian mechanic recalled that he knew that the men where militants when one yelled "Allah is Great!"[2] Abdul Abdullah Yahia and the other three members of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA) brandished firearms and explosives and demanded co- operation from the 220 passengers and 12 flight crew.[3] The hijackers had Kalashnikov assault rifles, Uzi pistols, homemade hand grenades, and two 10-stick dynamite packs. At one point in the flight the men placed one pack of dynamite in the cockpit and one pack From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 1 under a seat in the middle of the aircraft. The men linked them with detonator wire.[2] The men hijacked the aircraft since, as a part of the national airline Air France, it was a sym- bol of France. The men took the uniforms of the cabin crew to confuse snipers.[3] Burignard recalled that the hijackers did not like seeing a lack of adherence to their Islamic beliefs; According to Burignard the hijackers objected to men and women sitting together and sharing the same toilets and women having uncovered heads. Once they took control of the aircraft the hijackers forced women with uncovered heads, includ- ing the cabin crew members, to cover their heads.[2][3] Women who did not have veils used aircraft blankets to cover their heads.[2] An elderly Algerian man told the TF1 net- work that the hijackers "had a kind of art in their terror. Twenty minutes of relaxation and 20 minutes of torture. [sic] You never knew what was next."[2] The men stated over the aircraft’s cockpit radio: We are the Soldiers of Mercy. Allah has selected us as his soldiers. We are here to wage war in his name. —GIA, Peter Taylor[1] Abderahmane Meziane-Cherif, the Minister of the Interior of Algeria, came to the airport control tower to begin negotiating with the hijackers. The hijackers, using the captain to speak for them, demanded the release of two Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) political party leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, who were in house arrest; the FIS was banned in Algeria in 1992. Cherif demanded that the hi- jackers begin releasing children and elderly if they wanted to talk to the Algerian govern- ment.[2] The media began arriving at the air- port to cover the crisis.[3] At 12 Noon Alain Juppe, Foreign Minister of France, organized a crisis team, and Charles Pasqua, Interior Minister of France, met his aides.[2] French Prime Minister Éd- ouard Balladur was recalled from his Christ- mas vacation in Chamonix, France, and other government officials were recalled from their vacations.[2] Balladur recalled spending his entire afternoon on the telephone, trying to determine what was happening and feeling confusion. According to Balladur the Algerian authorities wanted to crack down on the ter- rorists and that Balladur encountered difficulties discussing the events.[3] At one point the hijackers dropped the demand for the release of the party leaders.[2] Two hours after the hijacking began, the hijackers asked the captain to depart for Paris so the hijack- ers could hold a press conference there. The captain could not take off as the aircraft boarding stairs were still attached to the A300 and the Algerian authorities blocked the runway with parked vehicles. When the captain, forced by the hijackers, asked for the removal of the boarding stairs, the Algeri- an authorities, determined not to give in to any of the hijacker demands, refused. The hi- jackers announced that they would detonate the aircraft unless the Algerian authorities gave in to the demands.[3] During the passport check the hijackers had discovered than an Algerian police of- ficer was a passenger on the flight. To get the Algerian government to cave in, the hi- jackers came to the police officer and asked him to follow them. Kakachi, recalled that the police officer, two rows behind her, was hes- itant to follow the hijackers as he did not know what was going to happen.[3] Several passengers recalled him pleading "Don’t kill me, I have a wife and child!"[2] The hijackers shot the police officer in the head. The pilots and most of the passengers initially did not know that the Algerian police officer died. Dhellemme recalled that his first contact with the passenger cabin during the hijack- ing was when a flight attendant, allowed into the cockpit, asked the pilots if they needed anything. According to Dhellemme he asked for a glass of water from the attendant as the pilots’ throats were parched and the pilots had difficulty swallowing. The attendant then whispered to the captain that the hijackers had already killed a passenger.[3] The Algerian authorities refused. Burgniard recalled realizing, with the other occupants, that "things were going wrong" when the hijackers came to collect another passenger.[3] The hijackers selected 48-year old Bui Giang To, a commercial attaché at the Embassy of Vietnam in Algeria.[2] Burignard described To as "the real foreigner on this plane." She recalled that To was not intimid- ated by the hijackers and believes that this attitude upset the hijackers. The diplomat be- lieved that he was going to be released. In- stead he was shot. Dhellemme recalled that when the flight attendant appeared with a bottle of water and glasses she whispered to From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 2 him that two passengers, not one, have died.[3] The French government wanted to bring military personnel into Algeria to safely re- solve the hijacking, but the Algerian govern- ment did not want foreign military to land on Algerian soil to resolve an Algerian political crisis. Balladur said that he asked the Algeri- an government "extremely forcefully and ur- gently" to let the aircraft take off. He felt that the French government had the responsibility to solve the problem as the aircraft belonged to Air France, a French airline, and that a number of the passengers were French.[3] Seven hours into the hijacking the cabin was tensely calm; at that point few of the re- maining passengers knew that two passen- gers died. The aircraft was surrounded by spotlights as it was nighttime. The pilots tried to defuse the situation by talking to the hijackers and trying to gain their trust. Dhel- lemme explained that the beginning of a hi- jacking is violent, so the role of the pilot is to keep the participants calm, "buy time," show the hijackers who the crew are as people, and find details about the hijackers; then the pilot is to try to gain the trust of the hijack- ers.[3] During the night the French military gave authorization to send its forces to Majorca, Spain; this was as close to Algeria as possible without being accused of interfering in the situation.[3] At 8 PM the Groupe d’Interven- tion de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) op- eratives boarded an Airbus A300 aircraft sim- ilar to F-GBEC, the aircraft on Flight 8969, at a military base in France.[2] On the way to Majorca the operatives familiarized them- selves with the A300 and prepared for storm- ing the aircraft.[3] After the aircraft arrived at Palma de Mallorca Airport, the Algerian government insisted that French forces were not welcome in Algeria.[2] 25 December The pilot toured the cabin at about 2 A.M. Dhellemme said that the cabin was "calm" during that time.[3] In Christmas Morning French Prime Minister Balladur flew to Par- is.[2] By Christmas morning new information ar- rived via a mole in the Armed Islamic Group: We received this information dir- ectly from members of the Algerian secret service. And this information was very worrying. The terrorists’ true aim was to crash the plane in Paris. —Charles Pasqua, translation from the French Interior minister’s words[1] [1] The information arrived at the Consulate General of France in Oran, Algeria.[2] Police confirmed this plan after a raid on a safe house.[1] On Christmas day the hijackers released some passengers; they were mostly women with young children and people with severe medical conditions. Over 170 people re- mained on board. The hijackers offered to re- lease the remaining Algerian passengers, therefore the French passengers would be the ones still on board. The Algerians refused to leave the aircraft. Captain Dhellemme be- lieves that one passenger said that he re- fused to leave, because if he did the crew would be killed. Dhellemme believes that the passenger’s motives were sincere.[3] By the end of Saturday the hijackers freed a total of 63 passengers.[2] The Algerian police used night vision devices to identify the lead hijacker, Yahia. [2] The government sent his mother to plead for her son to release the passengers. The government hoped that her pleas would cause Yahia to give in.[2] The tactic failed. Zahida Kakachi, passenger, said that Yahia became very angry about the fact that his mother was being used to get him to stop. The hijackers began to target the French- men; two staff members of the Embassy of France in Algeria, a secretary and a chef, were on board.[3] The hijackers took used the chef, Yannick Beugnet, by having him plead in the microphone. The hijackers demanded that if the Algerian government did not let the A300 take off before 9:30 P.M., the hi- jackers would kill one passenger every 30 minutes. The French diplomat said that the Algerians assured them that the hijackers were bluffing while the French demanded that the aircraft be allowed to take off. When the deadline passed, the hijackers had the chef killed.[2] The door open warning light in the cockpit indicated to the pilots that anoth- er passenger died. The airline knew that the embassy member was executed since it listened to the conversations between the air- craft and the control tower. Philippe From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 3 Legorjus, a former Air France security ad- visor, said in an interview that the airline em- ployees "lived through" the event "with great emotion."[3] The French government became informed about the events. French Prime Minister Éd- ouard Balladur said over the telephone to Prime Minister of Algeria Mokdad Sifi that the French government would hold the Al- gerian government responsible for the out- come if it does not allow the French govern- ment to become involved in the crisis.[2][3] Several French publications stated that the Algerian government wanted to allow the plane to depart if France resumed arms ship- ments to Algeria. Before midnight Balladur told President of Algeria Lamine Zeroual that France was ready to receive the Air France flight.[2] As a result of Balladur’s demands, 39 hours after the start of the hijacking, the Zeroual allowed the aircraft to leave Algiers. Claude Burgniard, a flight attendant, recalled that the occupants on board were relieved that the aircraft was departing and they be- lieved the crisis was over. Since the auxiliary power unit, which uses four tonnes of fuel per day, ran throughout the crisis. As a result the aircraft did not have sufficient fuel to reach Paris. Therefore the aircraft was scheduled to arrive at Marseille Provençe Airport in Marseilles and refuel there. Before takeoff, Captain Dhellemme confronted a hi- jacker and asked him if the aircraft was go- ing to be detonated between Algiers and Marseille. The hijacker insisted that the air- craft would not be detonated. Dhellemme be- lieved the hijacker and prepared for takeoff. In an interview Dhellemme said that he did not know if the hijackers would have given him the same answer if he was in the stage between Marseille and Paris. Burignard re- called that the hijackers, in the cockpit, seemed excited and "like kids."[3] 26 December The aircraft approached Marseille during the morning of 26 December. The hijackers did not know that Major Denis Favier’s GIGN squad was already in Marseille,[3] having ar- rived to a from Majorca to a military base near Marseille, and planned to storm the air- craft while it was in Marseille. The GIGN squad practiced entering the A300 before Flight 8969 arrived in Marseille[2] Favier ex- plained in an interview that the enemy was arriving in friendly territory, and the power difference would be a key element in the struggle.[3] The Flight 8969 aircraft landed at 3:33 A.M.[2] Flight attendant Claude Burgniard said that the hijackers felt that the landing in Marseille was a "magic moment" as they had arrived in France. Burignard recalled that the airport was dark and that she only saw the lights of the A300 and a car that the A300 followed. The French authorities deliberately lead the aircraft away from the terminal and into a remote corner of the airport. By 26 December the French government had re- ceived information stating that the hijackers had planned to attack Paris. Favier planned to appear conciliatory and prolong the nego- tiations as long as possible. He believed that the hijackers were tired, so he planned to wear them down.[3] Alain Gehin, the Chief of Police of Marseilles, spoke to the group of hi- jackers in the control tower. Gehin imple- mented Favier’s strategy.[2] While using Dhellemme to speak for them,[2] the hijackers asked for 27 tonnes of fuel; the aircraft needed 9-10 tonnes to fly to Paris from Marseille. The request indicated to the French authorities that the aircraft was going to be used as a firebomb or to fly the aircraft to an Islamic country sympathetic to the hijackers’ cause, such as Iran, Sudan, or Yemen. Hours later the authorities re- ceived word of the firebomb plots. Passen- gers who were released in Algiers stated that the A300 had been rigged with explosives. Demolition experts determined that the plane was likely rigged in a way that would cause it to explode.[2] Charles Pasqua said in an inter- view that the French government had de- cided that the aircraft was not going to leave Marseille, regardless of the consequences.[3] Around 8:00 A.M. the hijackers demanded that the forces let the aircraft take off by 9:40 A.M. The negotiators delayed the ulti- matum by giving the aircraft additional food and water, emptying the toilet tanks, and providing vacuum cleaners. The GIGN oper- atives servicing the aircraft were disguised as regular airport personnel. They discovered the aircraft doors were not blocked or booby trapped.[2] The men planted eavesdropping devices and "Cannon" microphones on the A300’s fuselage and windows.[2][3] Favier’s group asked the hijackers if they would rather do a press conference in Marseille in- stead of Paris, since all of the major press is From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 4 in Marseille instead of Paris. The hijackers agree to hold a press conference on the A300. The negotiators requested that the front of the aircraft would be cleared for the press conference. In fact this was to create an area for the GIGN during the storming of the aircraft. Favier explained in an interview that the press conference was an important tactic as it allowed the passengers to be moved to the rear of the aircraft. The hijack- ers did not realize that the doors of the A300 could be opened from the outside.[3] 12 hours after the A300 arrived at Mar- seille, the GIGN knew how many hijackers were on board and their location on the air- craft with the help of eavesdropping devices, infared vision equipment, and "cannon" mi- crophones.[2][3] It intended to wait until sun- down to take advantage of the darkness. The occupants of the aircraft were unaware of the GIGN’s true motives, and the militants were confused about why the press had not yet ar- rived. Yahia, frustrated by the absence of the press, ordered the pilot to move the aircraft. Dellemme parked the aircraft at the foot of the airport control tower and in close proxim- ity to the terminal and other aircraft. The hi- jackers demanded immediate press confer- ence. If the hijackers detonated the aircraft at that point, many casualties would result.[3] This was a tactical disadvantage for the GIGN; the positions were based on the air- craft being parked where the French author- ities ordered the placement of the A300. When the aircraft moved the GIGN had to quickly reorganize its forces. Favier placed snipers on the roof so they would have a view of the cockpit. He organized a cavalry charge of three passenger boarding stairs and thirty men to take over the aircraft. Favier planned to have two teams, each with 11 people, open the rear left and rear doors of the A300. A third team of 8 would open the rear right door. The forces planned to isolate the cock- pit, with Yahia, from the rest of the air- craft.[3] By 5 P.M. the authorities had not de- livered any amount of fuel to the A300. Yahia entered the cabin to choose a fourth person to kill. He selected the youngest member of the Air France crew, who had told the hijack- ers that he was an atheist. The episode "The Killing Machine" of the Mayday (Air Crash In- vestigations, Air Emergency) programme states that Yahia felt reluctant to kill a fourth passenger at that point. Burignard stated in an interview that she did not know whether Yahia had decided not to execute the crew member; she knew that he kept delaying the execution. Instead the hijackers opened the door and fired around the aircraft. Zahida Kakachi, a passenger, recalled that the hi- jackers began reciting verses from the Qur’an on the public address system. The verses were prayers for the dead. According to Kakachi the passengers were silent and began to feel panicked. The hijackers knew the negotiators were in the control tower, so through the side window of the cockpit they began to fire automatic machine gun bullets towards the control tower. Philippe Legorjus, who at the time was the airline’s security ad- visor, recalled that glass shattered all around the negotiators. Captain Dhellemme said that throughout the time in Marseilles there had been tension, but "nothing like what seemed to be about to happen." French Prime Minis- ter Édouard Balladur allowed Favier to take whatever actions he felt were necessary; after the hijackers fired at the control tower, Favier decided to begin the raid.[3] Raid When the hijackers noticed airstairs moving towards them, they realized that an assault was about to take place. The first airstair reached the front right door, but it was posi- tioned a little bit higher than the door, so there was a delay before the forces reposi- tioned the airstair and entered the aircraft. The hijackers returned fire, attacking the GIGN forces. Then the two other units entered the rear of the aircraft. The parti- cipants fired hundreds of bullets.[3] The hi- jackers fired through the skin of the air- craft.[2] Grenades erupted and smoke went through the cabin.[3] The GIGN’s concussion grenades temporarily blinded and deafened occupants, allowing the GIGN to storm the aircraft. Of the hijackers’ homemade gren- ades, one detonated, causing little damage.[2] The snipers on the tower could not get a clear shot into the aircraft as the copilot, Jean-Paul Borderie, blocked the view of the snipers. Through a window, Borderie jumped out of the cockpit and staggered away. With the view unobstructed, the snipers began fir- ing into the cockpit, while the GIGN evacu- ated passengers in the rear of the aircraft.[3] Flight attendant Claude Burgniard de- scribed the firefight as "the apocalypse." Christophe Morin, a flight attendant, recalled From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 5 that the GIGN ordered passengers and crew to get down as low as possible with their hands over their heads, hide, and then to not move. Morin described the situation as "viol- ent." He recalled putting his overcoat over his head so he would not see the tracer bul- lets and other occurrences during the raid. Morin said that he tried to help a female pas- senger next to him escape, but she was too fat and Morin was unable to move her, so the two held hands. Pilot Bernard Dhellemme said that he was in "a rather bad spot," so he crouched and made himself "as small as pos- sible." His mind made him believe that his body could stop bullets.[3] A few minutes after the beginning of the assault, most of the passengers had escaped. At that point three of the four hijackers were fatally injured. Dhellemme recalled that the cockpit only had himself, the flight engineer, and one hijacker. Dhellemme said that the hi- jacker could have killed him and his col- leagues out of spite, but instead did not. In an interview Denis Favier explained that there likely was a mutual recognition and "re- spect" between the hijackers and the host- ages. He believes the bonds between the hi- jackers and hostages helped save lives of pas- sengers and crew in the conflict.[3] News footage showed a GIGN man blown out of the aircraft by gunfire. The remaining hijacker kept the GIGN at bay for 20 minutes. As his ammunition was depleted, he died from a gunshot wound. The operatives were not sure which men were the hijackers and how many were still alive, so the forces sus- pected all of the men inside.[3] The flight en- gineer, Alain Bossuat, radioed the tower stat- ing that the hijackers were dead and that there were no more left.[2] Dhellemme said that when the forces entered the aircraft, they ordered him to put his hands on his head. Dhellemme said that, after the hijack- ing ordeal had run its course, he refused to leave with his hands on his head and be "pun- ished like a child." Burgniard said that when she saw Bossuat handcuffed, the cabin crew told the forces to let him go as the individual was the flight engineer.[3] At 5:35 PM Favier radioed to the tower that the incident was over; the incident unfolded in 54 hours.[2] All of the hijackers died. The 173 remain- ing passengers and crew survived the 20-minute gun battle.[3] Of the 161 remain- ing passengers, 13 received minor injur- ies.[2][3] 9 of the 30 GIGN operatives received injuries; of them one received serious wounds.[3] 3 crew members received injur- ies.[2] Dhellemme received bullets in his right elbow and thigh.[3] Bossuat received minor injuries; the dead bodies of two hijackers had shielded Dhelhemme and Bossuat from gun- fire. Borderie, the most seriously injured, fractured his elbow and thigh from the 16-- foot drop.[2] Favier said that he determined that the operation was a success since none of the GIGN received fatal injuries. French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur said that the events unfolded "exceptionally well."[3] Aftermath As a result of the damage to the aircraft, the A300 was written off.[4] Several hours after the incident ended, the Armed Islamic Group, which had claimed responsibility for the event, killed four Roman Catholic priests in retaliation in Tizi-Ouzou, Algeria. Three of the priests were French, while one was Bel- gian.[2] The crew of the A300 and the GIGN forces received high national honors. Charles Pasqua, then the Minister of the Interior, said that throughout the ordeal the crew "rose to the occasion."[3] Bernard Dellemme returned to flying and worked for Air France for nine years before retiring. Flight attendant Claude Burgniard said that she "kept seeing the faces" of the three passengers who had been executed; when she received her medal she realized that she had helped save 173 people; this allowed her to mourn and get over the incident. Burgniard said that she does not wear the medal, but that she felt like she de- served it. Burgniard, who also received a message of thanks from the airline, never again worked for Air France. Flight attendant Christophe Moran stopped working for Air France and began to work for a charitable or- ganization.[3] A former militant group leader admitted that the men had planned to detonate the air- craft over the Eiffel Tower. The episode "The Killing Machine" of the television document- ary series Mayday said that hundreds of people may have died if that scenario oc- curred. The militant groups never again at- tempted this plot. Pasqua said that if the mil- itants crashed an aircraft on the Eiffel Tower or the Élysées Palace they would have com- mitted what they would believe to be "an ex- traordinary feat."[3] From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 6 The episode stated that the world public largely forgot about Flight 8969 until the 11 September attacks occurred in 2001. Burgniard said that the 11 September attack footage caused the memories of Flight 8969 to come back to her. She thought that "we had apprentice terrorists, boys who didn’t understand very well what they were doing. But, voilà, they taught everyone a lesson."[3] Morin and passenger Zahida Kakachi co- authored the book Le vol Alger-Marseille : Journal d’otages.[5] Air France discontinued the number "Flight 8969" after the hijacking; flights between Algiers and Paris are now Flight 3543 or Flight 7667. Passengers and crew Most of the passengers were Algerians; 138 of the passengers were Algerian citizens. A significant number of the passengers were French people leaving Algeria. Captain Bern- ard Dhellemme said that the hijackers, who had extensively planned the operation, did not anticipate that most of the passengers would be Algerians.[3] The hijackers recited Qur’an verses tried to reassure the Algerian passengers. Witness accounts said that they "terrorized" non-Algerians.[2] The hijackers 25-year old Abdul Abdullah Yahia, also known as "The Emir," was a petty thief and green- grocer from the Bab El Oued neighborhood of Algiers. The negotiators said that Yahia spoke "approximate" French language and al- ways ended his sentences in "Insha’Allah" ("God willing").[2] Several passengers said they had no beards and closely-cropped hair. A woman said that the men "were polite and, correct" and that they "had the determined air of cold-blooded killers." Another passen- ger said the hijackers "seemed excited, very euphoric" and that they told the occupants that they would teach the French and the world a lesson and show what they were cap- able of doing.[2] As the hijacking progressed the passen- gers recognized the personalities of the hi- jackers. Claude Burgniard, a flight attendant, recalled that the crew and passengers gave nicknames to the hijackers "to make things simpler." Yahia. the leader, had given his name, so the passengers called him by that name. According to Burignard, Lotfi had a "peculiar" character, "was always on a knife edge," and "the most fanatic" and "the most fundamentalist" of the hijackers. Therefore he received the nickname "Madman" from the passengers. According to Burignard, Lotfi was the hijacker who insisted that the pas- sengers follow Islamic law. Lotfi found wo- men having their heads uncovered "intoler- able," making him very angry. One hijacker did not give his name to the passengers, so they called him "Bill." Burignard stated that Bill was "a little bit simple" and "more of a goatherd than a terrorist." She said his role as a hijacker was "an error in casting." Burignard remembered that the occupants wondered why Bill was there and that they saw Bill appearing as if he wondered why he was there. The hijacker nicknamed "The Killer" shot the hostages who the hijackers had targeted.[3] Dramatization The incident was featured in the episode Hi- jacked from the Mayday television series (also known as Air Emergency or Air Crash Investigation) as well as in Zero Hour televi- sion series episode Shoot-Out in Marseilles. Bernard Dhellemme, the captain of Flight 8969, agreed to make his first ever television interview for Mayday as long as he appeared under silhouette; he requested this as he felt the events were still threatening to him. Col- onel Denis Favier, then a major who was the head of the GIGN counter-terrorist unit as- signed to the flight, also requested to keep his face obscured as members of the public believed that the militants offered a reward for an assassination of Favier.[3] A one-hour documentary, episode 3 of the UK BBC2 television series "The Age of Ter- ror" transmitted at 21:00 BST on 29 April 2008, covered this hijacking in depth, and in- cluded interviews with passenger, crew, GIGN commando, and government official eyewitnesses, including the co-pilot who jumped out of the cockpit window.[6] It was stated explicitly that a mole with the GIA ter- rorists informed the French, but not Algerian, authorities that the intention was to use the aircraft as a missile to attack Paris. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 7 Notes [1]^ Peter Taylor (2008-06-18). "The Paris Plot". Age of Terror. BBC World Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ documentaries/2008/05/ 080617_age_of_terror_three.shtml. Retrieved on 2009-02-14. "The plan foreshadows Osama bin Ladin’s holy war on the West. Seven years before 9/11 the hijackers were planning to fly to Paris and crash the plane with over 200 passengers on board into the heart of the city." [2]^ Sancton, Thomas. "Anatomy of a Hijack." TIME. Sunday 24 June 2001. Retrieved on 3 May 2009. [3]^ "The Killing Machine." Mayday [documentary TV series]. [4]^ "Hijacking description 26 Dec 1994." Aviation Safety Network. Retrieved on 3 May 2009. [5] "Le vol Alger-Marseille : Journal d’otages." Amazon.com. Retrieved on 3 May 2009. [6] Peter Taylor (2008-03-25). "Age of Terror / Episode 3: The Paris Plot". BBC Two. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ age_of_terror/7306318.stm. Retrieved on 2009-02-14. "broadcast on BBC Two at 9pm on 29 April" See also • List of accidents and incidents on commercial airliners • Singapore Airlines Flight 117, similar hijacking which resulted in a storming of the aircraft. External links • Meeting Thierry P - Interview with a former GIGN member who was injured during the raid (in French) • Video of the raid with commentary • Video of the raid - Video of the GIGN’s assault on the plane (INA archives). • Video of the raid - no soundtrack • Pre-hijack photos taken from Airliners.net • Peter Taylor (2008-06-18). "The Paris Plot". Age of Terror. BBC World Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ documentaries/2008/05/ 080617_age_of_terror_three.shtml. Retrieved on 2009-02-14. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_8969" Categories: 1994 in France, Airliner hijackings, Aviation accidents and incidents in 1994, Avi- ation accidents and incidents in Algeria, Air France flights, Islamist terrorism in France, Acci- dents and incidents involving the Airbus A300, Terrorist incidents in 1994 This page was last modified on 7 May 2009, at 16:32 (UTC). All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. (See Copyrights for details.) Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a U.S. registered 501(c)(3) tax- deductible nonprofit charity. Privacy policy About Wikipedia Disclaimers From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Air France Flight 8969 8
